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At present date, 47 States have committed to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The Convention aims to give all humans some basic human rights. Children are 
however not explicitly mentioned. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the 
sovereign authority in interpreting the ECHR. Even though children are not explicitly 
mentioned in the ECHR, the ECtHR rule in cases involving children.  
This study aims to see how the ECtHR adhere to children’s human rights in cases involving 
both adults and children. More specifically, care order cases. By looking at the judicial 
precedent set by the ECtHR and combining statistical analysis with discourse analysis, this 
study aims to answer how the ECtHR balance the children’s and parents’ rights when ruling in 
care order cases. 
In order to get a better understanding of the main research question, this study will also look at 
who decides what is in the child’s best interest, to what extent children are granted rights under 
the ECHR, the ECtHR’s relation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and how 
the ECtHR assess cases stemming from 47 different judicial systems. 
The study revealed that both, biological parents and children’s rights, in care order cases where 
to a certain extent insignificant. It was the child’s interests that were the weighty argument. The 
finding showed that the ECtHR has in latter years turned towards a more child-centric approach. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction1 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the sovereign authority in interpreting the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court is composed of the 47 member 
States of the Council of Europe, each with its own representative (judge). All rulings from the 
ECtHR are final. Which means, if the Court rule against you, you cannot appeal.  
The ECHR grant everyone some basic human rights, such as right to life (art.2), right to a fair 
trial (art.6) and right to respect for private and family life (art.8). However, the ECHR does not 
distinct between children and adults. Nor does the ECHR distinct between newly-born and 
children nearing adulthood. Seemingly, the rights given by the Convention are primarily to 
protect adults. Nevertheless, the ECtHR rule in cases involving both parents and adults.  
If a child’s health or development is threatened, the State may intervene and remove the child 
from its home. This is an interference of the highest order and arguably one of the most intrusive 
interventions a State can do in a person’s life. Article 8 of the ECHR grants everyone right to 
respect for private and family life. If a care order is issued and thus a child removed from its 
parents, that could potentially be a breach on art.8 of the Convention. 
Whether to issue a care order is up to the States discretion. To determine whether the impugned 
measure was a violation against the ECHR is up to the ECtHRs discretion. In their decision 
making, the judges of the ECtHR exercise strong discretion. 
With 47 different domestic judicial systems and 47 judges, one from each member state, how 
can the ECtHR secure that everyone appearing before the Court is treated fairly? If the 
children’s rights are contradictory to the parents’ rights, which rights are most weighty? How 
is care orders justified and reasoned? 
This train of thought led me to my research question, which constitute the base for my upcoming 
research: 
How does the European Court of Human Rights balance the children’s and parents’ rights 
when ruling in care order cases? 
                                                
1 Parts of Chapter 1 – Introduction is a rewrite of a paper written by me as part of a preparatory paper to my 
master thesis. The paper was submitted 25.05.2018 to the University of Bergen as part of a compulsory 




To answer the research question, I intend to perform an argumentation analysis of all care order 
cases that have appeared before the ECtHR, from 1959 – 2016, in total 44 judgements. 
1.1 In-depth presentation of research question 
According to Article 1 of the ECHR (1950), everyone is granted the rights presented in the 
Convention. Article 14, prohibition against discrimination, states that any and all discrimination 
is a violation against the Convention (ECHR, 1950, art.14). Both of these facts are seemingly 
ignored regarding children. The ECHR does not mention children. Each case presented before 
the ECtHR, involving a minor, are looked upon separately. Whether a child is entitled to its 
rights, is up to the Courts discretion (Kilkelly, 1999, p.18). When it comes to adults or, for all 
purposes in this thesis, parents, may, indisputably, enjoy the rights granted to them by the 
ECHR. 
Article 8 of the ECHR (1950) states that everyone is entitled to “…respect for private and family 
life”. There shall be no interference from the authorities “…except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” (ECHR, 1950, art.8(2)). In my 
research, I am looking at care order cases that have appeared before the ECtHR. In their 
deliberations, the ECtHR repeatedly ask whether the interference from authorities, and thus the 
care order, was “necessary in a democratic society” (See i.a. Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, 
para.67, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.65, and Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.133). When 
reading the care order case judgements from the ECtHR some arguments, used to justify the 
care order, recurs repeatedly. The most profound argument that reoccur, is that the intervention 
was in the child’s best interest. The phrase “in the child’s best interests” is used by all parties 
in a case to justify their views and opinions surrounding the necessity of taking a child into 
public care. The child’s best interests is an ambiguous principle (Skivenes, 2010, p.1, Skivenes 
and Søvig, 2016, p.3). Mnookin and Szwed are two legal scholars that have researched 
extensively on the topic of the child’s best interests. They state: “the flaw is that what is best 
for any child or even children in general is often indeterminate and speculative and requires a 
highly individualized choice between alternatives.” (Mnookin and Szwed in Skivenes and 
Søvig, 2016, p.3-4). In other words, it is difficult to generalize what is in the child’s best interest. 
The difficulty in assessing what is in the child’s best interests leaves great room for the ECtHR 
to exercise discretion in its assessments. 
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The ECHR is not the only human rights convention in existence. Nor is it the most ratified. The 
most ratified human rights convention in history is the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) (Unicef, 2005). The focus of the CRC is to give children protection, provision and 
participation rights. In the preamble, the CRC state that children are in need of special 
safeguards and care due to physical and mental immaturity (CRC, 1990, preamble). In other 
words, according to the CRC, children need someone to protect them and make decisions on 
their behalf, in their best interest. 
The ECtHR was founded to ensure that the Contracting States complied with the ECHR and 
had no obligation to the CRC. As is, there is no possible way the CRC can secure that the 
Contracting States oblige to the convention. However, the CRC is mentioned in the judgements 
by the ECtHR. In the work leading up to my master thesis I conducted an interview with Dean 
of law school at the University of Bergen, Karl Harald Søvig, who has previously researched 
on the relationship between the CRC and ECtHR. Søvig raised the question of whether the CRC 
has real impact on the decisions made by the ECtHR or if the mention of the CRC merely is a 
“courtesy-visit” in order to emphasize and justify the decision made by the Court. 
When reading about care orders, the ECtHR, the ECHR and the CRC I was baffled. There is no 
clear definition as to how the ECtHR should assess care order cases. Neither are there any 
definition as to what would constitute an interference to be “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Seemingly, it is up to the ECtHRs discretion to assess each case individually. 
Looking at previous research, there is little social science research to be found about children’s, 
and parents, rights in the ECtHR. Searches in the University of Bergen’s database, Oria, and in 
google scholar came out pretty much empty. There are, however, some legal-studies.2 As I am 
conducting my research in the field of social science, I will limit myself from presenting a 
review of the legal literature. 
One of the social science studies I did find was an article written by Marit Skivenes and Karl 
Harald Søvig (2016). The article looks at how the judges of the ECtHR exercise judicial 
discretion in cases involving art.33 of the CRC and art.84 of the ECHR.   
                                                
2 E.g. Choudhry, Shazia & Fenwick, Helen (2005) Taking the Rights of Parents and Children Seriously: 
Confronting the Welfare Principle under the Human Rights Act. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 25 (3), p. 453-
492. 
3 Child’s best interests.  
4 Right to respect for private and family life. 
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When ruling, the ECtHR exercise discretion. Skivenes and Søvig (2016, p.5) argue that the 
Court have authority to exercise strong discretion and that “…there are no limits to their 
authority on particular issues…”. Even though the judges have the authority to develop norms 
and first-order rules, they can still “…be criticised for making a good or bad decision based on 
the strength of the reasoning of their decision (Skivenes and Søvig, 2016, p.5). 
Skivenes and Søvigs findings is supported by an article in the Strasbourg Observer (2018). The 
article presented what had been voted the best and worst judgements of 2017 (Strasbourg 
Observers, 2018). What was voted the worst judgement, was not actually a judgement. It was 
the dissenting opinion of judge Dedov in the case of Bayev and others v. Russia (2017) The 
case was brought before the ECtHR stating that Russia’s LGBT-politic were discriminating the 
LGBT-community. In the judgement judge Dedov voted against the rest of the Commission, 
stating that the Russian government had done what needed to be done to protect public moral 
and children (Bayev and others v. Russia, 2017). The Strasbourg Observers (2018) called judge 
Dedovs dissenting opinion for “homophobic” and “shocking”. Judge Dedovs dissenting opinion 
highlights the extent of which the judges may exercise discretion in their decisions. It is 
inevitable that the judges are influenced by the culture of the State of which they originate 
(Hofstede, 1980). In principle, all shall be treated equally and are granted the same rights by 
the ECHR. With 47 judges, each representing a Contracting State and each with the opportunity 
to exercise strong discretion, how do the ECtHR secure the rule of law to everyone? 
Care order cases have at least three parties, the child, the parents and the authorities, all with 
rights that needs to be balanced against each other. According to the CRC, the child is in a 
position where all decision made on its behalf shall be in its best interests. This includes court- 
decisions (CRC, 1990, art.3). Article 35 of the ECHR (1950) state that “The Court [ECtHR] 
may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted…”. Which 
entails that if parents bring a case before the ECtHR, the domestic courts have ruled against 
them. However, the ECtHR does not assess the rulings made by the domestic courts, it assesses 
whether there has been a breach on the parents’ human rights.  
As aforesaid, the child’s best interest is frequently used as an argument in the cases concerning 
children (Skivenes, 2010, Skivenes and Søvig, 2016) and the CRC are the most ratified human 
rights convention in history. Looking at cases concerning children, Skivenes and Søvig (2016) 
examined the relationship between the CRC and ECtHR, and found that “…the CRC is not a 
prominent source for the ECtHR and that the child, to a varying degree, is represented in the 
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case material.”. The principle of the “child’s best interest” is evident in the cases, but to varying 
degrees. Furthermore, Skivenes and Søvig (2016, p.14) found that “The discretionary power 
and practice of the ECtHR are somewhat bound by the national states legislation…”. However, 
the ECtHR are still the sovereign authority in interpreting the ECHR. To which extent the Court 
wish to exercise its powers is up to the Courts discretion.  
My main area of research focus is how the ECtHR balance biological parents’ and children’s 
rights in care order cases. In order to examine my main research question, the child’s best 
interests, children’s rights, the CRC and the ECtHRs assessments, all play a role. I therefore 
created four supportive questions, that will help to get a deeper understanding of my field of 
research and the ECtHRs assessments. They will also help to illuminate all sides of my main 
research question. 
Firstly, there are no definition as to how the ECtHR should exercise its power. Each care order 
case is assessed separately. In the end, the question of whether there has been a breach on the 
ECHR is up to the ECtHR discretion to decide. With 47 judges, each representing a Contracting 
State, all with different judicial schooling and cultural background, how does the ECtHR 
exercise its discretion? In other words, how does the ECtHR assess cases, and how does the 
ECtHR secure the rule of law to everyone, when dealing with different judicial systems?  
Secondly, the child’s best interests are ever present in cases pertaining to children. Looking at 
how the ECtHR refers to the child’s best interests, who decides what is in the child’ s best 
interests? Is the decision up to the discretionary power of the Court, or is the decision based on, 
inter alia, statements from professionals? In the latter case, to what extent do professionals 
influence the Courts decisions? 
Thirdly, to what extent are children granted rights under the ECHR? The ECtHR rule in cases 
concerning children even though children are not specifically mentioned in the ECHR, which 
entails that children, at least, have some rights under the Convention. How are the children’s 
human rights adhered to by the Court? 
Lastly, I want to look at the relationship between the CRC and the ECtHR. More specifically, 
if the CRC plays a role in the ECtHRs judgements, and if so – to what extent? Does the CRC 
affect how the ECtHR assess care order cases? 
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1.2 Outline of the paper 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter1 is the introductory chapter, where I have 
presented my main research question and my supportive questions. In chapter 2, I will present 
the context in which I am researching. I will start by giving a short presentation of care orders, 
before presenting the ECtHR, the ECHR and the CRC. Chapter 3 is the framework which 
supports my theoretical approach. I will present theories surrounding children’s rights and 
interests, and paternalism, which will help to give a deeper understanding of my research 
questions. I will also present discretion which is the main focus, in my research. In chapter 4, I 
will present the argument theory that constitute the base of my analysis. In Chapter 5, I will 
first present my research methods and thereafter present how I gathered my data material. 
Chapters 6 and 7 are both analysis-chapters, where I present my findings. Lastly, chapter 8 is 
titled discussion and concluding remarks. I will start by discussing the findings presented in 
chapter 6 and then the findings in chapter 7, before giving my concluding remarks pertaining 
to my main research question. 
When reading the paper one should be aware of how I refer to judgements from the ECtHR. 
When I first present a new judgement, I will present the judgements name in its entirety in italic, 
i.a. Kutzner v. Germany (2002). When referring to judgments that previously have been 
presented, I will only use the applicants name, i.a. Kutzner. Looking at judgements with an 
anonymous applicant, such as B. v. the UK (1987), I will keep the country in the referrals to 
avoid any misunderstandings. 
Each judgement consists of several sections, hereafter called paragraphs and abbreviated para., 
which is each numbered by the ECtHR. All references to a specific paragraph of a judgement 
will be presented as, i.a., Kutzner (para.65) or B. v. the UK (para. 63). 
Chapter 2 - Context5 
This thesis revolves around care order cases in the ECtHR. I will start by giving a brief 
presentation of care orders, before presenting the ECtHR. In order to understand how the 
ECtHR assess cases, one must have an understanding of the inner workings of the Court. The 
care orders that have appeared before the ECtHR range from 1987 to 2016. In this timespan 
                                                
5 Parts of Chapter 2 - Context is a rewrite of a paper written by me as part of a preparatory paper to my master 
thesis. The paper was submitted 25.05.2018 to the University of Bergen as part of a compulsory assignment to 
pass the subject AORG323. 
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the ECtHR have gone thru major structural changes. In the following section, I will give a 
brief presentation of the ECtHR background, then present the changes in the Court that came 
with protocol 11 and 14 and lastly present the inner workings of the Court today. I will there 
thereafter give an in-depth presentation of the ECHR and the CRC. 
2.1 Care orders 
If parents are deemed unfit to care for their child, the social services remove the child from 
their home. The order to remove a child from their home is called a care order. The ECtHR 
have stated that a care order should only be issued as a last resort, and can only be justified if 
it is “in accordance with the law” or “necessary in a democratic society” (ECHR, 1950, art.8). 
If the child’s health, wellbeing or development are at risk, that would fulfill the necessity 
demand and a care order would thus be justified (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012). 
ECHR (1950, art.8) states that you have the “right to respect for private and family life.”. Any 
direct interference with your family life could be considered a violation of your human rights. 
However, the ECtHR states that the parents may never be entitled to have measures taken that 
potentially could harm a child’s health and development (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78, 
Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59). 
In short, when the domestic authorities are contemplating whether to intervene and issue a care 
order, they must balance the biological parents’ rights against the child’s interests. If the 
biological parents believe a care order to be a violation against their human rights, they can 
bring their case before the ECtHR. The ECtHR then assess whether the domestic authorities’ 
decision-making process leading up to the care order, were fair and afforded due respect to the 
parents’ rights under art.8 of the ECHR (A.D. and O.D. v. The UK, 2010, para.82). 
The assessments done by the ECtHR constitute the base of my research.  
2.2 European Court of Human Rights 
2.2.1 Background: 
To enforce the obligation from the ECHR three institutions were established: The Commission 
for Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Minister of the 
Council of Europe .6 If one of the Contracting States breached the ECHR, complaints were filed 
                                                




against them either by another Contracting State or by individual applications. Until Protocol 
No.117 came into force in 1998, the recognition of the right of individual application was 
optional (CoE, n.d., p.4333). 
All complaints were sent to the Commission and were subjected to a preliminary hearing. The 
Commission then decided whether a case was admissible. If the Commission found the case 
admissible, it was sent back to the parties to give them the opportunity to reach a friendly 
settlement. If the parties fail to come to an agreement, the Commission drew up a report with 
the merits of the case and sent it to the Committee of Ministers. When the case was sent to the 
Committee of Ministers, the parties had three months to bring their case before the ECtHR. It 
was only Contracting States that had the opportunity to bring their case before the Court. If the 
case was submitted by an individual or if the Contracting States did not bring the case before 
the Court, the Committee decided whether there had been a violation or not (CoE, n.d.). 
When the ECtHR was established, it was a part-time court. The Court started out with sessions 
every three years. With the ever-growing number of cases brought before Court, the sessions 
became more frequent. The need for a full-time Court was imminent. In 1998 Protocol No.11 
came in to force. With it, the Protocol brought big changes to the Court (CoE, n.d., Helland, 
2012, s.37). 
2.2.2 Changes in the European Court of Human Rights – Protocol No. 11 and No. 14 
Protocol No. 11 
When Protocol No. 11 came into force in 1998 it changed the entire structure of the ECtHR. 
One of the biggest changes was that the ECtHR went from being a part-time Court to a full-
time Court (ECHR, 1950, art.19).  
As part of the structural changes that came with Protocol No. 11, the Commission was 
abolished, and the ECtHR took over their duties. Art.32 (1) gives the Court jurisdiction in “… 
all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols…”. Art.32 (2) states that if there are any disputes whether the Court has jurisdiction 
or not, the Court decides, meaning that the Court has the jurisdiction to deal with any allegations 
from any of the High Contracting Parties8 against another High Contracting Party. States that 
                                                
7 See section 2.2.2 Changes in the European Court of Human Rights, Protocol No. 11, for further information. 
8 “High Contracting Parties is the representatives of states that have signed or ratified a treaty” Oxford Reference 
(n.d.) High Contracting Parties.  
9 
 
are not a high contracting parties may not bring cases before the Court, not even if the accused 
State is a party of the Convention (ECHR, 1950, art.33, Helland, 2012, s.37-38).  
Furthermore, individuals were now allowed to bring cases before court (ECHR, 1950, art.34). 
Art.34 explicitly states that the High Contracting Parties is not to obstruct the exercise of this 
right in any way. However, there are some limitations to individuals’ rights to bring a case 
before the ECtHR. These limitations are described in art.35 of the ECHR. The idea behind 
art.35 of the Convention is that human rights should be protected on a national level, meaning 
that the individual should exhaust all national remedies before bringing their case to the ECtHR. 
If the national court system fails to secure the applicants rights under the Convention, the 
ECtHR9 (ECHR, 1950, art.35, Helland, 2012, s.38-39). Any application submitted 
anonymously will not be accepted by the ECtHR. Nor will any cases where the matter in 
question already has been examined by the Court. However, if there are new circumstances that 
shed light on a previously examined case, the Court will look at the matter (Helland, 2012, 
s.39). 
Lastly, art.46 of the ECHR (1950) states that “The Contracting Parties undertake to abide by 
the final judgement if the Court in any case to which they are parties.”. To ensure that the 
Contracting Parties uphold their obligation to the ECHR, the final judgement from the ECtHR 
are sent to the Committee of Ministers. The Committee then supervise the execution of the 
judgement (ECHR, 1950, art.46(2)). 
Protocol No. 14 
Protocol No. 11 helped speed up the processing of cases. In many ways the Protocol was 
successful in doing so. What no one could anticipate was the unprecedented rate cases 
submitted to the ECtHR grew at, the following decade after Protocol No. 11 came in to force 
(Myjer et al., 2010, s.55). It was evident that something needed to be done. The result was 
Protocol No. 14. 
When Protocol No. 14 came in to force, in 2010, it was a new start for the ECtHR. The Protocol 
aimed to streamline how the ECtHR handled cases. In the work leading up to Protocol No. 14, 
it was clear that many of the cases submitted to the ECtHR were inadmissible. Other cases were 
in an area of already well-established case-law. Both of these cases were speedily taken care 
of, but still took up time from the judges. Protocol No. 14 restructured how many judges that 
                                                
9 This is often referred to as the principle of subsidiarity.  
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assessed each case and what mandate were given to each of the decision-making bodies of the 
Court. Prior to Protocol No. 14 it was a three-judge Committee that decided whether or not a 
case was inadmissible. Protocol No. 14 gave a single judge the power to do the same. When it 
came to cases within a well-established area of case-law, prior to Protocol No. 14, it was a 
seven-judge Chamber that handled the cases. After Protocol No. 14 came in to force, it was a 
three-judge Committee that did the same (Myjer et al., 2010, s.55-56). 
Another big change was how the ECtHR could make the Contracting Parties oblige to the 
judgements from the Court. Before Protocol No. 14, there were no practical way of making sure 
the Contracting Parties implemented the judgements at a national level. The only possible 
sanction was exclusion from the Council of Europe, which would be a drastic measure (Helland, 
2012, s.40). Protocol No. 14 gave the Committee of Ministers the opportunity to challenge a 
state before the ECtHR for failing to execute a judgement (ECHR, 1950, art.46(3)(4)). 
2.2.3 Judges  
There are 47 judges in the ECtHR at present day. One representative from each of the 
Contracting States. The judges are independent and have no obligation to their nation, even 
though they are elected from each of the Contracting States (ECtHR, 2018a). The ECHR (1950, 
art.21(1)) states that judges “…shall be of high moral character and must either possess the 
qualification required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized 
competence.”.  
There are three measures taken to help ensure that the judges remain independent from the state 
they are sitting in respect of. First, how the judges are elected. A State does not choose their 
representative. The State presents a shortlist of three potential candidates to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, which then elects one of the candidates. Meaning, it is the 
Assembly who elects the judges, not the states (ECHR, 1950, art.22). Second, judges cannot be 
removed from office by a state. It requires a majority vote of two-third, from the other judges, 
stating that the judge in question no longer fulfill the requirements of office to remove a judge  
(Helland, 2012, p.47). Lastly, reelection. Prior to Protocol No. 14 judges were elected for a 
period of six years with the possibility to be reelected. That opened the door for a theoretical 
opportunity that a state could choose not to put a judge up for reelection, if the judge in question 
had voted in disfavor of his nation. Meaning, the reelection process gave the judge a potential 
incentive to vote favorable for the state he was sitting in respect of (Helland, 2012, p.47). When 
Protocol No. 14 came into force, the opportunity to be reelected was gone, as were any potential 
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incentive for the judges to vote in favor for a state party in proceedings before the ECtHR. 
Judges are now elected for a non-renewable nine years. (Helland, 2012, p.47). 
All 47 judges in the ECtHR come from different legal cultures. Arold (2007, p.320) found in 
her research that the legal cultural differences are irrelevant when it comes to assessing a case. 
The judges in the court are driven by a common ideal of human rights. The judges believe that 
unanimity is a sign for higher legitimacy.  
2.2.4 Single judge formation, Committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber 
To be able to understand how the ECtHR evaluates each case, it is important to understand the 
structure of the Court. My research is mainly focused on the present day. I therefor limit myself 
to present the decision-making bodies of the Court as they are at present day. 
When a case is submitted to the ECtHR it is first reviewed by a single judge, who decides if a 
case is admissible. If the case is declared admissible, the judge forwards the case to a Committee 
or a Chamber for further examination (ECHR, 1950, art.27). When sitting as a single judge, the 
judge shall not examine any cases involving the Contracting State of which he sits in respect of 
(ECHR, 1950, art.26(3)). 
The Committee consist of three judges. They are given the mandate to either dismiss a case or 
rule in cases that are in an area of well-established case-law of the ECtHR. Every decision taken 
by the Committee must be unanimous (ECHR, 1950, art.28). In the Committee, the judge 
elected from the contracting party may be involved in the proceedings. If the judge is not a part 
of the Committee, the Committee may invite the judge to take the place of one of the other 
judges in the Committee at any time in the proceedings (ECHR, 1950, art.28(3)). 
The Chamber consist of seven judges. At this point, the judge elected from the contracting party 
shall be one of the seven judges. The reason for this is to ensure that the Chamber have sufficient 
understanding of the legal system, in the involved state, to make the correct evaluation of, inter 
alia, the steps taken by the state to secure the disputed rights (ECHR, 1950, art.26(4), Helland, 
2012, p.48-52). 
The Grand Chamber consist of seventeen judges. Just as in the Chamber, the judge elected from 
the state concerned shall be one of the judges. The president of the Court, the vice-presidents 
and presidents of the chambers shall all sit in the Grand Chamber. However, none of the judges 
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that were in the chamber that referred the case to the Grand Chamber shall sit in the Grand 
Chamber (ECHR, 1950, art.(4)(5)). 
2.3 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is 
more commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Continuing 
the League of Nations’ work on minority protections issues in the years between WWI and 
WWII, the newly founded Council of Europe (CoE) completed, and signed, the convention in 
1950. The ECHR aims to give all humans basic rights and freedoms (ECtHR, n.d.). 
The ECHR entered into force on September 3. 1953, after being ratified by 10 of the 14 Member 
States in the CoE. Today there are 47 Member States in the CoE, all have ratified the 
Convention (Helland, 2012, s.31). 
The preamble of the ECHR states that one of the biggest sources for inspiration was the UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human rights10(UDHR) (ECHR, 1950, preamble). Even though the 
UDHR were the source of inspiration, there are some fundamental differences between the 
UDHR and the ECHR. Whilst the UDHR is broadly formulated, making it unsuitable for legal 
action, the ECHR is more to the point. In the ECHR, the Contracting States have concrete 
obligation they need to fulfil (Helland, 2012, s.32). Each article, and protocol, of the ECHR aim 
to give all basic rights and freedoms. 
“The ECHR grants to everyone the right to life, liberty and security and a fair trial, vouchsafing 
that no one shall be punished except by law, and prohibits torture, slavery and enforced labour. 
Respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of 
speech have been made enforceable rights. It also secures the freedom to assemble and associate 
with others and the right to marry someone of the opposite sex. In keeping with its underlying 
premise of equality, the Convention furthermore prohibits discrimination, and the abuse of one’s 
rights as a means to injure others is forbidden. Further rights are protected through various later 
protocols to the Convention, including, i.a., the right to property, certain rights related to political 
participation and more extensive procedural rights in criminal, such as the rights to appeal and 
the right not to be tried twice for the same offence.”(Helland, 2012, s.33). 
                                                
10 United Nations General Assembly. n.d. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Online]. New York. 
Available: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ [Accessed 13.03 2018]. 
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The ECtHR was established as a legal system by the ECHR, to help ensure that every State 
fulfils their obligations to the Convention.  
2.3.1 Presentation of central articles in the ECHR 
When looking at how the ECtHR weigh children’s and parents’ rights in care order cases, two 
articles from the ECHR are central, art.1 and art.8. In the following section I will give a short 
presentation of the two articles. 
Article 1 – Obligation to respect Human Rights 
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defines in Section I of this Convention” (ECHR, 1950, art.1) 
Article 1 is the foundation in which the entire convention builds on. The article commits the 
Contracting States to follow the rest of the articles in the Convention. 
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” (ECHR, 1950, art. 8(1)). 
Article 8 is the common denominator of all the care order cases that have appeared before the 
ECtHR. Part 1 of the article gives everyone the right to respect for private and family life. Part 
2 states that the public authorities will not interfere in the exercise of this right, with a few 
exceptions. Firstly, if you violate the law, the authorities will act. The authorities will also act 
to prevent crime, if it is the nation’s best interest, nation security and the nation’s “economic 
well-being”. Lastly, the authorities will act “… for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”, (ECHR, 1950, art.8(2)) hereunder children. 
2.3.2 Children and the ECHR 
Art.111 of the ECHR states that the rights presented in the Convention shall be granted to 
everyone. Art.1412 explicitly mentions that discrimination on any ground is a violation against 
the Convention. These facts are seemingly ignored with regards to children. At what age a child 
may enjoy its rights is not mentioned in the ECHR. Nor are there any, written, differences in 
young children and children nearing adulthoods relation to the Convention. Each case, 
                                                
11 Art.1: Obligation to respect Human Rights. 
12 Art.14: Prohibition of discrimination. 
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involving minors, are reviewed separately by the ECtHR. The decision of whether or not a child 
is entitled to its rights is up to the Courts discretion (Kilkelly, 1999, p.18). 
Even though the ECHR does not mention at which age one is considered a child, the ECtHR 
have thru its rulings defined childhood. The case of Paton v. The United Kingdom13 raised the 
following question; should the unborn child, in light of art.214, be protected by the Convention? 
After examining the term “everyone” both in art.2 and in the ECHR as a whole, the ECtHR 
found that “everyone” was a term that could only be used postnatally. Nevertheless, the Court 
could not exclude the possibility that in rare cases an prenatal application could occur (Kilkelly, 
1999, p.20). At which age childhood ends is clearer than when it begins. Childhood ends the 
day you are considered an adult in the eye of the law. Meaning when one reaches the age of 
maturity (Kilkelly, 1999, p.22). At what age one reaches the age of maturity is a matter for 
domestic law, usually when one turns 18 years of age. 
Some articles open for preferential treatment of minors. Art.515 states that minors may be 
detained for the purpose of educational supervision and Art.616 states that the press and public 
may be excluded from any legal proceedings regarding juveniles (ECHR, 1950, art.5 & 6). 
When looking at rulings from the ECtHR it is clear that the Court is very tolerant about domestic 
laws and practice that treat children differently from adults. The Court has even stated that is 
justified to treat children differently from adults, if the aim is to protect children from harm or 
negative influence (Kilkelly, 1999, p.27). 
To summarize, for the Court, childhood begins when one is born and ends when one reaches 
the age of maturity (18 years of age). The ECHR does not have a section on children rights. 
Children are protected by the same articles as adults. However, current caselaw shows that the 
ECtHR acknowledges that children and adult may be treated differently, if it is in the child’s 
best interest.  
2.4 The Convention on the Right of the Child 
When talking about children and human rights it would be difficult to ignore the Convention 
on the Right of the Child (CRC). The CRC is the most ratified human rights convention in 
history. Every member state of the UN has ratified the agreement, except for the USA. The 
                                                
13 No8416/78 Paton v UK, Dec 13.5.80, DR 19, p 244, 3 EHRR 408. 
14 Art.2: Right to life. 
15 Art.5: Right to liberty and security. 
16 Art.6: Right to a fair trial. 
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USA are, however, signatory to the agreement (CRC, 1990, Unicef, 2005). The CRCs purpose 
is to protect children against harm and give children basic rights (CRC, 1990). Unlike the 
ECHR, the CRC have a clear definition of when one is considered to be a child: “…a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years…” (CRC, 1990, art.1). 
A difference between the ECHR and CRC is how the two conventions can make sure that the 
Contracting States comply with the conventions. Until a new optional protocol entered into 
force in 2014, the UN had no way to enforce that the Contracting States complied with the 
CRC. The protocol aimed to formalize how each Contracting State enforced the CRC at a 
national level. The protocol was not an immediate success. Only 10 of the 196 states that have 
ratified the CRC, ratified the protocol when it entered into force. Today there are 37 states that 
have ratified the protocol and 22 more that are signatory to the agreement. This is still a 
relatively small percentage of the total number of states that have ratified the CRC. This means 
that in regard to most of the Contracting States, the UN have no means to secure compliance 
with the CRC (Williams and Invernizzi, 2011, p.185, OHCHR, 2014). 
2.4.1 Children’s rights in the CRC – Protection, Provision and Participation 
The rights granted to children by the CRC can be summoned up in three P’s; protection, 
provision and participation. 
First, protection. The preamble of the CRC states that “the child, by reason of his physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care…” (CRC, 1990, preamble). That children 
are in need of a more extensive protection than what would have been deemed appropriate for 
adults is considered an accepted truth in modern societies.17 For these reasons there are articles 
in the CRC which sole purpose is to protect children’s wellbeing18 (Archard, 2015, p.110-112, 
Kjørholt, 2010, p.35-38). 
Children’s basic needs are covered by the provision part of the CRC. The provision rights states 
that children are entitled to a good, secure, upbringing. All children have the right to “…a 
standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development.” (CRC, 1990, art.27(1)). 
                                                
17 See section 3.2 Paternalism. 
18 I.a. The CRC art.19 and art.32. 
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Lastly, the participation part of the CRC grant children a voice. Art.13 gives the child freedom 
of expression and art.15 gives the child freedom of association and freedom of peaceful 
assembly (CRC, 1990, art.13 & 15). 
2.4.2 The ECtHR and the CRC 
The ECtHR and the CRC are independent from each other. The CRC is not mentioned in the 
ECHR and the ECtHR does not convict any states for breaching the CRC. Nevertheless, the 
ECtHR still refers to the CRC as a legal argument for children rights.19  
Even though the CRC is used as a legal argument by the ECtHR, it is not a prominent source. 
(Skivenes and Søvig, 2016, p.14). As stated in chapter 1, in the work leading up to my master 
thesis I conducted an interview with Dean Karl Harald Søvig where I asked him about these 
findings. He then stated that one can divide the ECtHR’s references to the CRC in to two groups. 
The first group is when the ECtHR performs a “courtesy visit” in their judgement. This group 
of references is like an ornamentation to underline the ECtHR’s views and have little to no 
impact on the outcome of the judgements. The other group of references are the references were 
the ECtHR changes their view to show responsiveness. The latter is the group that have a real 
impact on the judgements from the ECtHR. 
One of my supportive research questions revolve around the ECtHRs relation to the CRC. I 
intend to see if the CRC is used by the ECtHR as means to justify its decisions. Discussion 
surrounding my findings will be addressed in chapter 8 – Discussion and concluding remarks. 
Chapter 3 - Building a theoretical framework20  
Children’s rights are a complex field. Some will even argue that children do not have rights (cf. 
Archard, 2015, p.59). When looking at how the ECtHR weigh children’s- and parents’ rights, 
it is a prerequisite that children have rights. Even so, there are elements that put children in a 
special position relative to adults and which may potentially influence how the ECtHR assess 
cases. The common denominator in all the elements presented in the following chapter is 
children’s rights. The elements presented will act as supporting theories for my theoretical 
framework. 
                                                
19 See i.a. case No.2561/94 L v. Finland (2000) or case No.52502/07 Aune v. Norway (2010). 
20 Parts of Chapter 3 – Building a theoretical framework is a rewrite of a paper written by me, as part of a 
preparatory paper to my master thesis. The paper was submitted 25.05.2018 to the University of Bergen as part 
of a compulsory assignment to pass the subject AORG323. 
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3.1 Rights theory – do children have rights? 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, some will argue that children do not have rights 
(cf. Archard, 2015, p.59). I will argue that to say children do not have any rights will be a 
grossly understatement. However, to what extent a child has rights is actually up for debate. 
3.1.1 Will theory and interest theory 
Will- and interest theory are two competing theories about right-holders. While will theory 
focuses on the rights to do something, the interest theory focuses on the rights to have 
something. The two theories are seemingly complementary to each other, but they have a 
distinct difference: “…what it is to have a right, not what one might have rights to.” (Archard, 
2015, p.58-59).   
Will theorists see rights as the opportunity to exercise ones’ choice. As a right-holder you are 
entitled to do as you please. Here there is a different between children and adults. Children do 
not have the same opportunity to choose for themselves as adults do. There are laws and 
regulations restricting children’s freedom to do as they please.21 When a child legally cannot 
make a decision on its own behalf, it is the child’s guardians that make the decision.22 When 
one is not able to decide for one self, in the eyes of will theorists, one have no rights. Ergo, 
according to will theorists children do not have rights (Archard, 2015, p.59). This is a big 
shortcoming for the will theorists. Keeping in line with their original thinking, will theorist 
sought out a way to pass this obstacle. If the guardian act on their child’s behalf in the same 
manner that the child itself would act, if able, then the child has exercised its rights thru its 
representative and consequently has rights (Archard, 2015, p.58-59) 
Interest theorists do not same hindering as will theorist when looking at children’s rights. 
Interest theorists sees rights as a protection, or promotion, of ones’ interests. Since the child has 
interests, it has rights. A child does not necessarily have the opportunity to make legal decision, 
even if the decision influences the child interests. Interests theorists states that if a child cannot 
decide on its own, others have an obligation to further the child’s interest on behalf of the child 
(Archard, 2015, p.58, Wenar, 2015).. 
One of my supportive questions revolve around children’s rights. More specifically, to what 
extent children are granted rights under the ECHR and how the ECtHR adhere to these rights. 
                                                
21 This will be addressed further in section 3.1.2 Children’s legal rights. 
22 E.g. if you are under the age of 18, you need your guardians’ permission to enter into a contract. 
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If one looks at the assessments done by the ECtHR in care order cases thru the eyes of a will 
theorist, it is a prerequisite that the child’s guardian act as the child itself would act, in order for 
the child to have rights. In care order cases brought before the ECtHR there are at least two 
parties, the biological parents and the domestic authorities. The domestic authorities issue a 
care order and deprive biological parents of their parental rights, if they believe it to be in the 
child’s best interests. If one had asked the child if it would like to remain with its biological 
parents or be placed with an unknown foster family, I would not be surprised if the child in 
most cases would choose its biological parents. Which would entail that, according to will 
theorists, the child does not per se have rights. 
On the other hand, in the eyes of interest theorists the child has rights if others, i.a. domestic 
authorities or the ECtHR, fulfil their obligation to further the child’s interests on behalf of the 
child. Meaning that the child has rights, even if it disagrees with its guardians. 
As I will explain later in my thesis, the ECtHR have reiterated time and again that the child’s 
best interests are central in the Courts assessments. Which entails that children, according to 
interest theorists, have rights. There are no interviews of the children in the care order cases I 
am analysing. Therefore, there is no way of confirming if the child agrees with the ECtHRs 
assessments and thus have rights according to will theorists. For these reasons, for the remainder 
of the thesis, I will limit myself to the mindset of the interest theorists. Children do have rights. 
The question is to what extent? 
3.1.2 Children’s legal rights 
The CRC states that every human under the age of eighteen is considered a child23 (CRC, 1990, 
art.1). Nevertheless, to say that a newborn baby inhabits the same physical and mental state as 
a seventeen-year-old would be absurd. This is taken in to account when one looks at children’s 
legal rights. As the child grows older, its rights become more extensive (Barneombudet, 2018). 
How different states perceive a child may differ. I.a. in Norway one is not permitted to buy or 
drink alcoholic beverages24 before one turns eighteen (Alkoholloven, 1990, § 1-5). In Norway’s 
neighboring country, Denmark, the age limit to buy and drink alcohol is sixteen (Danske Love, 
2008, §2). 
                                                
23 See section 2.4 The Convention on the Right of the Child. 
24 In Norway one needs to be 20 to buy, or drink, alcohol which has an alcohol-content higher than 22%. While 
the age-limit for alcohol-content below 22% is 18 years. 
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The child’s age will play a role in the child’s involvement in care orders. I.a. in Norway adults 
must, in a greater manner then before, take into account what the child want to do in cases 
regarding the child when it turns 12.25 At twelve the child no longer can be adopted without its 
consent (Barneombudet, 2018) 
3.2 Paternalism 
“Paternalism is the restriction of a subject’s self-regarding conduct primarily for the good of 
the same subject.” (Pope, 2004, p.660).  
Parents and children’s relationship are the classic example of paternalism. The word 
paternalism derives from the Latin word pater, or paternus, which means father/fatherly. There 
are many levels and forms of paternalism. All paternalistic decisions are an intervention in a 
subject’s freedom. There are laws requiring motorcyclist to wear helmets, car drivers to wear 
seatbelts and there are laws prohibiting drugs. All these laws are paternalistic (Goodin, 1993, 
p.233). The government has decided that you are not allowed to choose for yourself in these 
matters, because it is for your own good that you do not use drugs and wear a seatbelt and 
helmet. Paternalism can be divided in two groups, soft- and hard paternalism. While both soft- 
and hard paternalism are defined as “…two liberty-limiting principles.” (Pope, 2004, p.667), 
there are some distinct differences between the two groups. 
The difference in soft- and hard paternalism is to what extent it limits a subject’s freedom. Soft 
paternalism states that if a subject lacks the capacity to make a well-considered choice, 
paternalistic interference is justified. “People do not always mean what they say; they do not 
always say what they want; and they do not always want what they say they want.” (Elliot, 
1993, cited in Pope (2004), p.669, Pope, 2004, p.667). Soft paternalism enables a subject to 
make a more informed decision (Pope, 2005, p.685). Pope (2005, p.673) uses an example of a 
man walking towards an unsafe bridge, as an example of soft paternalism. If you stopped the 
man from walking out on the bridge, your action would be paternalistic on the base of you 
restricting the man’s liberty to walk were he pleases. The man may not have known that the 
bridge was unsafe and therefore lacked the knowledge to make a well-considered decision. You 
stopping the man is in the man’s best interest and therefore are justified as a soft paternalistic 
intervention.  
                                                
25 I.a. where to live if your parents’ divorce. 
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While soft paternalism enables the subject to make a more informed decision, hard paternalism 
overrides the subject’s decision (Pope, 2005, p.685). Dworkin (1995, cited in, Pope, 2005, 
p.683-684) presents three definitional conditions for paternalism: 
“P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if…”: 
1. “…P’s act is a limitation of Q’s autonomy or liberty.”. 
2. “…P acts with the intent of averting some harm or promoting some benefits for Q.”. 
3. “…P acts contrary to (or is indifferent to) the current preferences, desires, or values of 
Q.”. 
To make a clear distinction between soft- and hard paternalism in Dworkins definitional 
conditions, Pope (2005, p.684) added a fourth condition: 
4. “…the agent either disregards whether the subject engages in the restricted conduct 
substantially voluntarily, or deliberately limits the subject’s substantially voluntary 
conduct”. 
Dworkins three conditions could be used for both soft- and hard paternalism, while Pope’s 
fourth condition can only be considered true for hard paternalism. Hard paternalism, in other 
words, doesn’t help the subject to make an informed choice, it eliminates to opportunity to 
choose all together (Pope, 2005, p.685). 
Looking at paternalistic decision with regard to the field of care orders, the ECtHR have stated 
that all other options must be considered before taking a child into public care (see i.a. Moser 
v. Austria, 2006, para.66). Any measure taken by the domestic authorities influencing the 
biological parents’ parental rights, are to an extent paternalistic. If the domestic authorities 
guide the biological parents to make the right decision for their child, it may be considered soft 
paternalism. However, if the domestic authorities deprive biological parents of their parental 
rights, they eliminate the biological parents’ opportunity to choose what they believe to be in 
the child’s best interests, and this may be considered hard paternalism. 
3.3 Discretion 
Discretion is used in many forms every day. In relation to the care order cases, which is the 
focus of this thesis, discretion has been used both by domestic social services and legal system 
before the case appear before the ECtHR. Within the ECtHR discretion is exercised by all 
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decision-making bodies of the Court. In short, discretion is exercised at all bureaucratic levels. 
In the legal sphere, judicial discretion is an important part of the decision-making. Discretion 
enables legal rules to be interpreted and therefore makes the rules applicable to the different 
merits of each case (Hart, 2013, p.652-655, Hawkins, 1986, p.1162-1164). 
Dworkin (1967) distinguishes between two types of discretion, weak and strong. Weak 
discretion means that “…for some reason the standards an official must apply cannot be applied 
mechanically but demand the use of judgement.” (Dworkin, 1967, p.33). This is expressed in 
two forms. One relates to having authority to make judgements, the other to giving decision-
makers final authority to make a non-appealable decision on a particular issue (Magnussen and 
Skivenes, 2015, p.708). Strong discretion on the other hand relates to decisions not “…bound 
by any standards set by an authority.” (Dworkin, 1967, p.33, in Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015, 
p.708). If judges are given the authority to decide the best interests of the child with no 
instruction on how to do this, it would be strong discretion (Magnussen and Skivenes, 2015, 
p.708, Skivenes and Søvig, 2016). 
3.3.1 Judicial discretion 
Related to my research, understanding how judicial system exercise discretion, both in domestic 
legal systems and in the ECtHR, is crucial to understand the outcomes of the care order cases 
that are the base of my research. 
All courts exercise judicial discretion to a certain extent. In the ECtHR, every decision-making 
body26 exercise judicial discretion. From the single judge formation who exercise discretion 
when deciding whether a case should be admissible, to the grand chamber were the judges 
exercise discretion in interpreting the law.  
The ECtHR have, at several occasions, pointed out that art.8 of the ECHR does not contain any 
explicit procedural requirements (see i.a. McMichael v. The UK, 1995, para.87). Which entails 
that assessments made by the Court is based on strong discretion. The ECtHR is the sovereign 
authority in interpreting the ECHR (Skivenes and Søvig, 2016). As I will explain in chapter 5, 
the ECtHR base its assessments on established case law.27  
                                                
26 See section 2.2.4 Single judge formation, Committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber. 
27 See section 5.4 Creating a foundation for statistical foundation. 
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3.3.2 Margin of appreciation 
Margin of appreciation is a well-established concept in the ECtHR. The ECHR does not 
mention to what extent the Contracting States are able to exercise discretion in their decision. 
One saw the need for balancing the Contracting States’ opportunity to make discretionary 
choices with the ECtHRs requirement to keep control, and the result was the concept called 
margin of appreciation. In short, margin of appreciation gives the Contracting States an area of 
which they can exercise discretion (Grant and Barker, 2009, p.361). 
Looking at care order, the Contracting States are given a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether an interference with the biological parents’ rights under art.8 of the ECHR 
where “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” (ECHR, 1950, 
art.8, Grant and Barker, 2009, p.361). To what extent the Contracting States have margin of 
appreciation will be duly discussed in chapters 7 and 8. 
3.4 In the child’s best interest – discretion, paternalism and children. 
There are differences between how the law perceives children and adults. As are the how society 
perceives the latter. Children encounter paternalistic decisions every day.28 Every decision 
made on behalf of the child, should be in the child’s best interest. I will in the following section 
address children’s relation to both paternalism and discretion. I will, in addition give a brief 
introduction to the topic of the child’s best interests. 
3.4.1 Paternalism, children and children’s rights 
There are limitations as to what a child is entitled to do. There are others, inter alia guardians, 
parents and school teachers, that make decisions on behalf of the child on an everyday basis. 
Children do not choose their own representative. The standard is that when a child is born, its 
parents becomes its representatives. In the child’s upbringing, parents make the decisions they 
believe to be in the child’s best interest. However, who the best person to choose for a child is, 
is widely discussed (Archard, 2015, p.69). 
In his book, Children: rights and childhood, Archard (2015, p.69-70) address a series of issues 
pertaining to the child’s guardians-, and the child’s own, ability to choose what is in the child’s 
best interests. Firstly, parenthood does not automatically constitute a competence to know what 
choices would be in the child’s best interest. Secondly, it is not given that the choices a child 
                                                
28 I will explain this further in section 3.4.1 Paternalism, children and children’s rights. 
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would take, if able, are the best choices for the child. Given the choice, a child may want 
chocolate spread for lunch at school every day, instead of healthy food. Thirdly, is the child 
bound by the choices made by others? If the child has no real saying in the choices made on its 
behalf, the choices made would be considered paternalistic, not a prolonged-arm for the child’s 
own wishes. 
When parents or the child’s representatives make decisions on behalf of the child, they are 
assumed to do so to further the child’s best interests. The idea of representatives furthering a 
subject’s interests are in line with how interest theorists perceives children’s rights.29 
The child’s representative is not totally free to act as they please when they choose what would 
be in the child’s best interest. There are laws and regulation protecting children and 
consequently restricts some choices for the child’s representatives. As written in section 2.4 
The Convention on the Right of the Child, the CRC gives children right to, inter alia, “…a 
standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development.” (CRC, 1990, art.27(1)). The rights given to the child by the CRC are followed 
up by domestic law (Barneombudet, 2018, Barnevernloven, 1993). If parents fail to follow the 
laws and regulation protecting the child, social services will intervene. 
3.4.2 Discretion and children 
Discretion is dependent on one’s ability to reflect over a decision. If one is not able to reflect 
over the matter in question, one is not able to exercise discretion. The British philosopher John 
Locke writes about children as strangers in our world. Children experience all things for the 
first time. Everything is new, everything, including the ability to reason, must be taught (Locke 
and NetLibrary, 2000, p.60, section 120).  
Children do not learn the ways of the world in one evening. They have an incremental learning 
curve. Children cannot walk, talk, read or write when they are newly born. Nor are children 
born with a certain political or religious view. By teaching children about how the world works 
and thru socialization, children get an opinion about what is right or wrong. Thus, children 
slowly become prepared for a life in our culture and society. However, culture is only a piece 
in an otherwise large jigsaw puzzle that depicts children’s development. To understand a child’s 
                                                
29 See section 3.1.1 Will theory and interest theory. 
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development, one needs to see the totality in which the child exists (GSI Teaching & Resource 
Center, n.d., Benhabib, 2002, p.5-11). 
Children are prepared for a life where one is responsible for the choices one makes, by the 
society in which it lives. As explained in section 3.1 Rights theory – do children have rights?, 
there are limitation as to how a child may choose for itself. For newborns, a guardian makes all 
the decisions. As the child grows older it is given more rights and therefor may take more 
decisions on its own accord, and it gets more acquainted with our world and can take more 
deliberate decisions. It would be farfetched to believe that children are sheltered from all 
decisions calling for the use of discretion. However, a child cannot exercise discretion in the 
same manner an adult can, as long as the child’s final decisions lay in the hands of others.  
3.4.3 The child’s best interest – liberation or caretaking 
“The child’s best interest is the guiding principle when enforcing the law. Providing the child 
with the security of good adult contact and care is an important consideration when evaluating 
what is in the child’s best interest.  The same principle applies to the child’s need for having 
the same adult caregivers over a longer period of time.” (Fylkesnemndene for barnevern og 
sosiale saker, n.d.). 
The best interest of the child is a legal term used to make decisions on behalf of the child (US 
Legal, n.d.). The question is; how does one decide what is in the child’s best interest?   
Liberation and caretaking are two different views on how children rights should be enforced. 
Liberationist believes that children should be liberated and that the restriction on children’s 
rights should be lifted (Archard, 2015, p.64-65). By restricting children’s freedom to, inter alia, 
vote, work and travel, liberationist argue that the society discriminates every child. Caretakers 
do not agree with the argument put forward by the liberationist. Caretakers argue that “…adults 
may choose paternalistically for children as the latter would choose if they were adults.” 
(Archard, 2015, p.72). The main question for the liberationist and caretakers boils down to who 
decides what is best for the child, the adult or the child itself? 
Archard (2015, p.80) states that it would be unjust to deny children rights solely on the basis of 
a child being a child. Age should not be the only factor when deciding if a child should be 
entitled to certain rights. Age is only one of several factors that must be taken in to consideration 
when deciding what is in the best interest of the child. That children are given more rights as 
they grow older is due to the correlation between age, mental state and relevant competence 
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(Archard, 2015, p.80). In conclusion, when deciding what is in the child’s best interest, one 
needs to take all circumstances affecting the child, including development and age, in to account 
(US Legal, n.d.). There are differences between children of all ages. What is right for one child 
may be wrong for another.  
Chapter 4 - Theoretical framework 
Looking at the care order cases that have appeared before the ECtHR, it is clear that the Court 
exercise strong discretion in its assessments. I intend to conduct an argumentation analysis on 
the care order judgements from the ECtHR. Looking at the argumentation used by the ECtHR, 
it will give me an insight to what extent the Court use discretion, and how the Court weighs the 
different considerations in each case. 
I will in the following chapter present the theories that constitute the foundation of my research. 
The theories will act as backdrop for, both, my analysis and discussion surrounding how the 
ECtHR balance children’s and parents’ rights in care order cases. Any questions as to how the 
theories will be used, will be answered in chapter 5 – Research methods and data material. 
4.1 Discourse theory 
Discourse relates to the way we communicate with each other. The words we choose to express 
our meaning are not arbitrary. By analyzing the words that has been chosen, we can give 
statements both a cognitive and normative meaning (Bratberg, 2017, p.34-36).  
Discourse theory is a diverse field. There are several roads to travel within the field of discourse 
theory. Two acknowledged discourse theory concepts are Foucauldian and Habermasian. 
Foucauldian stems from the works of French philosopher and historian of ideas, Michel 
Foucault, and Habermasian from the works of German philosopher and sociologist, Jürgen 
Habermas (Stahl, 2004, King, 2009, Allen, 2009). Foucauldian and Habermasian represent two 
different direction in the field of discourse theory. Habermas and Foucault, both, commented 
on the others work. Habermas, especially, were critical to Foucault’s work (Allen, 2009, p.1-
2). Foucault did comment on Habermas work, but passed away soon after and thus ended the 
debate between the two philosophers (Stahl, 2004, p.4333).  
The comparison between Foucauldian and Habermasian did not end with Foucault’s death. 
Secondary literature, discussing the two philosophers ideas, has kept the debate alive (Allen, 
2009, p.1). There has been a tendency that the Habermasians have been more active in the 
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debate then the Foucauldians. Whilst the Habermasians repeatedly criticize Foucault’s work, 
the Foucauldians seemingly believes that Habermas’ work “… is so boring and irritating (so 
German?) that it is beneath discussion” (Allen, 2009, p.2). As is, the debate is in an interesting 
deadlock: the Habermasians act as they have won the debate, while the Foucauldians act as they 
have not participated (Allen, 2009, p.2). 
The two concepts are seemingly opposites. However, there are some similarities. Both concepts 
sees discourses as constitutive for our reality (Stahl, 2004, p.4332 - 4334). Both concepts states 
that political judgements are insusceptible to any final justification, by appeal to a foundational 
principle. However, while Foucault states that all political judgements must be insusceptible to 
such justification, Habermas states that only some political judgements needs to be the same 
(King, 2009, p.289). Lastly, both concepts acknowledge power as an important component in 
discourse analysis. However, whilst Foucault has a wide approach, stating that power is 
omnipresent, Habermas has a narrower approach, stating that authorities, relations and 
communicative action may play a role in defining power (Allen, 2009, p.14 - 24). 
Habermas’ ideas about communicative action and – rationality and his distinction between 
moral and ethics, separates him from Foucault (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, Allen, 2009, p.24 
- 28). Habermas’ ideas on moral and ethics, and the right- or good choices, are intriguing when 
looking at the care order cases in the ECtHR. For these reasons, I have chosen to focus mainly 
on Habermas and his ideas. 
4.1.1 Communicative rationality and – action. 
Max Weber is one of the originators in the field of rationality. In order to understand rational 
behavior, he looked at action theory. He defines social action as all human behavior an 
individual ties a subjective meaning to (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.34). Unlike the 19th-
hundred French philosophers, Weber believed that humans had always, subjectively, been 
rational. He stated that rationality was not a result of the Enlightenment. He argued that 
“primitive” men’s specific religious rituals in order to favor a specific God, were indeed 
subjectively rational (Kalberg, 1980, p.1148). Weber divided rationality in to four typologies 
of social action: affectual, traditional, value-rational and purposive-rational.30 (Eriksen and 
Weigård, 2014, p.34 - 36, Kalberg, 1980, p.1148 - 1149). 
                                                




Table 1 Weber’s action typology (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.36). 
Mean Goal Value Consequence
Purposive-rational + + + +




Subjective meaning include the following elements:
 
In a purposive-rational way of thinking, based on one’s own subjective values, one has a 
complete overview of what goal one wants to reach, what means one ought to use to reach set 
goal and the consequences of one’s actions. Purposive-rational is Weber’s ideal-rationality. In 
a value-rational way of thinking, one does not consider the consequences of one’s actions 
towards reaching a goal. Otherwise, it is similar to purposive-rational. Affectual is an emotion-
based rationality. One does know what the goal is, and which means to use to reach the goal, 
but one cannot control consequences and values. In a traditional way of thinking one does what 
one always does. One knows what means to use, but goal, value and consequences are unclear 
(Kalberg, 1980, p.1147 - 1150, Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.34 - 37). 
Habermas used Weber’s thoughts about purposive rationality as the base for his idea about 
communicative rationality and -action. Habermas saw that purposive rationality could not, by 
its own, explain all actions in society. He divided actions into three categories: instrumental-, 
strategic- and communicative action (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.39 - 40). Both instrumental- 
and strategic action are result-oriented. However, instrumental action is considered a non-social 
action while strategic action is considered a social action. As result-oriented actions, both 
actions are driven by a pre-determined goal. The goal is often hidden, and are therefore not, in 
the eyes of Habermas, normal communication (Ritzer and Smart, 2001, p.203 - 205). Habermas 
saw the need for a category that covered normal, day to day, communication. Communication 
that was not aimed at reaching a goal, but a joint understanding as to how society works, namely 
communicative action. Communicative action differs from instrumental- and strategic, as it is 
understanding-oriented rather than result-oriented. However, communicative action may also 
have a goal, but the communication builds on consensus between the participants not 




Table 2 Habermas’ action typology (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.40) 
Result-oriented Understanding-oriented
Non-social Instrumental action
Social Strategic action Communicative action  
Habermas defines the distinction between the two social communication methods as “…the 
difference between mutual understanding and mutual influencing” (Ritzer and Smart, 2001, 
p.204). The recognition of humans as autonomous and the mutual understanding of how to 
reach a goal thru communicative action, gives an insight to rational behavior that elopes a result-
oriented approach.  
Habermas defines communicative action meaningful interaction between persons (Edgar, 2006, 
p.21). The term involves both language- and gesture-based interactions. A key word, however, 
is meaningful. Habermas states that if an interaction should be considered meaningful there are 
some conditions that need to be fulfilled. He sums up the conditions in a term he calls validity 
claims. The four conditions are: truth, rightness, truthfulness and meaning (Edgar, 2006, p.163 
- 165, Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p. 53 - 57).  
Habermas’ first condition is that the statement one utters needs to be true. If I state that it is 
sunny outside when it is raining, my statement is not true and therefore a violation against 
Habermas’ first validity claim (Edgar, 2006, p.164). Habermas’ second claim relates to where 
and when one utters a statement. Telling your friend about your day is not a violation against 
Habermas’ claims. However, stopping a stranger in the street to tell about your day is. When 
talking about rightness it is important to remember that situations may be cultural conditioned. 
In some cultures, it may be inappropriate to enter a near empty bus and choose to sit next to one 
of passengers, while in other cultures it may be rude not to. In other words, the actions need to 
be considered right in a normative context (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.55, Edgar, 2006, 
p.164 - 165). When it comes to the third condition, Habermas recognizes that the interaction 
may be ironic, a lie, a joke or something similar. If the recipient of the action does not get the 
irony or the joke, a continued conversation may be difficult. If one is repeatedly caught lying, 
the recipient of the action may not believe one is truthful. If the recipient does not trust you, 
meaningful interaction is difficult (Edgar, 2006, p.164). Lastly, if one does not speak the same 
language, a conversation is problematic. As is it, if one does not share any common interest. In 
order to sustain a conversation, all parties must consider the content of the conversation 
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meaningful. If one of the parties in the conversation fail to keep interest in the conversation, it 
will not be sustainable (Edgar, 2006, p.164 - 165). 
4.1.2 Habermas’ three worlds 
Habermas stated that in order to understand human behavior, a purposive-rational way of 
thinking is not sufficient. One needs to see purposive rationality in light of the “world” the 
actors live in. Habermas divided the social sphere in to three worlds; the objective-, the social- 
and the subjective world (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.46).  








































The objective world considers facts. There are two direction within the objective world, 
cognitive and teleological. If the actors understanding of the facts correspond with the actual 
facts, the actor will consider the facts as true and correspond accordingly. The teleological 
approach considers facts as a mean to gain the results one wants. With this approach, facts can 
be manipulated, to an extent, in order to achieve the desired goal (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, 
p.46). 
The social world is related to the norms in society. As part of the society, one is part of a group. 
Within the group one lives, there are unwritten rules as to how the group believes one ought to 
behave. Breaking these unwritten rules may not cause any legal ramifications, however there 
may be other consequences within the group one lives. The trueness of what one ought to do 
may be morally conditioned (Habermas et al., 1999, p.38-39, Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.46-
48) 
The subjective world relates to one’s inner sphere. One’s thoughts, believes, perceptions, 
feelings and personally experiences. Everything that relates to one being oneself. Within this 
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world, the actor beholds his/her fellow members of society as an audience for his/her own 
subjectivity. There are two criterions in the social world, veracity and authenticity. Actors may 
be influenced by society. Manipulative behavior from other actors, commercials and political 
propaganda may all influence an actor. The perception of the actor must give a truthful picture 
as to how the actors inner thoughts and believes are, not what they have been influenced to be. 
In other words, the thoughts and believes of the actor need to be authentic in order to fulfill the 
criterions for the subjective world (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.48-51). 
Even though Habermas has a clear distinction between the three worlds, they may. In certain 
situations, there may be ethical, morally and legal reasons to act in a certain way. E.g. if you 
murder someone. A murder is against the law, and thus a violation against the written rules in 
the objective world. Seen from the viewpoint of the social world, the murder would be 
considered an un-moral action and therefore be a violation against the norms in society.  
4.1.3 Discourse ethics 
Following Habermas ideas about the three worlds I will distinct between four discourses, legal-
, pragmatic-, ethic- and moral discourse. The legal- and pragmatic discourse is closely related 
to the objective world. The legal discourse is focused around a truth rationality and is 
understanding-oriented, while the pragmatic discourse is result-oriented and focuses on 
efficiency, or in other terms purposive rationality. Moral discourse relates to the social world 
and ethic discourse to the subjective world, both are understanding-oriented. 
Discourse ethics basically boils down to two key principles, the universalization principle (U) 
and the discourse principle (D) (Thomassen, 2010, p.90-91). 
(U): “All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these 
consequences are preferred to those known alternative possibilities for regulation).” 
(Outhwaite and Habermas, 1996, p.185). 
(D): “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval 
of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” (Outhwaite and 
Habermas, 1996, p.185) 
When focusing on moral, not legal, norms, it important that all actors engaging in the action 
have a joint understanding of the norms in question. (U) Function as a test for moral norms. If 
31 
 
all affected by the norm accepts its ramifications, the norms is considered legitimate and the 
actors will come to a consensus (Outhwaite and Habermas, 1996, p.185-186, Thomassen, 2010, 
p.91).  If the norm fails the test, meaning that if one or more of the actors affected by the norm 
does not accept the ramifications, the norm is not considered legitimate and the actors will not 
come to a consensus. Habermas underlines that a society cannot function without moral, and 
legal, norms (Habermas, 1996, p.233-234). While (U) is considered a test, (D) is considered the 
discourse ethics tenet (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.102).  
In line with the principle of (U) and (D) is human’s ability to argue, in order to make their case 
heard. The principle of arguing is related to communicative rationality. The idea behind 
communicative rationality is that if one can argue and take on the ideas and thoughts of others, 
one can come to a consensus – depending on which rationality criterion one focuses on 
(Habermas et al., 1999, p.105). The pragmatic discourse however, as it is result-oriented, are 
not as susceptible to the idea behind communicative rationality 
There is a difference as to how one expects a person to react in the four different discourses. 
When one is in the objective world, that does not affect the actor at a personal level. The actors 
objectify their belief and focus on how to achieve their desired goals. While in the subjective- 
and social world, your moral and ethics – your inner being – may be challenged. Taylor (1985) 
defines the difference between the choices made in the objective world, and in the moral- and 
ethic world as weak and strong assessments. The idea is that an actor must assess the situation 
and do what he/she believes is the correct action. Weak assessments do not say anything about 
you as a person. However, strong assessments do. Strong assessments may not cause you to 
break the law or to do something that seems natural to other, however they may challenge your 
belief.  















The legal discourse has its roots in the objective world. Outhwaite and Habermas (1996, p.131) 
explains the objective world as “the world of external nature”. While the other three discourses 
are practical discourses, the legal discourse is theoretic (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.111). 
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Thru conversation and existing theories and descriptions, the legal discourse aims the unveil 
facts. Thru this discourse, Habermas aims to see facts thru the perspective of adjudicators 
(Baxter, 2011, p.106). The legal discourse’s normative ideal is the truth (Eriksen and Weigård, 
2014, p.111). 
The pragmatic discourse focuses on how to most efficiently reach one’s goal. It is based in the 
objective world. Unlike the other three discourses, pragmatic discourse is based on strategic 
action, not communicative action. This means that Habermas’ validity claims are not present in 
this discourse. In this discourse the actors focus on reaching their goals. There may be a one-
way communication were one actor manipulates his/her surroundings in order to achieve the 
desired goal (Outhwaite and Habermas, 1996, p.130). The pragmatic discourse normative ideal 
focuses on what is useful or/and appropriate. The discourse itself aims to show rational 
decisions (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.111). 
The moral discourse has its grounding in the social world. It uses communicative action in order 
for the actors to come to a consensus. Any action in this discourse is driven, and regulated, by 
norms. By understanding the norms in “our” world of society, the moral discourse aims to find 
fair solutions of normative conflicts. The discourse’s normative ideal focuses on what is the 
right thing to do (Outhwaite and Habermas, 1996, p.130-131, Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, 
p.111). 
The ethical discourse is rooted in the subjective world. Outhwaite and Habermas (1996, p.131) 
explains the discourse as “My world of internal nature”. Meaning that the discourse revolves 
around your ideas, values and principles for way of living. In other words, your culture (Eriksen 
and Weigård, 2014, p.109-110). The discourse uses communicative action in order for the 
actors to understand each other and come to a consensus. The discourse itself aims to give 
guidance towards personal self-realization. Its normative ideal is to do what is good (Eriksen 
and Weigård, 2014, p.111).  
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Table 5 Summary of Habermas’ four discourses (Eriksen and Weigård, 2014, p.111) 
Discourse type Content The discourse's task Normative ideal
Legal objective conversation theortically
theories,
descriptions





















Moral social normregulated moral* norms





Traits with the form of argumentation
Discourse
 
I will, in chapter 5 – Research methods and data material, operationalize Habermas’ discourse 
theory in relation to the discourses in the ECtHR. 
Chapter 5 - Research methods and data material31 
The raised research question aims to answer how the ECtHR weigh children’s and parents’ 
rights in care order cases. - In the following chapter I will explain the methods I use to answer 
the research question and how I gathered the necessary data. I will first present the intended 
research method, before presenting how I gathered my data material. Any questions about 
validity and reliability surrounding my research method and data gathering will be addressed at 
the end of the chapter. 
5.1 Qualitative- or quantitative method? 
When choosing a method, there are two main routes to choose: quantitative- or qualitative 
method. While quantitative method gives a statistic generalization of the research question 
being studied, qualitative method gives an analytic description (Grønmo, 2016, p.144).  
My data material is mostly qualitative. Grønmo (2016, p.138) state that data expressed by text 
is the most qualitative type of data there is. In my research, I will use written judgements from 
the ECtHR as my data material. However, some of my data has a quantitative side to it. As I 
will explain later in this chapter, I intend to look at the judicial precedent set by the ECtHR. 
                                                
31 Parts of chapter 5 – Research methods and data material was originally written, by me, as part of a preparatory 
paper to my master thesis. The paper was submitted 25.05.2018 to the University of Bergen as part of a 
compulsory assignment to pass the subject AORG322. 
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Which judgements, and which paragraphs are most referred to and which judgements are most 
referring to others are all metric, quantitative, data.  
In my research, I will mainly use qualitative method. When ruling, the judges of the ECtHR 
use judicial discretion. Nuances in the Courts statements, regarding as to how a case has been 
assessed, may be difficult to pick up in a quantitative study. All quantitative data will, therefore 
be used as a supplement to the qualitative data. 
5.2 Analysis method –discourse analysis and descriptive statistic 
A discourse analysis aims to unveil how a text is structured by a larger pattern of thought. By 
reading “between the lines”, one can interpret what the author really meant. It is done by 
dividing the text in to pre-determined categories, inter alia, values, viewpoint or arguments. 
This analysis method makes it possible to compare different texts to each other (Bratberg, 2017, 
p.185, Grønmo, 2016, p.142).  
In order to shed light on my research question I will conduct a discourse analysis. I will use 
Habermas’ thoughts about discourse ethics to categorize arguments from the ECtHR. 
All arguments stating facts, references to how the ECtHR should assess a law and any legal 
references are all coded in the legal discourse. Arguments that indicate rational choices and 
knowledge are coded in the pragmatic discourse. Any argument referring to ones’ inner self, 
like interests, feeling, and values are coded as ethical arguments. While any argument referring 
to norms in civil society are coded as moral arguments. 
Some arguments can arguably, be placed in more than one discourse category, e.g. there are 
arguments with a legal-, pragmatic- and ethical side stating that the goal of any care order should 
be to reunite the child with its biological parents. Discussion surrounding the potential diversity 
of the arguments will be addressed in chapter 8 – Discussion and concluding remarks. 
Combined with the discourse analysis, I will use descriptive statistic. As mentioned in section 
5.1 Qualitative – or quantitative method, there are some relevant quantitative data. Grønmo 
(2016, p.289) explains descriptive statistics as a mean to analyze a single variable. By looking 
at how many percent of judgements that are citing, inter alia, a judgement or a paragraph, I will 
be able to see the impact each judgement has had on the care order field. I will also use 
descriptive statistics to discuss and compare the findings in the discourse-analysis.  
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5.3 Gathering data - Care order cases in the ECtHR 
All judgements from the ECtHR are entered into a database called HUDOC. The HUDOC 
database provides access to the case-law of the ECtHR32, the European Commission of Human 
Rights33 and the Committee of Ministers34 (HUDOC, 2018). Decisions made in a single judge 
formation are not published, nor are Committee decisions prior to April 201035. Decisions made 
by the Commission prior to 1960, exits only in hard copy in the ECtHR’s archives (HUDOC, 
2018). 
I received an existing data material reviewed by Marit Skivenes and Karl Harald Søvig. Which 
included all care order cases that had appeared before the ECtHR from 1959 – 2016. The search 
itself and the first processing of the material were done by research assistants. The following is 
a description as to how they gathered the information and a presentation of their findings.  
Information about the care order cases in the ECtHR is all searchable in the HUDOC database. 
The following restrictions were made to the search: “Grand Chamber”, “Chamber”, “art.8”36, 
“English” and “sort by relevance”.  
The search words used were “child” AND “care”. This resulted in 370 cases. Of the 370 cases, 
35 were found to be “secure cases”, meaning that it was clear that it was a care order case, 
whereas 24 cases were marked as “uncertain cases”. 11 cases were marked as “struck out of 
list”, meaning that the parts involved had reached a friendly agreement before the ECtHR ruled 
in the case. The remaining cases were dismissed as they did not involve care orders. 
The 11 cases that were “struck out of list” are not relevant in this research as I’m only looking 
at cases where the ECtHR have ruled. 
That leaves 59 cases, where 35 cases were considered “certain” and 24 “uncertain”. The 
material has been jointly reviewed, manually, by Marit Skivenes and Karl Søvig. After the 
review, they were left with 44 cases that involved care orders for the time period 1959 – January 
2016. It is these 44 cases that constitute the base for my data material. 
                                                
32 Grand Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgements and decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions 
and legal summaries from the Case-Law Information Note. 
33 Decisions and reports. 
34 Resolutions. 
35 Just before protocol 14 entered into force. 
36 Art.8 – Rights to respect for private and family life. 
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The following table is an overview over which country the 44 care order cases originate from: 
Table 6 Overview of cases and their country of origin 
Country Cases Country Cases Country Cases
The United Kingdom 11 Germany 2 The Republic of Moldova 1
Finland 5 Norway 2 Poland 1
Sweden 5 Romania 2 Russia 1
Italy 3 Slovenia 2 Slovakia 1
Austria 2 France 1 Spain 1
Croatia 2 Malta 1 Ukraine 1
Overview of cases and their country of origin
 
There are in total 18 countries that have care order cases brought before the ECtHR. As the 
table shows, three countries stand for near half of the cases brought before the Court.  
5.4 Creating a foundation for statistical analysis 
This thesis aims to examine how the court weigh children’s and parents’ rights in care order 
cases. As previously stated, the Court use established case law when justifying their 
assessments. Analyzing judicial precedent set by the care order judgements will show if there 
has been a development in the case law from the aforesaid judgements. I.a. does the ECtHR use 
the same argumentation at present date as it did in 1987?  
Looking at the statistics related to the care order judgements, one senses the development in the 
care order field. To get a grip on how the ECtHR balance children’s and parents’ rights in their 
rulings, one must look at the judgments that have had most impact on the care order field. By 
examining the impact each judgement has had on the care order field and looking as to who is 
in favour in the paragraphs being referred to, one can see if there has been a visible change in 
how the ECtHR assess cases. The statistics will give an indication on which judgements and 
paragraphs that have had the largest impact.  
5.4.1 Finding the descriptive statistics – the cases 
I will distinct between two types of impact, generic and context-based. Generic impact is impact 
on the general merits that are similar in all care order cases, that transcends the merits of a single 
case and are applicable to a larger field. Such as the fact that in all care order cases, a child has 
been taken into public care. Context-based impact is impact on the merits that lay outside the 
generic field, i.a. unique merits for the case in question. If the merits of a case are unique for 
the case in question and not applicable to a larger field, the case may have huge impact on cases 
to come, with similar merits, but not on the care order field as a whole. 
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When looking at which cases have made the biggest impact I examined which cases had created 
judicial precedent for cases to come and thus established case law. Case law is defined as law 
created by the courts (ICLR, n.d.). Meaning, that when the court rules in a case, that case may 
influence similar cases to come. Case law helps secure that everyone is treated similar.37  
When examining the impact a judgement has had on the field of care orders, I have not limited 
my search to the references that are relevant for my research. There is a possibility that a case 
has significant impact in the field of care orders on merits that lay outside my research area. 
Even though the merits are not relevant for my research, they can still have generic impact on 
the care order field. In order to ensure that I could see which cases have had the biggest impact 
on the care order field, as a whole, I included all references where the 44 cases referred to each 
other. 
My data material stretches over three decades. In order to compare judgement from 1987 with 
judgements from 2016 I looked at the judgements referral-rate. To find the referral-rate, I 
looked at how many times a judgement had been referred to and divided the number on potential 
cases that could refer to a judgement. In other words, I looked at how many percent of the cases 
that potentially could refer to a judgement actually did so. As I am trying to see how great an 
impact a judgement has on the field of care orders, I am not interested in the number of times a 
case has been referred to. I am interested in how many different judgements have referred to 
the case in question. The reason for this is that if a judgement refers to a case several times, the 
case has great impact on the judgement in question, but not on other judgements. Many 
references from a judgement to another may also indicate that there are similarities between the 
merits of the two cases in the judgements. By seeing how many unique cases refer to a 
judgement, one may get an indication as to how generic the merits of the judgement are. In 
other words, many different cases referring to a judgement equals large applicability. My 
interests are on the case law field as a whole, not how a case may or may not influence single 
judgements. For these reasons each case is only counted once, regardless of the number of 
references, when finding the referral rate. The referral rate indicates to what extent a judgement 
has established case-law in the care order field. 
The next step in assessing the impact a judgement has had on the care order field is to see how 
many times the judgement refers to other judgements. If the judgement has several references 
                                                
37 See also section 5.5 Creating a foundation for discourse analysis - judicial precedence. 
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to other judgements that may indicate either that the judgment finds itself in an area of well-
established case law or that there is a domestic tradition in the State that are a part in the case 
to anchor the judgement in case-law (Lupu and Voeten, 2018, p.29). For the same reasons as 
aforesaid, I have only counted how many separate judgements a case refers to. Meaning, that if 
a case has multiple reference to one judgement, it is counted as one. What is interesting is 
looking at how many judgements a judgement refers to.  
By comparing a judgements referral-rate with the number of times it has referred to others, one 
can get an indication as to how the judgement has impacted the care order field. I.a., if a case 
has a high referral-rate and refers to few other judgements that may indicate that the judgement 
has brought something new to the care order field, or if a judgment has a low referral-rate and 
refers to several other judgements, that this may indicate that the judgment is in an area of well-
established case law.  
5.4.2 Finding the descriptive statistics – the paragraphs 
In order to identify the paragraphs that have a broad impact on the field of care order cases, I 
examined how many times each of the paragraphs in the judgements were referred to. If a 
paragraph is often referred to it indicates that the content of the paragraph is considered generic. 
To see if there has been a development in how the ECtHR weigh children’s and parents’ rights 
in care order cases, I categorized the paragraphs being referred to in a judgement according to 
the timespan of which they have been referred. By combining the timespan which the paragraph 
has been referred to with who the paragraph favours38, one can get an indication of any 
development in the ECtHRs assessments. Meaning, if there has been a change in the 
argumentation used by the ECtHR from one year to the next, i.a. a change in the number of 
arguments in favour of either the child or parents, this can indicate a development in the ECtHRs 
assessments.  
5.5 Creating a foundation for discourse analysis - judicial precedence 
In my research, I am interested in the argumentation used by the ECtHR when ruling in care 
order cases. I intend to conduct a discourse analysis, where I categorize arguments presented 
by the ECtHR in their judgements. In order to delineate my search for arguments, I will limit 
                                                
38 I.a. the child or biological parents. 
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myself to look at the arguments that have had most impact in the field of care order cases, 
namely, the arguments that have created judicial precedence. 
When ruling in a case, the ECtHR use previous judgements as a mean to justify its decision. By 
using established case-law, the Court secure that all applicant is treated equally. However, this 
only applies in cases were the merits of the case are of sufficient similarity (Lupu and Voeten, 
2018, p.1, LawTeacher, 2013).  
An important part of judicial precedent is the principle of stare decisis. This means that inferior 
courts are bound by the legal principles stated by superior courts. E.g. In the ECtHR, chambers 
are bound by judgements made by the grand chamber (LawTeacher, 2013). This principle is 
evident in the structural changes made to the Court when protocol No. 14 came into force. The 
three-judge committee can only rule by using existing case-law in areas that are well-
established.39 
The ECtHR, as an international court, has one factor that domestic courts do not: cases originate 
from separate countries, each with its own domestic laws and regulations. However, when the 
ECtHR use judicial precedence, country-specific factors do not play a part in the Courts 
decision. The Court solely focus on legal-issues in the case (Lupu and Voeten, 2018, p.27). 
Country factors do, however, play a role when it comes to writing the judgements. If the 
domestic courts have a tradition of anchoring their judgements in case-law, the ECtHR do the 
same when ruling in cases concerning those legal systems (Lupu and Voeten, 2018, p.29). 
I am only looking at the judicial precedence set by the 44 care order cases. As aforesaid, I want 
to examine the arguments the ECtHR use to justify their decisions, when ruling in care order 
cases. These are the arguments that have had an impact on how the Court assesses care order 
cases. For these reasons, I have omitted all references to judgements that are not in the field of 
care orders from my data material. For the remainder of the thesis, when referring to judicial 
precedence, it is limited to precedence created by one of the 44 judgements in my data material 
that is referred to by at least one of the other judgements. 
Of the 44 care order cases that have appeared before the ECtHR, 40 cases use judicial 
precedence in their argumentation. Three of the four cases that do not use judicial precedence 
are all from 1987. They are B. v. The UK, R. v. The UK and W. v. The UK. These were among 
                                                
39 See section 2.2 European Court of Human Rights. 
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the first five care order cases that appeared before the Court. In other words, there were a limited 
amount of care order judgements that could potentially be referred to. The last judgement that 
does not use judicial precedence in its argumentation is R.K. and A.K. v. The UK. However, all 
four judgements that do not use judicial precedence in its argumentation are referred to by 
others. Which means that the four judgements have created precedence for cases to come. The 
referral-relationship between the 44 judgements will be presented in section 6.1 Statistical 
findings – the cases. See also appendix D for table. 
5.5.1 Finding the judicial precedence 
When I read the judgements, I found that different judgements had different reference styles, 
when referring to past cases, e.g. “case of Johansen v. Norway”, “Johansen v. Norway 
judgement of 7 August 1996” and “Johansen v. Norway, 7 august 1996”. The common 
denominator for all references is the applicant and country. I therefore used the applicants name 
and country, e.g. “Johansen”, as a search phrase. This showed me all the cases that were 
referring to Johansen v. Norway (1996). However, it did not give an exact number of referrals. 
If a judgement refers to a case more than once, the second reference may be written differently, 
e.g. “see Johansen, cited above”. Since the country is omitted from the reference, it was not 
picked up by my initial query. To bypass this hindering, I performed a second query, only using 
the applicants name. I then saw how many times the applicants name was mentioned in the 
judgements which were referring to the case in question. In cases where the applicant was 
identified by a single letter, and therefore the search phrase was a single letter, the query picked 
up more than only the references I was seeking. To ensure I only wrote down the references to 
the cases in question, I manually went thru the result from each query. 
In my queries I found that five cases, B. v. The UK, R. v. The UK, O. v. The UK, H v. The UK 
and W. v. The UK often were referred to, in different constellations, as one. E.g., Gnahoré v. 
France (2001) refers to “… the W., B. and R. v. The United Kingdom judgements…” (Gnahoré 
v. France, 2001, para.52). To ensure I did not miss any references, I went thru all references to 
the five cases an extra time. 
When looking at Olsson v. Sweden (1988) I found that there were two separate cases. “Olsson 
v. Sweden” No.1 from 1988 and “Olsson v. Sweden” No.2 from 1992. My interests is limited 
to case No.1 from 1988 as this is a care order case. I therefore dismissed all references to the 
No.2 case from 1992. 
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I entered all the data I had gathered in to a cross-table. This way I could see how many times a 
case had been referred to, how many separate cases that had a reference to the case and how 
many times that case had referred to other cases. See appendix D for table. 
5.5.2 Coding the judicial precedent – initial-categories 
In total there are 153 paragraphs, being referred to 465 times by 34 judgements. 10 judgements 
were not referred to by any other judgement. Not all paragraphs are relevant for my research. 
To delimit the paragraphs according to my research area, I created five categories. The five 
categories, hereafter called the initial-categories, are an initial coding that reflects the essence 
of each paragraph as a whole: 
1. Pro-child  
2. Pro-parents 
3. Biological family 
4. The Court 
5. Other 
The pro-child code covers every paragraph in favor of the child. The paragraphs in this code 
are all focused around the child’s best interest.  Some paragraphs are direct when referring to 
the child’s interest; “…the child’s interest must come before all other considerations” (Gnahoré 
v. France, 2001, para.59); “…consideration of what is in the best interest of the child is in any 
event of crucial importance…” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.66); “… the Court wishes to 
underline that, in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be paramount.” (R. 
and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.73). Others are more subtle; “…decisions may well prove to be 
irreversible: thus, where a child has been taken away from his parents and placed with 
alternative carers, he may in the course of time establish with them new bonds which it might 
not be in his interests to disturb or interrupt by reversing a previous decision to restrict or 
terminate parental access to him.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63); “The Court recalls that a fair 
balance must be struck between the interests of the child and those of the parent (see, for 
example, the Olsson v. Sweden judgment (no. 2) of 27 November 1992, Series A no. 250, pp. 
35-36, para. 90) and that in doing so particular importance must be attached “to the best interests 
of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the 
parent.” (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62). In total there are 30 paragraphs in favor of the child, from 
17 different judgements. 
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The pro-parent code covers all paragraphs in favor of the biological parents. Several of the 
paragraphs are focused around the fact that care orders are a temporary measures; “It would be 
inconsistent with this aim if the making of a care order or the adoption of a parental rights 
resolution were automatically to divest a natural parent of all further rights and duties in regard 
to access.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77), “The Court considers that taking a child into care 
should normally be regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as 
circumstances permit and that any measures of implementation of temporary care should be 
consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent and the child.” (Johansen v. 
Norway, 1996, para.78). Other paragraphs focus on the fact that even a mother that has been 
deprived of parental rights have the right to apply to the ECtHR on her child’s behalf, due to 
being the child’s biological mother; “Even where a mother has been deprived of parental rights 
- and indeed that is one of the causes of the dispute which she has referred to the Court - her 
standing as the natural mother suffices to afford her the necessary power to apply to the Court 
on the child’s behalf too, in order to protect his or her interests.” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 
2012, para.27). The pro-parent code is diverse. The common denominator is that in one way or 
another, biological parents are seen in a favorable light. In total there are 32 paragraphs in favor 
of parents, from 18 different judgements. 
The biological family code covers paragraphs in favor of not splitting up a biological family. 
One third of all paragraphs in this category includes the same sentence: “The exercise of 
parental rights and the mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitute 
fundamental elements of family life” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.60). This code also includes 
paragraphs that states that care orders are temporary measures and that the ultimate aim is to 
reunite the biological family: “It follows that the interest of the child dictates that family ties 
may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to 
preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family. In the interest 
not only of the parent concerned, but also of the child, the ultimate aim of any “care order” must 
be to “reunit[e] the ... parent with his or her child” (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59); “The 
Court recalls that in cases like the present a parent’s and child’s right to respect for family life 
under Article 8 (art. 8) includes a right to the taking of measures with a view to their being 
reunited …” (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.91). This code also 
includes paragraphs stating that parent’s and children’s interests should be weighed against 
each other; “…a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in 
public care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child” (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, 
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para.78). In total there are 29 paragraphs in favor of biological family, from 19 different 
judgements. 
When looking at the paragraphs, it was clear that a greater number of paragraphs were about 
the ECtHRs role in assessing cases. I therefore created a code which I called Court. The Court 
code covers all paragraphs concerning the ECtHR assessments. This code contains significantly 
more paragraphs than the other four codes. In total there are 54 paragraphs, from 18 different 
judgements, in the Court code. The paragraphs themselves vary in content. Some refer to the 
Contracting States margin of appreciation “…in determining whether an interference is 
“necessary in a democratic society” or whether there has been breach of a positive obligation, 
the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States” 
(R. v. The UK, 1987, para.65(d)), “The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent 
national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the 
interests at stake, such as the importance of protecting the child in a situation in which its health 
or development may be seriously at risk and the objective of reuniting the family as soon as 
circumstances permit.” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67), others refer to the ECtHRs 
relation to domestic law: “The phrase “in accordance with the law” does not merely refer back 
to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the 
rule of law; it thus implies that there must be a measure of protection in domestic law against 
arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by, inter alia, paragraph 
1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)” (Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.61(b)), “It is not however the 
Court’s role to examine domestic law in the abstract.” (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.122). 
All in all, the Court-code covers every paragraph that creates a precedent as to how the Court 
should act and assess a case. 
I created the last code, other, in order to catch seemingly interesting paragraphs that do not fit 
into the four other categories. The content of the paragraphs varies from biological parents 
contact with their children, while the children are in public care, to foster parents contact with 
the children: “Moreover, telephone conversations between family members are covered by the 
notions of “family life” and “correspondence” within the meaning of Article 8” (Margareta and 
Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.72), “The applicants also recalled that for the last six 
years the rationale for the continuation of the access restrictions had been that the children had 
to get attached to their foster family and that too close a relationship with their own parents 
endangered this purpose. For the authorities, it had been sufficient that the children were aware 
of their parents’ existence. As this justification had once passed the administrative courts’ 
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proceedings it had been used for the reasoning of the rest of the restriction decisions from ever 
since.” (K. and T. v. Finland, 2001, para.166), “…predominant in any consideration of this 
aspect of the present case must be the fact that the decisions may well prove to be irreversible: 
thus, where a child has been taken away from his parents and placed with alternative carers, he 
may in the course of time establish with them new bonds which it might not be in his interests 
to disturb or interrupt by reversing a previous decision to restrict or terminate parental access 
to him. This is accordingly a domain in which there is an even greater call than usual for 
protection against arbitrary interferences.” (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.62). In total there are 25 
paragraphs, from 15 different judgements, in the other code. 
There are paragraphs that have been coded in more than one category. I.a. if a paragraph could 
be interpreted to be both pro-child and biological family, it has been coded in both categories. 
The same goes for paragraphs that have more than one section. If different parts of the paragraph 
fit different categories, they are coded accordingly. See appendix C for a complete overview of 
the references coded in more than one category 
After the initial coding I was left with 92 paragraphs, being referred to 312 times, by 27 different 
judgements. These paragraphs constitute the base of my analysis. 
5.5.3 Discourse analysis – coding and categorizing the arguments 
I will in the following section present how I intend to conduct my discourse analysis and 
compare argumentations across the five initial-categories. 
As stated in section 5.5.2 Coding the judicial precedent – initial categories, the paragraphs 
coded in each initial-category reflect the essence of the paragraph being referred to as a whole. 
However, the initial-category does not necessarily reflect all arguments presented in the 
paragraph. In other words, in the paragraphs in each of the initial-categories there may be 
arguments that contradict the essence in the paragraph, i.a. in a paragraph coded in pro-child 
category there may be arguments going in favor of the parents.  
Keeping in line with Habermas’s ideas about discourse ethics40, I will look at the sentence 
structure in each paragraph and code all arguments in the paragraph in the appropriate 
discourse-category. To distinct between arguments coded in the four discourse categories, I 
have named them accordingly to the discourse: legal arguments, pragmatic arguments, ethical 
                                                
40 See section 4.1.2 Habermas’ three worlds and 4.1.3 Discourse ethics. 
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arguments and moral arguments. Some arguments are ambiguous, meaning that they could be 
placed in more than one discourse category. The ambiguity of the arguments will be addressed 
in chapter 8 – Discussion and concluding remarks. 
The legal arguments, rooted in the objective world, aim to unveil facts. Arguments coded as 
legal arguments all revolve around rights given by either the ECHR or domestic law. The 
pragmatic arguments, rooted in the objective world, indicate rational choices. Arguments coded 
as pragmatic arguments are arguments that show how the ECtHR aim to reach their desired 
goal, most efficiently. The ethical arguments are rooted in the subjective world. The subjective 
world revolves around one’s inner experiences. Which entails that the arguments coded as 
ethical focus on the interests of the children and the biological parents. The moral arguments 
are grounded in the social world. Moral arguments focus on the unwritten rules in society. 
Meaning, the norms. Society in each Contracting State has its own culture and thus its own 
norms.41 
When looking at the arguments, it is clear that the content of some arguments is relevant, and 
thus repeated, across each of the initial-categories. In order to visualize how arguments are used 
crosswise the initial-categories, I categorized the arguments according to their content and 
created tables. I.a. arguments stating that a care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological 
parents and child, have been categorized as “reunite”.  
One of the initial-categories, “other”, is a mix of references that did not fit into the other four 
categories, which in turn, separates it from the other initial-categories. Direct comparison 
between “other” and the other four initial-categories are, for these reasons, not relevant at this 
point. I have therefore omitted the “other” category in the comparison of argument-categories.  
Since some paragraphs are coded in more than one initial-category, that lead to arguments being 
repeated across the initial-categories.42 As I am coding the argument from each of the initial-
categories in the fitting discourse category, arguments found in paragraphs coded in more than 
one initial-category, can potentially be coded more than once. In order to ensure that the 
arguments are only counted once, I examine how many unique arguments one finds in each of 
the four discourses. Meaning that if an argument from a paragraph, which is coded as i.a. both 
pro-parent and the Court, is coded as legal twice, it will only count as one unique argument.  
                                                
41 See table 3, section 4.1.2 
42 See appendix C for complete overview of paragraphs coded in more than one initial-category. 
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5.6 Validity and reliability43 
In the core of every research stands the question of validity and reliability. Validity tells whether 
or not your research method is the best way of answering your research question. High validity 
means that the chosen research method is well suited to answer the research question, low 
validity means that you are researching something else then what you are supposed to be 
researching (Grønmo, 2016, p.241-242). Reliability on the other hand tells whether or not the 
data gathered correspond with other collections of data about the same phenomenon. High 
reliability means good correspondence, while low reliability means that there are no 
correspondence between the collected data (Grønmo, 2016, p.242). 
In qualitative research, validity means that the researches use different procedures to check for 
the accuracy of the findings. Reliability means that the researches approach is both accurate 
and consistent (Creswell and Creswell, 2018, p.199-202) 
Validity and reliability complement each other. By looking at both factors one can tell whether 
the quality on the data material is good or not. High reliability is a prerequisite for high validity. 
However, high reliability is not a guarantee for high validity (Grønmo, 2016, p.242). 
5.6.1 Validity and reliability in the data gathering 
When searching for care order cases, the search was done in HUDOC.44 The HUDOC database 
is the official database from the ECtHR. All documents in the HUDOC database originate 
directly from the ECtHR, Commission45 or The Committee of Ministers. On the whole, the 
HUDOC database is a credible source. 
Single judge formations and Committees are both omitted from the search. Decisions made in 
single judge formation are not recorded (HUDOC, 2018). A single judge never rules in a case, 
neither did the Committee prior to 2010.46 After 2010, the Committee can rule in in cases where 
case-law is well established. I cannot rule out the possibility that the Committee have ruled in 
care order cases between 2010 and 2016. Meaning, that there may be care order cases, with 
merits that are in an area of well-established case law, that have not been picked up by the 
                                                
43 Parts of Section 5.6 Validity and reliability is a rewrite of a paper written by me, as part of a preparatory paper 
to my master thesis. The paper was submitted 25.05.2018 to the University of Bergen as part of a compulsory 
assignment to pass the subject AORG322. 
44 See section 5.3 Gathering data – Care order cases in the ECtHR. 
45 The Commission were abolished when protocol 11 entered into force. 
46 See chapter 2 – Context. 
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search. However, as it is only Chambers and Grand Chamber who rule in cases where the case 
itself warrant the use of judicial discretion, rulings made in the Committee will not influence 
my research. 
The search is limited to include art.8 of the ECHR. Art.8 – Right to respect for private and 
family life – is the only article in the ECHR that is guaranteed to show in cases concerning care 
orders. Although there are big variations in other articles that are allegedly breached, art. 8 is 
always the common denominator. The delimitation to art.8 in the search for care order cases 
will consequently not have excluded any cases. 
English and French are the only two languages that count as official (ECHR, 1950, preamble). 
All judgements in the ECtHR are written in either French or English (ECtHR, 2018b, rule 
76(1)). Many judgements are written in both languages. In the search for care order cases, the 
search has been limited to only include cases written in English. When limiting the search to 
English it excludes all care order cases written only in French. In my research, I want to see 
how the ECtHR balance children’s and parents’ rights in cases involving care orders. In the 
data material provided to me by Skivenes and Søvig, I have 44 cases that are included in this 
category. The cases originate from 18 different countries. The judgements came from the two 
decision-making bodies of the ECtHR that rules in cases were case-law is not well established 
and the Court needs to use discretion. The variety of cases, both in content and origin, leads me 
to the conclusion that the data material will be sufficient to answer my research question, 
without jeopardizing the validity and reliability of my research. 
5.6.2 Validity and reliability in the data processing – delimitations and analysis 
The question surrounding validity and reliability in my delimitations and analysis is closely 
knitted together. I have, in my analysis, restricted my research to judicial precedent set by the 
ECtHR. I have looked at all references between the 44 care order cases. It is, in each of the 44 
care order cases, references to judgements that are not in the field of care orders. It is also a 
possibility that the 44 care order cases are referred to by judgements outside the field of care 
orders. I cannot positively rule out that there are no judgements outside the care order field, that 
influence how the ECtHR assess care order cases. I do, however, deem it highly unlikely. 
As previously mentioned, not all care order judgements are referred to by one of the other care 
order judgements. Meaning, not all judgement is present in the data material I am analyzing. 
Looking at the judgements that are not referred to by other judgements, they all refer to at least 
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one other care order-judgement. This entails that even though the judgement is not directly 
present in the data material, it is indirectly present. By using judicial precedent, the judgement 
makes its viewpoints heard. However, by delimitating my research to judicial precedent, there 
is a risk that groundbreaking, context-based47, merits are not picked up by my queries.  
This thesis aims to answer how the ECtHR balance children’s and biological parents’ rights in 
care order cases. My research revolves around the field of care orders as a whole. Meaning that 
I am, for the most part, interested in the generic-impact a care order judgement has on the care 
order field. I cannot rule out the possibility that there may be judgements that have created 
larger context-based impact on the care order field, than I give the judgement credit for. This 
does not, however, influence my research on judgements that have created generic-based 
impact.  
Chapter 6 - Descriptive statistics – findings 
Some judgements have created larger ripple-effects in the field of care orders than others. To 
better understand how the ECtHR weigh children’s and parents’ rights in care order cases, it is 
important to look at the cases that have created the largest impact on the field. Which cases 
have had the largest impact, what makes a case important and to what extent has a case created 
a ripple-effect in the care order field?  
I will, in the following section, focus on the numbers behind the care order cases, i.a. which 
judgements have been most referred to, which judgement refers mostly to other judgements and 
which paragraphs are most referred to. In other words, statistics that will help point out which 
judgements have had greatest impact on the care order field and thus created the largest ripple-
effect. It will also give an indication as to which initial-categories48 are most prominent. Lastly, 
the statistic will show if there has been a development in the number of care order cases having 
appeared before the ECtHR over the last three decades. 
In order to understand the significance of the statistical findings, it will help to have a deeper 
understanding of the content of the judgements and paragraphs being discussed. I will therefore 
discuss the statistical findings after presenting my discourse analysis in chapter 8. 
                                                
47 See section 5.4.1 Finding the descriptive statistics – the cases. 




6.1 Statistical findings - the cases 
In total, there are 44 care order cases in my data material. The first cases appeared before the 
ECtHR in 1987, the last in 2016. The first ten years, from 1987 to 1996, there were 10 cases 
appearing before the Court. The next ten years, from 1997 to 2006, there were 14 cases. The 
last years, from 2008 to 2016, there were 20 cases. Meaning, that every decade, there has been 
an increase in care order cases that have appeared before the ECtHR. It is, however, not every 
year a care order case appears before the Court. Table 7 shows an overview how many cases 
appeared before the ECtHR the last three decades. 
Table 7 List of how many care order cases appeared before the ECtHR each year 
Year Cases Year Cases Year Cases
1987 5 1997 0 2007 1
1988 1 1998 1 2008 2
1989 1 1999 1 2009 1
1990 0 2000 2 2010 2
1991 0 2001 2 2011 2
1992 1 2002 3 2012 4
1993 0 2003 1 2013 6
1994 0 2004 1 2014 0
1995 1 2005 0 2015 0
1996 1 2006 3 2016 2
Total 10 Total 14 Total 20
First decade Second decade Third decade
 
When looking at the impact a judgement has had on the field of care orders, I have included all 
references where the 44 judgements referred to each other.49 There were, in total, 465 references 
between the 44 judgement, referring to 153 paragraphs, from 34 judgements. There are 10 
judgements that have 0 referrals. See appendix E for a complete list of the referral rate of all 44 
judgements. Table 8 shows all judgements that are referred to at least once. When looking 
whether a judgement has had generic- or context-based impact (I return to this below), it is a 
prerequisite that the judgements has been referred to. Otherwise it has not yet had an impact on 
the care order field.  
                                                
49 See section 5.4.1 Finding the descriptive statistics – the cases. 
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Johansen v. NO (1996) 23 34 68 % E.P. v. IT (1999) 6 32 19 %
Olsson v. SE (1988) 23 38 61 % Moser v. AT (2006) 3 21 14 %
K. and T. v. FI (2001) 16 29 55 % P. and S. v. PL (2013) 1 7 14 %
Kutzner v. DE (2002) 14 26 54 % M. and R. Anders. v. SE (1992) 5 36 14 %
W. v. UK (1987) 22 43 51 % Saviny v. Ukraine (2009) 2 16 13 %
R. and H. v. UK (2011) 4 12 33 % Buchberger v. AT (2002) 3 27 11 %
Gnahoré v. FR (2001) 9 28 32 % R. v. FI (2006) 2 22 9 %
McMichael v. UK (1995) 11 35 31 % V. v. SI (2012) 1 11 9 %
Scozz. and Giu. v. IT (2000) 9 30 30 % Haase v. DE (2004) 2 23 9 %
P., C., and S., v. UK (2002) 7 25 28 % Aune v. NO (2011) 1 13 8 %
R.K. and A.K. v. UK (2008) 5 18 28 % A.D. and O.D. v. UK (2010) 1 14 7 %
B. v. UK (1987) 11 43 26 % R. v. UK (1987) 3 43 7 %
M.D. and Oth. v. MT (2012) 2 8 25 % L. v. FI (2000) 2 31 6 %
X. v. Croatia (2008) 4 17 24 % Bronda v. IT (1998) 2 33 6 %
K.A. v. FI (2003) 5 24 21 % H.K. v. FI (2006) 1 20 5 %
Y.C. v. UK (2012) 2 10 20 % H. v. UK (1987) 2 43 5 %
Eriksson v. SE (1989) 7 37 19 % O. v. UK (1987) 1 43 2 %  
10 judgements, that has a 0% referral-rate, are omitted from table 8. See appendix E for 
overview. The lack of referrals indicates that the judgements in question have not broken new 
ground. Meaning that they are in an area of well-established case law, but it may also indicate 
that it is a question about time. Meaning that the judgements are still so fresh that any precedent 
they may have established will not be visible for some years. It is, however, worth noting that 
R. and H. v. The UK, which is a fairly new judgement, has a referral rate of 33%. This put R. 
and H. v. The UK amongst the most cited judgements. The newest judgement that has created 
precedence is P. and S. v. Poland, which has a referral rate of 14%. 
As shown in table 8, there are big inequalities as to how many times a judgement has been 
referred to by others. There are also big inequalities in how many times each judgement refers 
to others. Table 9 shows how many different judgements each judgement refers to. For the same 
reasons as aforesaid, I only look to how many care order judgements each judgement refers to, 
not how many times. Unlike the referral-rate presented in table 8, the percentage of how many 
judgements each judgement refers to is not as relevant for the impact of the judgement. Both 
Eriksson v. Sweden (1989) and P. and S. v. Poland refers to two care order judgements. Even 
though the two judgements being referred to may influence the two judgements equally, there 
is a big difference in percentage. I have, for these reasons, sorted the table after how many care 
order judgements each judgement refers to, and I use percentages as an indicator of how many 
of the past care order judgements the ECtHR use in its rulings. 
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Haase v. DE (2004) 15 20 75 % McMichael v. UK (1995) 3 8 38 %
R. and H. v. UK (2011) 12 31 39 % RFI06 3 21 14 %
Kutzner v. DE (2002) 11 17 65 % XHR08 3 26 12 %
M.D. and Others v. MT (2012) 11 35 31 % Aune v. NO (2011) 2 30 7 %
NMD16 11 42 26 % Bronda v. IT (1998) 2 10 20 %
Y.C. v. UK (2012) 11 33 33 % E.P. v. IT (1999) 2 11 18 %
Gnahoré v. FR (2001) 10 15 67 % Eriksson v. SE (1989) 2 6 33 %
HFI06 10 23 43 % KTFI01 2 14 14 %
A.K. and L. v. HR (2013) 9 37 24 % M. and R. And. v. SE (1992) 2 30 7 %
Dolhamre v. SE (2010) 9 28 32 % P. and S. v. PL (2013) 2 36 6 %
P., C. and S. v. UK (2002) 8 27 30 % X. v. SI (2012) 2 34 6 %
ARU13 8 39 21 % A.D. and O.D. v. UK (2010) 1 29 3 %
Moser v. AT (2006) 11 42 26 % B. v. RO (2013) 1 38 3 %
RES13 8 40 20 % Berecová v. SK (2007) 1 24 4 %
Saviny v. UA (2009) 8 27 30 % H. v. UK (1987) 1 4 25 %
JSE16 6 43 14 % Mircea Dum. v. RO (2013) 1 41 2 %
VSI12 5 32 16 % Olsson v. SE (1988) 1 5 20 %
Johansen v. NO (1996) 4 9 44 % O. v. UK (1987) 1 4 25 %
K.A. v. FI (2003) 4 19 21 % B. v. UK (1987) 0 4 0 %
LFI00 4 12 33 % R.K. and A.K. v. UK (2008) 0 25 0 %
Scozz. and Giun. v. IT (2000) 4 13 31 % R. v. UK (1987) 0 4 0 %
Buchberger v. AT (2002) 3 16 19 % W. v. UK (1987) 0 4 0 %  
When reading tables 8 and 9, it is important to keep in mind that in order to use judicial 
precedence, the precedence must be relevant for the case in question. If there are no similarities 
between cases, the ECtHR cannot use judicial precedence in its deliberation. That may be the 
case for Aune v. Norway (2011). Aune has a low referral rate of 8% and only refers to two other 
judgements. The low number of referrals in the judgement and the low referral rate indicate one 
of two things. Either that the judgement in question is in an area of unproven ground. Meaning 
that the circumstances surrounding the case are so special that there has not been many cases 
that can compare to the actual case. Or, it may be that it is a clear-cut case. Which means that 
the law in this case is uncomplicated and that the result is given. This could potentially explain 
why the judgement does not refer to more than two other judgements and has a low referral 
rate. However, Aune came after Protocol No. 14 came into force. It was the chamber that ruled 
in the case. If the case had been in an area of well-established case law, it should have been 
ruled by a three-judge committee. 
If one compares table 8 and table 9, one will see that, in one way or another, all judgements are 
affected by each other. R.K. and A.K. v. The UK, which refers to no other judgement are in turn 
referred to by five other judgements. Meaning that in R.K. and A.K. v. The UK, the ECtHR does 
not lean on past judgement in its deliberations. A referral rate of 28% may indicate that the 
judgement has broken new ground and created new precedence. 
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Haase v. Germany (2004) refers to the most judgements, both in percentages and in actual 
numbers. Haase refers to 15 separate judgements which is 75% of the judgement it potentially 
could refer to. It has, however, a referral rate of only 9%. The high number of references in 
Haase compared to the low referral rate by other judgements, indicate that Haase is in a well-
established area of case law.  
6.2 Statistical findings - the paragraphs 
Table 10 shows all paragraphs that have been referred to seven times or more. These are 
paragraphs that are most referred to and thus have had broadest impact on the care order field. 
Column number three, “coded as” shows how the paragraphs are coded in the initial-
categories50, which gives an indication as to which initial-categories are most generic. 
The paragraphs in table 10 derived from six different judgements, five of which are the 
judgements with the highest referral rate. The sixth judgement, Gnahoré, is number seven on 
the list of highest referral rate. Of the six judgments, with the highest referral rate, Johansen is 
the only one that has a high number of referrals on every paragraph that is being referred to. 
The other five judgements have paragraphs that do not show on the top list. It is also worth 
noting that all the 12 paragraphs presented in the table 10 have been referred to in the entire 
timespan since their respective judgement was written. This indicates that the paragraphs are 
just as relevant at present as they were when the ECtHR wrote the judgements. Viewing how 
the paragraphs are coded, the two most cited paragraph are both pro-child. Pro-child is also the 
initial-category that are most represented in the top 10 list of most cited paragraphs, with five 
paragraphs. There are only two paragraphs coded as pro-parent among the 10 most cited 
paragraphs, both of which are ambiguous. Meaning that they are coded in more than one initial-
category. Paragraphs coded as biological family are the least ambiguous of the paragraphs. With 
three out of four paragraphs coded as only biological family. The Court-category have four 
paragraphs in the top 10 list, three of which are ambiguous, and lastly, the “other”-category 
have three paragraphs in the top 10 list, two of which are ambiguous.  
                                                
50 See section 5.5.2 Coding the judicial precedent – the initial categories. 
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Table 10 List of most cited paragraphs 
Judgement Paragraphs Coded as Referrals Judgement Paragraphs Coded as Referrals
Johansen v. NO (1996) para.64 Court, child 15 Kutzner v. DE (2002) para.67 Child, court 11
Johansen v. NO (1996) para.78 Bio.fam., child 15 W. v. UK (1987) para.62 Court, other 9
Johansen v. NO (1996) para.52 Bio.fam. 13 W. v. UK (1987) para.59 Bio.fam. 8
W. v. UK (1987) para.64 Parent, other 13 Gnahoré v. FR (2001) para.59 Child, parent 8
Olsson v. SE (1988) para.81 Bio.fam. 12 K. and T. v. FI (2001) para.154 Child 8
Olsson v. SE (1988) para.68 Court 11 K. and T. v. FI (2001) para.166 Other 7  
As explained in section 5.4.2 Finding the descriptive statistics – the paragraphs, in order to map 
any development in the ECtHRs assessments, I categorized all paragraphs going in favor of the 
child, of the parent and of the biological family according to the timespan of which they have 
been referred. I created three tables which can be found in appendix H, H1-3. 
Firstly, looking at how many times each of the three categories were mentioned, it is clear that 
arguments in favor of the child are considerably more referred to than arguments in the other 
two categories, with 94 referrals against pro-parents’ 72 and biological families 77.51 However, 
looking at the number of paragraphs being referred to, there is a predominance of arguments in 
favor of the parents. 27 paragraphs are in favor of parents, 24 in favor of children and 17 in 
favor of biological family. This indicate that the arguments in favor of the child have had a 
broader range of impact than the arguments in the remaining two categories. If one looks at the 
number of times each paragraph is referred to, that supports the aforesaid indication. There are 
six paragraphs, in the pro-child category, that have six or more referrals. In the pro-parent 
category, there is two, and in the biological family category there is five. It may also indicate 
that arguments in favor of parents are more case-specific, while argument in favor of the child 
or biological family are more generic.  
Looking at timespan in each of the three tables in appendix H, one can see that both the pro-
parent- and the biological family category have arguments stretching back to 1987, when the 
first five care order cases appeared before the ECtHR. Arguments in favor of the child, however, 
first started being referred to by the Court in 1995.  
                                                
51 See section 5.5.2 Coding the judicial precedent – initial categories, for definitions of the three categories. 
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Chapter 7 - Discourse analysis 
I will in the following section, keeping in line with Habermas’ discourse ethics, distinguishing 
between legal-, pragmatic-, ethical- and moral arguments, conduct a discourse analysis on the 
arguments presented in each of the paragraphs.52  
I will start by presenting the legal discourse. First, I will give an overview as to how the legal 
arguments are categorized, before I give an in-depth presentation of all legal arguments in each 
of the initial-categories; pro-child, pro-parent, biological family, the Court and other.53 Lastly, 
I will discuss the findings in the legal discourse. This process is repeated with each of the 
remaining three discourses. 
When categorizing the arguments in each of the discourses, the “other”-category is omitted. 
This is due to the category’s unique nature. See section 5.5.3 Discourse analysis – coding and 
categorizing the arguments. 
7.1 Legal discourse – findings and discussion 
Legal arguments are arguments pertaining to rights given by the ECHR or domestic law. The 
Court-category has the most legal arguments, with 29 arguments. Pro-parent and pro-child 
have nearly the same number of legal arguments, with 21 and 20, respectively. Biological 
family has 14 legal arguments and the “other”-category have five legal arguments. See table 
11 for overview. 54 
Table 11 Number of legal arguments in each initial-category 
Pro-child 20 Pro-parent 21
Biological family 14 The Court 29
Other 5
Number of legal arguments in each inital-category
 
7.1.1 Categorizing the legal arguments 
Legal arguments can be found across all the other four initial-categories. Table 12 shows an 
overview of how the legal arguments are categorized in each of the four initial-categories, 
respectively. In the Court category, with a total of 29 arguments and seven argument-categories, 
                                                
52 See section 5.5.3 Discourse analysis – coding and categorizing the arguments. 
53 See section 5.5.2 Coding the judicial precedent – initial categories, for definitions of the initial-categories. 
54 Not every legal argument in, inter alia, the pro-child category is in favor of the child. An in-depth presentation 
of all legal arguments in each of the five initial-categories is found in sections 7.1.2 – 7.1.6. 
55 
 
one finds the most legal arguments. Pro-parent and pro-child follow suit, with respectively 21 
arguments and seven argument-categories, and 20 legal arguments and five argument- 
categories. While the biological family category has the lowest amount of legal arguments with 
14 legal arguments coded in five argument-categories. In total there are 84 legal arguments 
spread across 18 different argument-categories. 
Table 12 Overview of the legal argument categories 
Category Judgements Arguments Category Judgements Arguments
Parental rights 7 11 Decision-making 5 8
ECtHR - no sub. 4 4 Family life 3 3
Care order 2 2 Parental rights 2 3
Arbitrary interference 1 2 Access 2 3
Authorities duty 1 1 Representation 1 2
Consideration 1 1
Data 1 1
Category Judgements Arguments Category Judgements Arguments
Public interference 8 8 Decision-making 7 8
Parental rights 2 2 Necessary in a dem.s. 6 7
Reunite 2 2 Arbitrary interference 4 5
Care order 1 1 Representation 2 4
Contact 1 1 Assessments 3 3
Domestic legislation 1 1
Just satisfaction 1 1
Pro-Child legal arguments Pro-Parent legal arguments
Biological family legal arguments The Court legal arguments
 
The two largest argument-categories are “decision-making” and “parental rights”, with 16 - and 
14 arguments respectively. “Public interference” is the third largest category with eight 
arguments. However, while arguments pertaining to “decision-making” and “parental rights” 
are found in more than one initial-category, arguments pertaining to “public interference” are 
only found in the biological family category. Six argument-categories, spread over all four 
initial-categories, have only one argument.  
Arguments revolving around parental rights can be found in three of the four initial-categories, 
in total 14 arguments. Two of the arguments in the pro-parent category, found in B. v. The UK 
para.76 and P., C., and S. v. The UK para.117, are also coded in the pro-child category, which 
means that there are 12 unique arguments pertaining to parental rights. 
The category labeled representation is found in both the pro-parent category and the Court, in 
total six arguments. One argument, found in M.D. and Others v. Malta para.27, is found in both 
categories, which means, there are five unique arguments in the representation category. 
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There are three more argument-categories which are found in more than one initial-category: 
“decision-making”, “care order” and “arbitrary interference”. All arguments coded in these 
categories are unique. Meaning that, in total, there are 16 arguments pertaining to decision-
making, three to care orders and seven to arbitrary interference. 
The arguments in the other categories are all unique, meaning that, in total, there are 80 unique 
legal arguments. 
7.1.2 Pro-Child - In-depth presentation of legal arguments 
The first care order cases brought before the ECtHR are from 1987. Five cases were heard at 
the same time by the Court “…in the interests of the proper administration of justice…” (B. v. 
The UK, 1987, para.4). In one of the first five cases, B. v. The UK, the ECtHR focused on the 
need of the public for protection against arbitrary interference from the authorities. The Court 
emphasized that the domain of care orders “…is an even greater call than usual for protection 
against arbitrary interferences” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). It is the authorities’ duty to be 
cautious when assessing whether to issue a care order. 
When considering taking a child into public care, the authorities base their decision on, among 
other things, statements from professionals. However, professionals are not infallible. In R. and 
H. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that 
“… mistaken judgments or assessments by professionals do not per se render childcare measures 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. The authorities, both medical 
and social, have duties to protect children and cannot be held liable every time genuine and 
reasonably held concerns about the safety of children vis-à-vis members of their family are 
proved, retrospectively, to have been misguided (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81). 
The ECtHR emphasizes that the authorities have a positive duty to protect the child. This duty 
may surpass the parent’s rights to family life. The Court also states that the authorities’ 
obligation to the child is so great, that they should not be held accountable for any action taken 
on the base of a genuine and reasonable concern for the child’s wellbeing. 
Two judgements, Johansen and Kutzner v. Germany (2002), stress that care orders are 
temporary. Both judgements underline that “…any measures implementing temporary care 
should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child.” 
(Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76).  
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In Johansen (para.64), Bronda v. Italy (1998, para.59), Kutzner (para.66) and R. and H. v. The 
UK (para.81), the ECtHR emphasize that the Court is not a substitution for the domestic 
authorities. The domestic authorities have the responsibility for regulating public care of 
children and the rights of the biological parents whose children have been taken into care. In 
other words, the domestic authorities are responsible for their public’s welfare. The ECtHR role 
is to review decision made by local authorities, in light of the ECHR, to potentially unveil any 
infraction on the convention. The four aforesaid judgements span over a time-period starting 
prior to the implementation of Protocol No. 11 and ending after Protocol No. 14 came in to 
force. Meaning, that in regard to the ECtHRs role of assessing these cases, the courts method 
of assessments has apparently not changed. 
11 out of 20 legal-arguments in the pro-child category all relates to parental rights.  These 11 
arguments derive from seven different judgements. 
B. v. The UK has four arguments stating, in one way or another, that a care order should not 
automatically deprive a biological parent of his/her parental rights.  
“… the extinction of all parental right in regard to access would scarcely be compatible with 
fundamental notion of family life and the family ties which Article 8 (art.8) of the Convention 
is designed to protect.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). 
The ECtHR states that it would not be in line with art.8 of the ECHR to deprive biological 
parents their parental rights. In the B. v. The UK-judgement the ECtHR also states that even 
though the authorities only allow parents restricted communication and access to their child, 
that does not necessarily mean that the parents have no parental rights. Parents have still the 
right to agree or refuse to agree to the child’s adoption (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77).  
The Johansen-judgement states that care orders issued by the authorities is a violation against 
the applicants rights to family life, according to art.8, unless it is “…in accordance with the law, 
pursues an aim or aims that are legitimate under paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2) and can be 
regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”.”(Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.52). 
Meaning that parents should not be deprived of their parental rights unless it is absolutely 
necessary. 
In Y.C. v. The UK the ECtHR states that “…where the maintenance of family ties would harm 
the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such 
ties be maintained.” (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). The ECtHR emphasizes the importance 
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of the child’s wellbeing. A child should not be put in harm’s way due to its biological parents’ 
parental rights. The child’s rights trump those of the biological parents. 
Kutzner, P., C., and S. v. The UK, R. and H. v. The UK all focuses on biological parents’ relation 
with their children, after their children have been taken in to care. 
“Following any removal into care, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further 
limitations by the authorities, for example on parental rights of access, as such further 
restrictions entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are 
effectively curtailed” (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.117, see also Kutzner v. Germany, 
2002, para.67 and R. and H. v. The United Kingdom, 2011, para.81) 
The ECtHR emphasize that any limitation, set by the authorities, beyond the care order could 
potentially jeopardize the family relation between the biological parents and a young child. R. 
and H. v. The UK makes a point of mentioning the national authorities’ margin of appreciation 
in regard to taking a child into care, but that the authorities should be careful with any further 
restriction regarding parental access. This is due to parents’ opportunity to sustain a relationship 
with their children. 
7.1.3 Pro-parent – In-depth presentation of legal arguments 
In M.D. and Others, the ECtHR states that a parent may represent his/her child in Court, even 
if one has been deprived of parental rights. Especially if the dispute surrounding the depriving 
of parental rights is the reason as to why one wishes to apply to Court. The ECtHR further states 
that parents’ right to act on their child’s behalf in the ECtHR includes cases were parents are 
not “…entitled under domestic law to represent another…” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, 
para.27). The ECtHR reiterates that a parents standing as a natural parent suffices to “…afford 
her [the child’s mother] the necessary power to apply to the Court on the child’s behalf too, in 
order to protect his or her interests.” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.27). 
The right to act on a child’s behalf is also discussed in B. v. The UK. Here the ECtHR states 
that a parent “…enjoys a continuing right to apply to the courts for the discharge of the order 
or resolution on the ground that such a course is in the child’s interests.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.77). Meaning that a parent may file for a care order to be lifted on behalf of a child, 
claiming it would be in the child’s best interest. The ECtHR emphasize that a care orders aim 
is not to “…extinguish all rights and responsibilities of the natural parent in respect of the child.” 
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(B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). A parent retains the rights to, inter alia, refuse or agree to a 
child’s adoption. 
In P., C., and S. v. The UK, the ECtHR address the importance of not to do anything to hinder 
a reunion between biological parents and child, after a child has been taken in to care. This 
includes, but is not limited to, parental rights of access. The Court reiterates that the taking of 
a child into care should be regarded as a temporary measure with the ultimate aim to reunite the 
biological parents and child. No measures that could hinder such a reunification should be 
implemented (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.117).  
Parental rights of access are also discussed by the ECtHR in B. v. The UK.  
“It would be inconsistent with this aim [sustain link between biological families] if the making 
of a care order or the adoption of a parental rights resolution were automatically to divest a 
natural parent of all further rights and duties in regard to access. … Moreover, the extinction of 
all parental right in regard to access would scarcely be compatible with fundamental notions of 
family life and the family ties which Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention is designed to protect 
… The Court thus concludes that it can be said, at least on arguable grounds, that even after the 
making of the care orders the applicant could claim a right in regard to her access to P [the 
child].” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77) 
Here the ECtHR points out that the removal of parental access would doubtfully be in line with 
art.8 of the ECHR.  The Court also underlines that it would act against a care orders ultimate 
aim of reuniting biological parents and child, if biological parents are automatically deprived 
of all rights regarding access following the removal of a child into care. The ECtHR 
acknowledge that there may be dissenting opinions in this matter but concludes that a parent 
may claim a right in regard to his/her access to the child.  
The care orders ultimate aim of reuniting the biological parent and child and rights regarding 
access has also been discussed by the ECtHR in Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden 
(1992). The Court states that there must be weighty reasons for taking measures that restricts 
parental access and that all measures must be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the 
biological parents and child (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.95) 
Art.8 of the ECHR gives all right to private and family life. In H. v. The UK, the ECtHR states 
that any questions regarding the applicants family life can solely be determined “…in the light 
of all relevant considerations…” (H. v. The UK, 1987, para.90). The Court further states that 
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the effluxion of time should not be a decisive factor when considering whether or not there has 
been a violation of art.8 in regards to family life. 
The ECtHR acknowledges, both in R. v. The UK and X. v. Croatia, that the removal of a child 
from care is an interference with the biological parents family life (R. v. The UK, 1987, para.64, 
X. v. Croatia, 2008, para.45). The Court also emphasizes that biological bonds are not broken 
due to a child being taken in to care (R. v. The UK, 1987, para.64). The relationship between 
biological parents and children is, to a certain degree, everlasting. In P., C., and S. v. The UK, 
the ECtHR states that to take the momentous step of severing the link between biological 
parents and child and effectively cut the child from its roots “… could only be justified in 
exceptional circumstances or by the overriding requirement of the child’s best interests.” (P. C. 
and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.118). In other words, the child’s interests may surpass those of 
the parent. The Court emphasizes that one must look at the content of each case, and especially 
the parent-child relationship, before deciding which measures are justified. If a parent never 
had custody or care for a child, the ECtHR has stated that severing the biological bonds, with 
that parent, fall under the margin of appreciation within the domestic courts (Söderbäck v. 
Sweden, 1998, para.31-34). 
When deciding in cases concerning children, the ECtHR has on several occasions underlined 
the importance of letting the child’s biological parents be a part of the decision-making process. 
In both X. v. Croatia and R. and H. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that if a parent has not “…been 
involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them 
with the requisite protection of their interests” (X. v. Croatia, 2008, para.48, R. and H. v. The 
UK, 2011, para.75), the authorities have failed to respect the parents’ family life and the 
decision made by the authorities will therefore be a violation against art.8 of the ECHR. 
However, if a child is in imminent danger, the parents can be excluded from the decision-
making process. A child should not be put in harm’s way due to parental rights. In order to 
justify an emergency-action, there must be weighty reasons to do so. If there is no urgency in 
the matter at hand, the parents shall be involved (Haase v. Germany, 2004, para.99). 
In W. v. The UK, the ECtHR explains that the reasons to involve parents in the decision-making 
process is to “…secure that their [the parents] views and interests are made known to and duly 
taken into account by the local authority…” (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). Further, the Court 
states that by including the parents in the decision-making process, one secures the parents 
ability to explore and exercise the remedies available to them, in due time. If one is not given 
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the opportunity to use the appropriate remedies as a counter-measure for the authorities’ 
intervention in one’s family life, it can be a violation against art.6 or 1355 of the ECHR. 
However, the Court emphasize that there are situations where the involvement of the parent in 
the decision-making process is neither possible nor meaningful. This includes situations where 
the parents are mentally ill or impossible to reach and in emergencies (W. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.64).  
When it comes to involvement of parents in the decision-making process, the ECtHR have 
stated that the contact between parents and the responsible social-workers can count as an 
appropriate communication channel for the parents to get their views heard by the authorities 
(W. v. The UK, 1987, para.64). However, the Court emphasizes that the contact between 
parents and social-workers should be regular. The Court also points out that when the 
authorities come to a decision, the decision is often based on case reviews. However, in the 
ECtHRs opinion, the decision could equally be based on a continuous monitoring done by a 
representative from the authorities (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.64). 
Art.8(2) of the ECHR states that the public authorities should not interfere in a person’s family 
life, unless it is “necessary in a democratic society” (ECHR, 1950, art.8(2)). In A.D. and O.D. 
v. The UK, the ECtHR reiterates that in order to answer the question of whether or not an 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society” one must examine the case as a whole. 
This includes examining the fairness of the decision-making process (A.D. and O.D. v. The 
UK, 2010, para.82). The phrase “necessary in a democratic society” will be duly discussed in 
chapter 8 – Discussion and concluding remarks. 
7.1.4 Biological family – In-depth presentation of legal arguments 
More than half of the legal arguments in the biological family category revolve around the 
authorities’ interference into parents’ family life. The ECtHR has repeatedly stated that a care 
order is an interference with the parents’ family life and consequently is a violation against art.8 
of the ECHR (See among others W. v. The UK, 1987, para.59, McMichael v. The UK, 1995, 
para.86, K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.92). This is further elaborated by the ECtHR in McMichael 
v. The UK (1995), Bronda and K.A. v. Finland. In the three judgements the Court  states that 
any measures taken by the authorities hindering “the mutual enjoyment between parents and 
                                                
55 Art.6 – right to a fair trial. Art.13 – right to an effective remedy. 
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child” (McMichael v. The UK, 1995, para.86, Bronda v. Italy, 1998, para.51, K.A v. Finland, 
2003, para.92) would constitute an interference with the parents’ rights given by the ECHR.  
In Bronda, the ECtHR emphasize that a child is to be returned to its parents and their home 
even in cases where the child lives with the parents’ family (Bronda v. Italy, 1998, para.51).  
The child’s home is with the biological parents not the biological parents’ family.  
However, the ECtHR points out that there are situations where an interference is justified. In, 
among others, K.A. v. Finland the ECtHR underline that measures interfering with parents’ 
right to family life is  justified if it is “…“in accordance with the law”, purses an aim or aims 
that are legitimate under paragraph 2 of  Article 8 and can be regarded as “necessary in a 
democratic society”.” (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.92). The Court further states that a more 
beneficial environment for the child’s upbringing does not constitute a necessity. There must 
be special circumstances pointing to necessities for the child’s wellbeing in order to justify 
measures that would interfere with the parents’ right for family life.  
The importance of weighing the biological parents’ rights against the child’s best interest have 
been emphasized by the ECtHR on several occasions (see i.a.E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.69, and 
M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). The ECtHR have also repeatedly stated that any care 
order issued has an ultimate aim of reuniting biological parents and their child.56 Any measures 
taken that would be inconsistent with that aim “…should only be applied in exceptional 
circumstances and can only be justified if they are motivated by an overriding requirement 
pertaining to the child’s best interests.” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). Meaning 
that the child’s best interests would justify an interference with the biological parents at the 
expense of their right to family life. Even so, in E.P. v. Italy, the ECtHR states that if the 
authorities fail to “…take all the necessary steps [to reunite the biological parents and child], 
… which could reasonably be expected of them in the circumstances…” (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, 
para.69) it would be a violation against the biological parents’ rights under art.8 of the ECHR. 
The reason for the violation is that the authorities in doing so failed to strike a balance between 
the best interest of the child and the parents’ rights given by the ECHR.  
The importance of reuniting biological parents and child is also brought up by the ECtHR in 
Margareta and Roger Andersson and Saviny v. Ukraine (2009). In Margareta and Roger 
Andersson, the Court states that “…in cases like the present a parent’s and child’s right to 
                                                
56 See i.a. section 7.2.3 Pro-parent – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments. 
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respect for family life under Article 8 [of the ECHR] include a right to the taking of measures 
with a view to their being reunited.” (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, 
para.91). In other words, the authorities have an obligation to take measures ensuring a reunion 
between biological parents and child. In Saviny, the ECtHR underline that any care order should 
be regarded as a temporary measure. The Court emphasizes that a care order could not be 
justified without “…prior consideration of the possible alternatives.” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, 
para.52). Meaning that the Court considers a care order to be a “last-resort” measure. In Saviny, 
the ECtHR also states that a care order “…should be viewed in the context of the State’s positive 
obligation to make serious and sustained efforts to facilitate the reuniting of children with their 
natural parents and until then enable regular contact between them, including, where possible, 
by keeping siblings together.” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.52). Keeping siblings together 
and allowing contact between parents and children ensures that there is a relationship between 
parents and children even though the children have been taken in to care by the authorities. 
In Margareta and Roger Andersson, the ECtHR states that “…telephone conversations between 
family members are covered by the notions of “family life” and “correspondence” with the 
meaning of article 8 [of the ECHR]” (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, 
para.72). When children are taken in to care it is the authorities’ duty to ensure that a 
relationship between biological parents and children can continue to develop. To hinder contact, 
both in person and over telephone, would be a violation against the children and parents’ right 
to family life.  
In Saviny, the ECtHR points out that “…severing family ties means cutting a child off from its 
roots…” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49). The Court further states that in order to justify 
such a measure there must be “very exceptional circumstances” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, 
para.49). In other word there are reasons that would justify breaking contact between biological 
parents and children. However, all measures taken by the authorities must be carefully 
considered and weighed against each other in order to ensure that the measures taken are in line 
with the biological parents’ and the child’s rights given by the ECHR. 
7.1.5 The Court – In-depth presentation of legal arguments 
Art.8(2) of the ECHR states that “there shall be no interference by a public authority … except 
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society…” (ECHR, 1950, 
art.8(2)). Both the phrase “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” 
have repeatedly been addressed by the ECtHR. In Olsson, the Court points out that “in 
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accordance with the law” does not only refer to domestic law, “…but also relates to the quality 
of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law; it thus implies that there must be 
a measure of protection in domestic law against arbitrary interference…” (Olsson v. Sweden 
(No.1), 1988, para.61(b)). Meaning that, according to the ECtHR, there shall be safeguards in 
the domestic legal system that protects their citizens against arbitrary interference.  
In Margareta and Roger Andersson, the ECtHR further elaborates on what the Court means 
with “in accordance with the law”. As in Olsson, the Court points out that art.8(2) of the ECHR 
refers not only to domestic law but also the quality of law. However, the ECtHR emphasize that 
“…the impugned measures should have a basis in domestic law.” (Margareta and Roger 
Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.75). Meaning that any care order issued by the public 
authorities in a Contracting State, must based on domestic law. Further, the ECtHR states that 
the domestic law should be “…formulated with sufficient precision to enable them - if need be, 
with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail.” (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 
1992, para.75). In other words, the domestic law must be phrased in a way that is reasonably 
understandable for anyone who may be affected by it. The ECtHR emphasize that a law that 
confers discretion is not necessarily inconsistent against the before mentioned requirement, 
“…provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with 
sufficient clarity … to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.” 
(Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.75). 
In X. v. Croatia, the ECtHR states that “The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities.” (X. v. Croatia, 2008, para.47). 
This is justified, by the Court, by the fact that some actions are irreversible, such as if a child 
has been taken into public care and later is freed for adoption. The ECtHR emphasizes that 
“This [care orders] is accordingly a domain in which there is an even greater call than usual for 
protection against arbitrary interference.” (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.62, X. v. Croatia, 2008, 
para.47). The reason being that if one acts rashly and commits to an irreversible measure, the 
consequences for those affected by the measure would not be acceptable. 
When it comes to assessing whether or not an interference was “necessary in a democratic 
society” the ECtHR states, in Olsson, that “…the notion of necessity implies that the 
interference corresponds to a pressing social need, and, in particular, that it is proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued…” (Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.67). Meaning that any 
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interference in a persons life must correlate with the social need to intervene and that the 
interference must be commensurate with the need for intervention. Further, the ECtHR 
underline that “…in determining whether an interference is “necessary in a democratic society”, 
the Court will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States.” 
(Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.67). This highlights the fact that the ECtHR acknowledge 
that a certain degree of discretion is needed for the respective authorities to assess the necessity 
of a measure. The ECtHR further states that the Court cannot confine itself to look at the 
impugned decision in isolation but see the case as a whole, to determine whether the 
justification of the measure was “relevant and sufficient”. The Court emphasize that the Courts 
review “…is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State exercised its discretion 
reasonably, carefully and in good faith.” (Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.68). 
In Kutzner (para.63), P., C., and S. v. The UK (para.114), R.K. and A.K. v. The UK (para.34), 
A.D. and O.D. v. The UK (para.82) and Y.C. v. The UK (para.133), the ECtHR states that in 
order to determine whether a measure were “necessary in a democratic society” one needs to 
see each case as a whole. The five judgements also emphasize that in order to justify any 
measure, the measures must be “relevant and sufficient”. The ECtHR does not elaborate as to 
what the Court considers as “relevant and sufficient” in neither Kutzner nor P., C., and S. v. The 
UK, other than “…the reasons adduced to justify them [the measures] were relevant and 
sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8.” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.63, P. 
C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.114). The same concerns A.D. and O.D. v. The UK. However, 
in A.D. and O.D. v. The UK, the ECtHR emphasize that in addition to measures being “relevant 
and sufficient” the decision-making process must be fair and afford due respect to the 
applicant’s rights under art.8 of the ECHR (A.D. and O.D. v. The UK, 2010, para.82). The need 
to see each case as a whole is also the focus in R. and H. v. The UK (para.81). However, unlike 
in the other five judgments, the ECtHR does not use the phrase “necessary in a democratic 
society”. The Court mere states that one must consider the case as a whole in order to examine 
if the reasons “…adduced to justify this measure were relevant and sufficient…” (R. and H. v. 
The UK, 2011, para.81). 
In Y.C. v. The UK, the ECtHR gives a summary on established case-law. 
“The Court’s case-law regarding care proceeding and measures taken in respect of children 
clearly establishes that, in assessing whether an interference was “necessary in a democratic 
society”, two aspects of the proceedings require consideration. First, the Court must examine 
whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were 
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“relevant and sufficient”; second it must be examined whether the decision-making process was 
fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.” (Y.C. 
v. The UK, 2012para.133) 
The summary of case-law does not bring anything new to the field. However, it provides an 
overview of established practices as to how the ECtHR assesses whether an interference was 
“necessary in a democratic society”. 
The ECtHR points out, on several occasions, that although art.8 of the ECHR “…contains no 
explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process involved in measures of 
interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 
8.” (McMichael v. The UK, 1995, para.87, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.56, P. C. and S. v. 
The UK, 2002, para.119, and R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.75).  
As mentioned, the ECtHR has stated that there are no procedural requirements in art.8 of the 
ECHR. However, how the Court assesses decisions, and the related decision-making process, 
made by domestic authorities are repeatedly brought to attention by the Court.  
Time is recognized by the ECtHR as a factor in the domestic authorities’ decision-making 
process and in any related judicial proceeding. The Court states that in cases concerning care 
orders there is a “…danger that any procedural delay will result in the de facto determination 
of the issue submitted to the Court before it has held its hearing.” (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.65). 
For these reasons, the ECtHR underline that any decisions regarding future relations between 
biological parents and child shall be “…determined solely in the light of all relevant 
considerations and not by the mere effluxion of time.” (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.65). In other 
words, time is not an adequate argument in decisions regarding respect for family life. 
In P., C., and S. v. The UK (para.121-122), the applicants claim that a domestic law, governing 
adoptions, is in breach of the ECHR. In response, ECtHR emphasize that it is not the Courts 
role to examine domestic law in abstract. However, the Court states that it can envisage 
situations where the domestic law in question may be applicable and not a violation against the 
ECHR and therefore the law per se is not in breach of the Convention. Instead of assessing the 
domestic law, the ECtHR states that it will examine if the measures taken in the particular case 
are in accordance with art.8 of the ECHR. 
In Saviny, the ECtHR focuses on the quality of the decision-making process. The Court states 
that, in order to assess the quality of the decision-making process, it will see “…whether the 
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conclusion of the domestic authorities were based on sufficient evidentiary bases.” (Saviny v. 
Ukraine, 2009, para.51). To determine whether the conclusion has come on a justifiable basis, 
the ECtHR has made a list of both professionals and laymen that could strengthen the 
conclusion reached by domestic authorities: “…statements from witnesses, reports by 
competent authorities, psychological and other expert assessments and medical notes.” (Saviny 
v. Ukraine, 2009, para.51). The ECtHR also emphasize that the biological parents must have 
had “…sufficient opportunity to participate in the procedure in question.” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 
2009, para.51) and that children must have been able to express their views. 
Regarding decisions made by authorities based on statements from professionals, the ECtHR 
acknowledge that the professionals may be mistaken in their assumptions. 
“…mistaken judgments or assessments by professionals do not per se render child-care measures 
incompatible with the requirements of Article 8. The authorities, medical and social, have duties 
to protect children and cannot be held liable every time genuine and reasonably-held concerns 
about the safety of children vis-à-vis members of their families are proved, retrospectively, to 
have been misguided.” (R.K. and A.K. v. The UK, 2008, para.36) 
In other words, the authorities’ positive duty to protect the health and development of children 
justifies any measures taken, if the measures are taken on the base of genuine and reasonably 
held concern about the child’s welfare. This includes cases where the concerns later prove to 
be unjustified. 
The ECtHR acknowledge that there may be discrepancy between biological parents and the 
authorities, when it comes to decide what is in the child’s best interest. In both Scozzari and 
Giunta (2000para.138) and M.D. and Others (para.27), the ECtHR states that even in situations 
where biological parents have been deprived of parental rights, they may represent their child 
in cases before the Court. This is particularly important if the biological parents and the 
authorities are in conflict. Further, the ECtHR states that a mothers standing as a “…natural 
mother suffices to afford her the necessary power to apply to the Court on the children’s 
behalf…” (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.138, and M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, 
para.27). 
7.1.6 Other – In-depth presentation of legal arguments 
The ECtHR have summarized established case-law in both B. v. The UK and R. v. The UK. The 
summary is identical in the two judgments. Firstly, the Court emphasizes that any interference 
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from the domestic authorities with a person’s right to respect for family will be a violation 
against art.8 of the ECHR, “…unless it was “in accordance with the law”, had an aim or aims 
that is or are legitimate under Article 8 § 2 (art.8-2) and was “necessary in a democratic society” 
for the aforesaid aim or aims.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.61(a), R. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.65(a)). In other words, unless there are compelling reasons that would justify an 
interference in a person’s right to respect for family life, the interference will be a violation 
against art.8 of the ECHR. Further, the ECtHR points out that although the object of art.8 of the 
ECHR is to protect individuals against arbitrary interference from the authorities, there may be 
additional obligations inherent in an effective “respect for family life” (B. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.61(c), R. v. The UK, 1987, para.65(c)).  
In R. and H. v. The UK, the ECtHR emphasize the importance of taking extra care in 
proceedings that may lead to a child being put up for adoption. The Court points out that “…the 
decision-making process involved in measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford 
due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.75). In 
order for an interference to be justified, the parents must be involved in the decision-making 
process to a degree that is sufficient to protect their interests. The ECtHR points out that it is 
the same principles that apply in all cases involving children, “…but they apply with greater 
force when those proceedings may culminate in a child being removed from their biological 
parent and placed for adoption.” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.76).  
7.1.7 Discussing the legal arguments 
In section 1.1 In-depth presentation of research question, I presented four supportive questions 
that would guide my research towards understanding how the ECtHR weigh children’s and 
parents’ rights in care order cases. I will in the following section discuss how the legal 
arguments may give some answers to the questions.  
The first supportive question relates to how the ECtHR assess cases and secure the rule of law, 
across 47 different judicial systems, for everyone. 
Looking at the ECtHRs decision making process, the Court emphasize that it is not a 
substitution for the domestic authorities. The Courts role is to review decision made by local 
authorities, in light of the ECHR, to potentially unveil any infraction on the convention (see i.a. 
Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.64, and R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81). When reviewing 
decisions made by domestic authorities, the ECtHR look towards how the decisions are 
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justified. As previously mentioned, the decision made by domestic authorities is strengthened 
if the decision is supported by the statement of i.a. professionals, laymen or witnesses (see i.a. 
R.K. and A.K. v. The UK, 2008, para.36, and Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.51). By 
encouraging the domestic authorities to use, i.a., professionals in their decision-making process, 
the ECtHR secure that the decisions made by the domestic authorities are rooted in expert 
knowledge. 
The ECtHR points out that any measure implemented by the domestic authorities, should be 
rooted in domestic law. The ECtHR underlines that there must be safeguards in the domestic 
legal system to secure against arbitrary interference. Further, the law should be phrased in a 
way that is reasonably understandable for the ones that are affected by it. Any law phrased in a 
way that opens for discretionary assessments should ensure that “…the scope of the discretion 
and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity…” to ensure the individuals 
protection against arbitrary interference (Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.61, Margareta 
and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.75).  On several occasions, the ECtHR emphasizes 
that in order to assess if the reasons used to justify the measure was relevant and sufficient, one 
must see the case as a whole. The same is relevant for situations where the ECtHR assess 
whether the impugned measure was “necessary in a democratic society” (ECHR, 1950, art.8, 
A.D. and O.D. v. The UK, 2010, para.82, andR. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81). 
Art.8(2) of the ECHR states that in order for an interference to be justified it must be “in 
accordance with the law” or “necessary in a democratic society”. While the phrase “in 
accordance with the law” underlines the authorities’ obligation to root any measure taken in 
domestic law, the meaning behind the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” is more 
elusive. In Olsson v. Sweden (No.1) (1988, para.67) the ECtHR states that the notion of 
necessity implies that there is a pressing social need to interfere. The Court also reiterates that 
a margin of appreciation is left to the domestic authorities in determining the necessity of an 
interference.  
To summarize, the legal arguments state that it is the role of the ECtHR to assess whether the 
measures taken by the authorities are “in accordance with the law” or “necessary in a democratic 
society. In order to see if the measure was “in accordance with the law”, the ECtHR review 
how the authorities justified the measure. How the ECtHR assess whether an interference was 
“necessary in a democratic society”, has been summarized by the Court in Y.C. v. The UK 
(2012, para.133): “First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, 
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the reasons adduced to justify the measures were “relevant and sufficient”; second it must be 
examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the 
applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.”. 
The second supportive question revolves around the child’s best interests. A care order is issued 
to protect the child’s best interest.57 Who is involved in the decision-making process leading up 
to a care order being issued and who decides what is in the child’s best interests?  
As shown in table 12, in section 7.1.1, decision-making is the largest legal-argument category. 
The decision-making arguments are only found in the paragraphs coded in the pro-parent- and 
the Court category. The arguments pertaining to decision-making is mainly focused on parents’ 
involvement in the decision-making process.  W. v. The UK (1987) is one of the judgements 
with the highest referral-rate.58 Three of seven paragraphs being referred to in the judgement 
revolve around the decision-making process. In W. v. The UK (1987, para.63 and para.64), the 
ECtHR states that parents must be involved in the decision-making process to an extent that 
their interests are heard. However, that does not necessarily mean that the parents must be 
involved directly. On the contrary, the ECtHR state that if there is regular contact between the 
parents and a social worker that contact may be enough to let the parents’ interests be known. 
The fact that parents must be involved in the decision-making process to an extent that their 
interests are known, are reiterated by the ECtHR time and time again. The ECtHR points out 
that art.8 of the ECHR does not contain any explicit procedural requirements but that the 
decision-making process involved in an interference must offer the affected due respect (See 
i.a. McMichael v. The UK, 1995, para.87, and Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.56). The ECtHR 
has repeatedly stated that the care order field is an area in need of “…even greater call than 
usual for protection against arbitrary interference.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). The need for 
extra protection against arbitrary interference can be seen in light of the lack of procedural 
requirements. No procedural requirement gives the Courts, and authorities, an even greater 
discretionary power. 
Looking at the legal arguments it is clear that the parents must in one way or another be involved 
in the decision-making process. The ECtHR has stated that to not include parents in the 
decision-making process is a violation against the parents’ rights under art.8 of the ECHR (X. 
v. Croatia, 2008, para.48, and R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.75). However, the ECtHR 
                                                
57 See section 2.1 Care orders. 
58 See table 8, section 6.1. 
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emphasizes that if there are pressing reasons to not include the parents in the decision-making 
process, such as the child’s wellbeing, their rights may be waived. The child’s wellbeing 
surpasses the parents’ rights (Haase v. Germany, 2004). Besides pointing out that the children’s 
wellbeing may cause the ECtHR to waive parents’ rights, children are rarely mentioned in legal 
arguments pertaining to decision-making process. There is only one paragraph, referred to once, 
that state that children must have been able to express their views in a decision-making process 
(Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.51), otherwise children are not mentioned. This may indicate 
that due to the children being minors others choose what they believe to be in the child’s best 
interests.  
How the authorities reach a decision and the quality of their conclusion has been addressed by 
the ECtHR. The ECtHR states that the authorities decision is often based on case reviews, but 
could equally be based on a continuous monitoring done by a representative from the authorities 
(W. v. The UK, 1987). In Saviny (2009, para.51), the ECtHR have made a list of professional 
and laymen that could strengthen the conclusion reached by domestic authorities: “…statements 
from witnesses, reports by competent authorities, psychological and other expert assessments 
and medical notes.”. The Court points out that any conclusion the authorities reach must be 
taken on sufficient evidentiary bases. 
A care order is issued to protect the health and development of a child.59 In other words, a care 
order is issued if the authorities believe it to be in the child’s best interest. That raises the 
question, who knows what is best for the child? The ECtHR acknowledge that there may be 
disagreements between what the authorities believe to be in the child’s best interest and what 
the biological parent believe. “A mother knows best” is a generally known phrase. That phrase 
is not necessarily always correct. However, the ECtHR points out that in cases where biological 
parents are in a conflict with the authorities, that may lead to situations where the children’s 
interest is not adequately brought to the Courts attention. For these reasons will a mothers 
standing as biological mother suffice to give her the power to represent the child in proceeding 
before the ECtHR (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.138, and M.D. and Others v. Malta, 
2012, para.).  
To summarize, what is in the child’s best interests is up for debate. Professionals, laymen and 
biological parents all have a say in the matter. As aforesaid, the authorities must base their 
                                                
59 See section 2.1 Care orders. 
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decision on sufficient evidentiary bases. The authorities’ conclusion is strengthened if it is 
supported by professionals and laymen. However, professionals are not infallible. Neither are 
laymen. This, in turn, leads to decisions taken on sound ground in the child’s best interests, in 
retrospect, not to be in the child’s best interests. In both R.K and A.K. v. The UK (2008, para.36) 
and R. and H. v. The UK (2011, para.81) the ECtHRs states that authorities cannot be held 
accountable for actions taken due to genuine and reasonable concerns about a child’s wellbeing. 
Which, in turn, relates back to the fact that the child’s best interests surpass the biological 
parents’ rights. The fact that errors are made emphasize the importance of a safety net, such as 
a biological parents’ right to represent their child in the ECtHR in cases where they have lost 
their parental rights (See i.a. Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.138).  
The third supportive question revolves around the children’s human rights, to which extent they 
are granted rights under the ECHR and how their rights are adhered to by the ECtHR. 
Looking at the legal arguments, there are no arguments directly stating as to what extent 
children have rights, nor how the child’s rights are adhered to. Seemingly, children’s rights are 
of a more in-direct nature. In Y.C. v. The UK (2012, para.134) the ECtHR states that a child 
should not be put in harm’s way due to its biological parents’ rights. The statement does not 
say to what extent children have rights. However, it does say that children’s right to protection 
trumps the biological parents’ right to family life. 
The child’s right to protection is also brought to the table in  R. and H. v. The UK (2011, 
para.81). The ECtHR states that the authorities have a positive duty to protect the child’s 
wellbeing to an extent that parents’ right may be surpassed. The authorities’ duty towards the 
child is of such a magnitude that they cannot be held accountable for decision proven, in 
retrospect, to be misguided. Meaning that any decision taken in the child’s best interests, on the 
base of “…genuine and reasonably held concerns about the safety of children vis-à-vis members 
of their family…” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81) is justified, even though it is a violation 
against the biological parents’ rights. 
The ECtHR has stated on several occasions that the child’s interests must always be weighed 
against the biological parents’ rights (See i.a. E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.69, and M.D. and Others 
v. Malta, 2012, para.76). Even so, the ECtHR reiterates on several occasion that the child’s best 
interests is an “…overriding requirement…” (See i.a. P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.118, 
and M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). An overriding requirement indicates that the 
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child’s interests surpasses the biological parents’ rights, and in situations where children and 
parents’ interests differ, the biological parents’ interests are not taken into consideration. 
However, there must be special circumstances pertaining to the child’s wellbeing in order for 
any measures taken in the child’s best interests to be justified (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.92).  
The biological parents’ rights and the child’s interests can be related. When one speaks about 
the biological family, it is a two-way relationship. When the child is taken into public care, it 
would constitute a violation against both the child’s and parents’ rights to automatically sever 
all ties between them. The ECtHR stress the importance of letting the relationship continue to 
develop, while the family is apart. Therefore, sustaining contact between the biological parents 
and child while the child is in public care is of the utmost importance and hindering such a 
contact is a violation against both the biological parents’ and the child’s rights, unless there are 
compelling reasons to justify abolishing all contact (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. 
Sweden, 1992, para.72). 
To summarize, the legal arguments points to the fact the child’s interests and rights trumps 
those of the parents. It is, however, not enough to state that being in public care is a more 
beneficial environment for the child. There must be compelling reasons pertaining to the child’s 
wellbeing for a measure, interfering with the biological parents’ right to family life, to be 
justified (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.92). There are no legal arguments directly stating how 
children’s rights should be adhered to by the ECtHR. Seemingly, the bottom line is that 
children’s rights are a question of what is in the child’s best interests. If the child’s health or 
development is at risk, any interference with the biological parents’ rights is justified. 
The last supportive question revolve around the ECtHRs relationship with the CRC and if the 
CRC influence the decisions made by the Court. There are no legal arguments pertaining to the 
CRC. Meaning that, seen from a legal-argument perspective, there is no judicial precedent 
stating if and how the CRC affects the ECtHR. 
7.2 Pragmatic discourse – findings and discussion 
Pragmatic arguments are arguments indicating rational-choices, or how one most efficiently 
can reach the desired goal. There are most pragmatic arguments found in the pro-child category, 
with 24 arguments. The Court-category have 15 pragmatic arguments. Pro-parent and 
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biological family each have five, and the “other”-category have one pragmatic argument.60 
Table 13 shows an overview of how many pragmatic arguments are found in each of the five 
initial-categories.  
Table 13 Number of pragmatic arguments in each initial-category 
Pro-child 24 Pro-parent 5
Biological family 5 The Court 15
Other 1
Number of pragmatic arguments in each inital-category
 
7.2.1 Categorizing the pragmatic arguments 
As with legal arguments, pragmatic arguments can be found in all four initial-categories. The 
pro -child category, with 24 pragmatic arguments and eight categories, has as many pragmatic 
arguments as found in total in the remaining three initial-categories. In total there are 48 
argument coded in nine argument-categories. The largest argument-category is “reunite” with 
13 arguments, followed by “direct contact” with nine arguments. Both “child’s best interest” 
and “margin of appreciation” has eight arguments. Of the four largest argument-categories, 
“child’s best interest” is the only one that is only found in one of the initial-categories. The 
other three categories are all found in more than one initial-category. In both “the Court”-
category and in “pro-child” one finds both discretion and margin of appreciation. In its 
argumentation, the ECtHR distinct between the states margin of appreciation and the 
discretionary choice the domestic authorities make when issuing a care order. The two aforesaid 
categories can arguably be overlapping. This will be addressed in chapter 8 – Discussion and 
concluding remarks. Table 14 shows an overview of the pragmatic argument categories. 
                                                
60 Not every pragmatic argument in, inter alia, the pro-child category is in favor of the child. An in-depth 
presentation of all pragmatic arguments in each of the five initial-categories is found in sections 7.2.2 – 7.2.6. 
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Table 14 Overview of the pragmatic argument categories 
Category Judgements Arguments Category Judgements Arguments
Child's best interest 7 8 Reunite 5 5
Reunite 4 5
Direct contact 3 3
Margin of appreciation 2 3 Category Judgements Arguments
As a whole 2 2 Reunite 3 3
Balance parent-child 1 1 Margin of appreciation 2 2
Discretion 1 1
Acting on childs behalf 1 1
Category Judgements Arguments
Direct contact 6 6
Discretion 3 3
Margin of appreciation 3 3
Decision-making 1 2
Pro-Child pragmatic arguments Pro-Parent pragmatic arguments
Biological family pragmatic arguments
The Court pragmatic arguments
 
As aforesaid, “Reunite” can be found in three of the four initial-categories. Two arguments, 
found in Gnahoré para.51 and Kutzner para.76, are coded in both the pro-parent – and the 
biological family category. This entails that there are 11 unique arguments in the “reunite” 
category. 
Arguments coded as “direct contact” are found in both the pro-child- and the Court category. 
All three arguments from the pro-child category, found in Johansen para.64, Kutzner para.66 
and R. and H. v. The UK para.81, is also found in the Court category. Which mean that there 
are six unique pragmatic arguments pertaining to “direct contact”. 
The “margin of appreciation” category is found in the pro-child-, the biological family- and the 
Court category. Of the eight arguments coded in this category, two, found in E.P. v. Italy para.62 
and Kutzner para.67, are coded in more than one of the initial-categories. In other words, there 
are six unique arguments pertaining to “margin of appreciation”. 
In the pro-child category there is one argument coded as “discretion”. This argument found in 
B. v. The UK para.63, is also coded in the Court category. Meaning that there are three unique 
arguments in the “discretion” category. 
All other arguments are unique. Which mean, there are 40 unique pragmatic arguments divided 
into nine argument categories. 
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7.2.2 Pro-child – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments 
Some of the pragmatic arguments relates to how the ECtHR should view a case. Olsson and 
Bronda both highlight the importance of viewing the case as a whole in order to examine 
whether or not a measure taken by the authorities were justified.  
“The Court reiterates that in determining whether the impugned measures were “necessary in a 
democratic society”, it has to consider whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons 
adduced to justify them were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 
8.” (Bronda v. Italy, 1998, para.59). 
It is worth noting the sentence “necessary in a democratic society”. According to art.8 of the 
ECHR, in order for a measure taken by the authorities to be justified, it must be “necessary in 
a democratic society”. What constitutes as “necessary in a democratic society” is not defined 
by the ECHR.  
If a case concerning a young child, the child may not always be able to speak for itself. Who 
knows what is best for the child has been discussed by the ECtHR. In Scozzari and Giunta, the 
ECtHR stated that “…even though the mother has been deprived of parental rights … her 
standing as the natural mother suffices to afford her the necessary power to apply to the Court 
on the children’s behalf, too, in order to protect their interests.” (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 
2000, para.138). Meaning, that a biological parent may represent his or her child in the ECtHR 
on the base of being the child’s biological parent, even though the parent has lost all parental 
rights. In other words, the ECtHR acknowledge the biological parents’ knowledge of what is in 
their child’s best interest and thus they [the biological parents] can apply to the Court on their 
child’s behalf. 
Johansen emphasizes the need to balance children and parents’ rights. “… a fair balance has to 
be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in public care and those of the parent 
in being reunited with the child.” (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78). Meaning that what is 
in the child’s best interest should be weighed against the care orders ultimate aim of reuniting 
parent and child. 
P., C., and S. v. The UK, K.A. v. Finland, M.D. and Others and Y.C. v. The UK all focus on the 
importance of reuniting the biological parents and their children. K.A. v. Finland underlines that 
“…the Court (ECtHR) has reiterated time and again, the taking of a child into public care should 
normally be regarded as a temporary measure…” (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.138). Since any 
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care order should be considered a temporary measure the ECtHR, in the four judgements, also 
stress the importance of national authorities facilitating the reunification of the family as soon 
as the situation permits. Y.C. v. The UK emphasize the importance preserving personal relations 
in order to “rebuild” the family (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). However, a reunification of 
the family should only be permitted as long as the wellbeing of the child is secure. This is 
underlined by M.D. and Others. In M.D. and Others the ECtHR states that child’s best interest 
is an “overriding requirement” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). The child’s best 
interest is also highlighted in K.A. v. Finland. Here the ECtHR states that the importance of 
reuniting the family as soon as situation permits should always be balanced “…against the duty 
to consider the best interests of the child.” (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.138). 
The ECtHR repeatedly acknowledge the national authorities’ margin of appreciation. In B. v. 
The UK the ECtHR states that it would add to the national authorities problems, if the ECtHR 
required the authorities to follow “…an inflexible procedure…” on each occasion (B. v. The 
UK, 1987, para.63). In E.P. v. Italy, the ECtHR merely states that “…the State enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation.” (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62). In Kutzner however, the ECtHR states 
that the national authorities margin of appreciation will “…vary in the light of the nature of the 
issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake…” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67). The 
Court further states that one must protect children in situation where their health or development 
is at risk. 
In Kutzner, the ECtHR recognizes the national authorities’ wide margin of appreciation in 
assessing the children’s need for protection and thereunder the necessity of a care order 
(Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67). The Court stress the fact that national authorities have an 
upper hand in assessing the situation leading up to a care order and the time afterwards. 
“…it must be borne in mind that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with 
all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or 
immediately after their implementation.” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81, see also 
Johansen v. Norway,1996, para.64 and Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.66). 
The ECtHR acknowledge that the direct contact with the parties concerned as the situation 
progresses is beneficial when deciding whether or not a care order should be issued. However, 
it does not mean that the national authorities are infallible. It merely means that the it must be 
taken into account that the national authorities have first-hand experience with each case, while 
the ECtHR rely on second hand information. 
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A third of the pragmatic arguments in the pro-child category revolves around the child’s best 
interest, or more specifically, the importance of keeping the child’s best interest in mind when 
deciding in matters concerning the child. The child’s best interest will also be a topic when 
discussing ethical arguments. In this section the focus is on the pragmatic use of the child’s best 
interest as an argument for deciding in matter concerning the child.  
In Y.C. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that “…the best interest of the child are paramount.”, when 
considering whether or not a child should be put up for adoption and thus sever all ties with its 
biological family (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). The Court emphasizes the importance of 
doing what is best for the children’s development or health. In R. and H. v. The UK, the ECtHR 
states that to authorize adoption and hence sever a child’s ties with its biological family “…can 
only be justified if they [the measures taken] are motivated by an overriding requirement 
pertaining to the child’s best interest.” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81, see also Aune v. 
Norway, 2011, para.66 and P., C. and S. v. the United Kingdom, 2002, para.118). In other 
words, unless the measures are taken based on the child’s best interested, they cannot be 
justified. 
In Saviny, the ECtHR emphasizes the importance of considering the child’s best interest in the 
decision-making process. 
“A relevant decision must therefore be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty 
considerations in the interests of the child, and it is for the respondent State to establish that a 
careful assessment of the impact of the proposed care measure on the parents and the child has 
been made.” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49) 
Within the deliberation of what is in the child’s best interest, the Court emphasize the 
importance of assessing the ramifications of the proposed care measure has on both parent and 
child. However, it is still the child’s best interest that is the weighty consideration. 
7.2.3 Pro-parent – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments 
All five pragmatic arguments, in the pro-parent category, revolve around the same principle: 
the speedy reunion between biological parents and children after a child has been taken in to 
care. 
In both Johansen and E.P. v. Italy, the ECtHR states that a care order should “…normally be 
regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit” (Johansen 
v. Norway, 1996, para.78, E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.64). In Kutzner, the Court has chosen another 
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phrasing. Here the ECtHR use the phrase in principle instead of normally, while the rest of the 
paragraph is the same as in the other two judgements (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76). 
There is little practical difference between “in principle” and “normally”. All three judgements 
emphasize that a care order is a temporary measure that should be discontinued as soon as 
possible. The ECtHR also states in the three abovementioned judgments that all care orders 
have an ultimate aim of reuniting biological parents and children.  
In Eriksson, the ECtHR states that it is the parents’ right under art.8 of the ECHR to have 
measures taken to secure the reunion between biological parents and child. If the authorities fail 
to implement such measures, that would constitute a violation against the biological parents’ 
right to family life (Eriksson v. Sweden, 1989).  
In Gnahoré, the ECtHR states that art.8 of the ECHRs object is to secure the public against 
arbitrary interference from the authorities. This is used as an argument to underline the 
authorities’ obligation to facilitate a reunion between biological parents and child, in cases were 
“…the existence of a family tie has been established…” (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.51). 
The Court emphasizes that it is the authorities’ duty to not only take measures to enable 
biological parents and children to be reunited, but also to make sure that the bond between 
biological parent and children is being developed (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.51). 
7.2.4 Biological family – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments 
Three out of five of the arguments in this category focus on the reunion of biological parents 
and their children after a care order have been issued. The four arguments all originate from 
different judgements. A common denominator for all four arguments is the discontinuation of 
a care order, as soon as the circumstances permit. In Olsson, the ECtHR states that since there 
has been no question about the children being adopted, the care order should be “…regarded as 
a temporary measure…” (Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.81). In other words, as long as 
there are no questions about the permanent care for the children the ECtHR considers any 
measure taken to be temporary and should hence be discontinued as soon as circumstances 
permit.  
In Gnahoré, the ECtHR underline the importance of taking measures that reunite biological 
parents and children in cases where a family tie has been established. The Court also emphasizes 
that where a family tie has been established “…the State must in principle act in a manner 
calculated to enable that tie to be developed…”(Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.51). The ECtHR 
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emphasizes the importance of maintaining a bond between the biological parents and children 
when the children are in public care, in order to reach the care orders ultimate aim of reuniting 
biological parents and children. 
The ECtHR have highlighted the importance of a speedy reunion between biological parents 
and child in Kutzner.  
“The positive duty to take measures to facilitate family reunification as soon as reasonably 
feasible will begin to weigh on the responsible authorities with progressively increasing force 
as from the commencement of the period of care, subject always to its being balanced against 
the duty to consider the best interests of the child.” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76). 
The best interest of the child forms the basis of all arguments about the reunification of the 
biological family. However, the authorities have an obligation to take measures to ensure that 
the biological family are reunited as soon as circumstances permits. The authorities must 
consider that the longer the child is in public care the more difficult it will be for the biological 
parents and children to maintain, and develop, a relationship. 
The last two arguments in this category are about the Contracting States margin of appreciation. 
In E.P. v. Italy, after talking about balancing the interests of the child and the biological parents 
and emphasizing that the authorities cannot authorize any measure that would “…harm the 
child’s health and development”, the ECtHR simply states “Moreover, the State enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation.” (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62). The statement comes without any 
elaboration. 
In K.A. v. Finland, the ECtHR elaborates on the extent of the authorities’ margin of 
appreciation. 
“Whereas the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of 
taking a child into public care, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further 
limitations, such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access. Such 
further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young 
child are effectively curtailed. The minimum to be expected of the authorities is to examine the 
situation anew from time to time to see whether there has been any improvement in the 
family’s situation. The possibilities of reunification will be progressively diminished and 
eventually destroyed if the biological parents and the child are not allowed to meet each other 
at all, or only so rarely that no natural bonding between them is likely to occur.” (K.A v. 
Finland, 2003, para.139). 
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The ECtHR effectively restricts the authorities’ margin of appreciation. The Court states that 
the authorities are free to make the discretionary choices needed when assessing whether or not 
to take a child into public care and in that regard enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. However, 
when considering other measures, like restricting parental access or any measure that could 
endanger the reunion of biological parents and child, the ECtHR calls for “stricter scrutiny”. 
The Court further states that there expectations as to how the authorities should act in cases 
where a child has been taken in to public care. The Court also sheds a light on the fact that any 
measure taken that would hinder parental access could potentially cause it to be impossible to 
reunite biological parents and child, due to the natural bond between them being broken. 
7.2.5 The Court – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments 
In Johansen (para.64), Kutzner (para.66), P., C., and S. v. The UK (para.115), R.K. and A.K. v. 
The UK (para.34), A.D. and O.D. v. The UK (para.83) and R. and H. v. The UK (para.81), the 
ECtHR emphasizes that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all 
persons concerned, when assessing the necessity of a measure. The contact between all persons 
concerned are “…often at the very stage when care order are being envisaged or immediately 
after their implementation.” (see among others Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.64). For these 
reasons the ECtHR emphasizes that it is not the Courts task to substitute itself with the domestic 
authorities. The domestic authorities are responsible for regulating “…the public care of 
children and the rights of parents whose children have been taken in to care,…” (P. C. and S. 
v. The UK, 2002, para.115), not the ECtHR. The Court acknowledges the authorities’ margin 
of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child in to public care. However, the 
ECtHR emphasize that when it comes to any further limitation on parental rights, such as 
restriction on rights of access, “…a stricter scrutiny is called for…” (R.K. and A.K. v. The UK, 
2008, para.34). 
In B. v. The UK (para.63), W. v. The UK (para.62) and X. v. Croatia (para.47), the ECtHR 
acknowledges that domestic authorities are faced with a task that is “…extremely difficult.”, 
when contemplating whether a measure should be implemented. For these reasons the ECtHR 
underline that the domestic authorities must be allowed a measure of discretion. “To require 
them to follow on each occasion an inflexible procedure would only add to their problems.” (B. 
v. The UK, 1987, para.63, W. v. The UK, 1987, para.62, and X. v. Croatia, 2008, para.47). 
In Kutzner and P., C., and S. v. The UK, the ECtHR comments on the reach of the authorities’ 
leeway in their discretionary choices. The Court states: 
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“The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the 
light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as the importance 
of protecting the child in a situation in which its health or development may be seriously at risk 
and the objective of reuniting the family as soon as circumstances permit.” (Kutzner v. Germany, 
2002, para.67). 
In P., C., and S. v. The UK, the ECtHR further elaborates as to what the Court expects from the 
national authorities. The Court states that when one evaluates a measure sat in motion by the 
national authorities, there must exist circumstances justifying implementing the measure. The 
national authorities are obliged to assess all possible alternatives before issuing a care order (P. 
C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.116). 
In B. v. The UK, the ECtHR shed a light on some sides of the national authorities’ decision-
making process. The Court states that “…there will clearly be instances where the participation 
of the natural parents in the decision-making process either will not be possible or will not be 
meaningful – as, for example, where they cannot be traced or are under a physical or mental 
disability or where an emergency arises.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.65). In other words, the 
ECtHR does not necessarily believe that the biological parents should participate in the national 
authorities’ decision-making process regardless of the situation. The Court points out that there 
may be special circumstances that hinder such participation. Secondly, the ECtHR states that 
the national authorities’ decision may evolve from “…a continuous process of monitoring on 
the part of the local authority’s officials.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.65). Meaning that 
monitoring the situation should be equated with testimony from biological parents and/or social 
workers. Lastly, the ECtHR states that regular contact between social worker and biological 
parents can “…provide an appropriate channel for the communication of the latter’s views to 
the authority.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.65). Meaning that in certain situations a hearing where 
the biological parents can present their views is redundant. 
7.2.6 Other – In-depth presentation of pragmatic arguments: 
In Y.C. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that the Courts role in assessing cases is to ascertain 
whether the domestic courts “…made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective 
interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what would be the best 
solutions for the child.” (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.138). Meaning that the domestic courts 
must pay due respect to the interests of all parties in a case but that the decision, in the end, 
must be in the child’s best interests. The ECtHR emphasizes that, in practice, there is likely a 
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certain degree of overlap of different interests which must be weighed against each other to 
justify a measure in respect of the care of a child. 
7.2.7 Discussing the pragmatic arguments 
In the following section, I will look at how the pragmatic arguments may answer the four 
questions presented in section 1.1 In-depth presentation of research question. 
Viewing how the ECtHR assess cases, the pragmatic arguments mainly focus on what the 
ECtHR expect domestic authorities to do and their decision-making process. In Y.C. v. The UK 
(2012, para.138) the ECtHR states that it is its role to ascertain whether the domestic courts 
“…made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with 
a constant concern for determining what would be the best solutions for the child.”. Meaning 
that when reviewing a case, the ECtHR assess whether the decision made by local authorities 
were justified and in the child’s best interests.  
When a measure is sat in motion, there must exist circumstances justifying that measure. This 
is especially important if the measure is a care order. As previously mentioned, the ECtHR has 
repeatedly stated that the care order field is an area which calls for extra protection against 
arbitrary interference from the authorities (see i.a. W. v. The UK, 1987, para.62). The ECtHR 
emphasizes that domestic authorities are obliged to assess all possible alternatives before 
issuing a care order (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.116). 
In Gnahoré v. France (2001, para.51) the ECtHR states that the object of art.8 of the ECHR is 
to protect the public against arbitrary interference from the authorities. The statement is used 
as an argument to highlight the authorities’ obligation to facilitate a reunion between biological 
parents and child as soon as circumstances permit. Further, the ECtHR emphasizes the it is the 
authorities’ duty to ensure that the natural bond between biological parents and the child 
continue to develop while the child is in public care. These arguments are in line with well-
established case-law stating that a care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological parents and 
children (see i.a. E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.64, and Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76). 
In regard to the domestic authorities’ decision-making process, the ECtHR has repeatedly stated 
that the authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all person’s concern, when assessing 
the necessity of a measure, which the ECtHR does not have (see i.a. Johansen v. Norway, 1996, 
para.64, and A.D. and O.D. v. The UK, 2010, para.83). Therefore, it is not the ECtHRs task to 
substitute itself with the domestic authorities. It is the authorities that are responsible for 
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regulating the public care of children and to protect the rights of biological parents whose 
children have been taken into care (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.115). As foresaid, the 
ECtHRs role is to assess whether the decisions made by domestic authorities were justified. In 
order for the decision to be justified it has to be “necessary in a democratic society”. To assess 
whether a decision were “necessary in a democratic society” one must see the case as a whole 
(Bronda v. Italy, 1998, para.59). There is no explanation as to how one should consider whether 
a decision was “necessary in a democratic society” in the pragmatic arguments. 
To summarize, the pragmatic arguments highlight how the domestic authorities should proceed 
in a decision-making process. Besides stating that the ECtHR is not a substitution for domestic 
authorities and underlining that it is the ECtHRs role to ascertain whether the domestic court’s 
decision was a result of careful consideration of the interests and rights of all involved, there 
are no pragmatic arguments pertaining to how the ECtHR assess cases across all 47 different 
judicial systems. However, by emphasizing how the domestic authorities should conduct their 
decision-making process in order to justify their decision, the ECtHR has essentially created a 
guideline as to how the domestic authorities should reach a decision. 
When it comes to who decides what is in the child’s best interests there is only one pragmatic 
argument directly stating who should decide on behalf of the child. In Scozzari and Giunta v. 
Italy (2000, para.138) the ECtHR acknowledge that a child may not always be able to speak 
for itself, i.a. young children that have not yet learned how to speak. To ensure the child’s 
interests, the ECtHR states that biological parents may represent the child in cases appearing 
before the Court and speak on their behalf, even in situations where the biological parents have 
been deprived of their parental rights. Meaning that the ECtHR acknowledge that the authorities 
are not infallible and decisions taken to protect the child’s best interest may in retrospect prove 
to be misguided. 
There is however several arguments pertaining to the authorities’ decision-making process, 
more specifically, the authorities’ margin of appreciation. When deciding in matters concerning 
children, the authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. In E.P. v. Italy (1999, para.62), 
the ECtHR states that the child’s interests should be weighed against the biological parents’ 
rights. However, the ECtHR emphasize that the authorities can never authorize any measure 
that could potentially harm the child’s health and development. In other words, the authorities 
must use their margin of appreciation to act in the child’s best interests. When it comes to the 
reach of the authorities margin of appreciation, the ECtHR has pointed out that it will vary 
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“…in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake…” 
(Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67) 
Looking at the children’s rights under the ECHR and how their rights are adhered by the 
ECtHR, most pragmatic arguments revolve around the reunion between biological parents and 
their child and the child’s best interests. 
The ECtHR has repeatedly stated that a care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological parents 
with their child, as soon as circumstances permits (see i.a. Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, 
para.81, and K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.138). In order to facilitate a speedy reunion between 
biological parents and their child it is important to preserve the natural family bond, while the 
child is in public care (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). The ECtHR have stated that the longer 
the child is in public care, the authorities’ positive duty to take measure to facilitate family 
reunification is ever increasing. The longer child is in public care, the more difficult it would 
be for the biological parents and children to maintain, and develop, a relationship  (see i.a. 
Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76, M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). However, the 
reunion between biological parents and children should only be permitted as long as the child’s 
well-being is secured. As aforesaid, the child’s interests is an overriding requirement and the 
authorities have a duty to always consider what is in the child’s best interests (K.A v. Finland, 
2003, para.138). 
Looking at children’s rights it is clear that their rights are together with what the authorities, 
and/or what the courts believe to be in the child’s best interests. In Johansen v. Norway (1996, 
para.78) the ECtHR emphasize that the child’s interests should always be weighed against the 
biological parents’ rights. The biological parents do have rights. It is therefore important that 
the authorities carefully assess the impact a measure has on both biological parents and child 
against the child’s best interest (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49). However, children must be 
protected in situations where their health or development is at risk (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, 
para.67) If the authorities and/or courts believe it to be in the child’s best interests to sever all 
ties with the biological parents or to remain in public care, the child’s interests trump the 
parents’ rights. However, unless the decision is based on what is best for the child’s health and 
development, it cannot be justified. It is the child’s interests that is the key-word (see i.a. 
Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78, P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.118, and Aune v. 
Norway, 2011, para.66). 
86 
 
The ECtHR has repeatedly stated that it is in the child’s best interests to maintain its natural 
bond with its biological family (see i.a. Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). For these reasons the 
ECtHR emphasize that any restrictions on i.a. parental contact could potentially be a violation 
against art.8 of the ECHR. Especially if the restriction leads to the natural bond between 
biological parents and child being broken (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.139).  
To summarize question two and three, the pragmatic arguments point to the fact that it is in 
most cases up to the authorities’ margin of appreciation to decide what is in the child’s best 
interest. If the biological parents have been deprived of their parental rights, they may still 
represent their child in proceedings before the ECtHR. By allowing biological parents who have 
been deprived of parental rights to speak on behalf of the child, the ECtHR gives the child an 
extra security to ensure that all aspects of its interest are elucidated. 
The pragmatic arguments pertaining to the child’s rights are tied up to what is believed to be in 
the child’s best interests. The ECtHR have reiterated time and time again that it is in the child’s 
best interests that the natural bond between biological parents and child is maintained (see i.a. 
Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). In order to maintain the natural bond between biological 
parents and child it is important that the authorities facilitate a reunion between the child and 
its biological parents as soon as feasible. The reunion must always be weighed against the 
child’s interests of staying in public care (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78). The authorities 
may never authorize a measure that puts the child’s health and development at risk. To consider 
the child’s best interests is paramount and an overriding requirement (Kutzner v. Germany, 
2002, para.76, Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134, M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76). 
In regard to pragmatic arguments pertaining to CRC, there are none. The CRC are not 
mentioned in any of the paragraphs coded as pragmatic arguments. 
7.3 Ethical discourse – findings and discussion 
Ethical arguments revolve around the biological parents’ and child’s interest. It is their inner-
thoughts and beliefs. The largest amount of ethical arguments are seen in the pro-child- and 
biological family category, with 28 and 25 respectively. There are 11 ethical arguments in the 
Court category and nine in the pro-parent. In the “other”-category, there is only one ethical 
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argument. Table 15 shows an overview of how many ethical arguments are found in each 
initial-category.61 
Table 15 Number of ethical arguments in each initial-category 
Pro-child 28 Pro-parent 9
Biological family 25 The Court 11
Other 1
Number of ethical arguments in each inital-category
 
7.3.1 Categorizing the ethical arguments 
There are ethical arguments in all four initial-categories. In total, there are 73 arguments and 11 
argument-categories that are coded as ethical. The largest category is “family ties”, which can 
be found in all four initial-categories and has 26 ethical arguments. The next two argument-
categories, “consideration – interest” and “mutual enjoyment” with 10 arguments each, can 
only be found in one of the initial-categories. However, seen as one, most of the ethical 
arguments revolve around either parents’ interests, child’s interests or the bond between 
biological parents and child. Table 16 shows an overview of the ethical argument categories: 
Table 16 Overview of the ethical argument categories 
Category Judgements Arguments Category Judgements Arguments
Consider. - interest 10 10 Family ties 6 6
Family ties 8 8 Parents' interests 2 2
Child's interests 5 5 Parental access 2 2
New bonds 3 3 Representation 1 1
Parental access 1 2
Category Judgements Arguments
Category Judgements Arguments Child's interests 4 4
Mutual enjoyment 10 10 Family ties 2 4
Family ties 7 8 Parents' interests 2 2
Balance interests 2 3
Reunite 2 2
Parental access 1 1
Pro-Child ethical arguments Pro-parent ethical arguments
The Court ethical arguments
Biological family ethical arguments
There are four argument-categories that are found in more than one initial-category. The first 
one is “family ties”. As previously stated, the “family tie”-category can be found in all four 
initial-categories. In total there are 26 ethical arguments in the “family tie”-category. Within 
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the “family-tie”-category, one argument, found in Y.C. v. The UK para.134, is coded in both the 
biological family – and the pro-child category. One argument found in B. v. The United 
Kingdom para.77, is coded in both the pro-child - and pro-parent category and one argument, 
found in R. and H. v. The UK para.81, is coded in both the biological family – and the pro-
parent category. Lastly, one argument, found in Gnahoré para.59, is coded in the biological 
family –, the pro child - and the pro-parent category. Meaning, that in total there are 21 unique 
ethical arguments pertaining to “family ties”. 
The category labeled “Child’s interests” is found in both the Court- and pro-parent category. 
One argument, found in Scozzari and Giunta para.138, is coded in both categories. This entails 
that there are eight unique ethical arguments in the “child’s interests” category. 
The “Parental access” category is found in three of the four initial-categories. The “parents’ 
interests” category is found in both the Court– and the pro-parent category. Both these 
argument-categories have only unique arguments. Which entails that, in total, there are 67 
unique ethical arguments. 
7.3.2 Pro-child – In-depth presentation of ethical arguments 
In B. v. The UK, the ECtHR cast light on the issue as to who can best tell what is in the child’s 
best interest. A biological parent who has lost custody can apply to the court stating it would be 
in the child’s best interest for the care order to be discharged. The Court acknowledge the 
parents right to apply to the Court on that regard, and states that “…the determination of a 
parental right is equally in issue where … a parent claims that the continuance or renewal of 
access is in the child’s interests.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). The ECtHR acknowledge the 
biological parents’ ability to know what is best for their children. A care order does not render 
biological parent rights-free regarding their children. The biological parents may still apply to 
have a care order lifted and say no to put their children up for adoption, claiming it to be in the 
child’s best interest. 
The ECtHR has also commented on the potential conflict of interests between biological parents 
and the guardian appointed by the authorities. Due to this, the Court states that “…there is a 
danger that some of those interests [the children’s] will never be brought to the  Court’s 
attention” (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.138). If the children’s guardian and 
biological parents are in a conflict of interests, the children’s interests may suffer accordingly 
and consequently lead to children being deprived of rights given to them by the ECHR. 
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Children’s bonds towards their families have also been discussed. The ECtHR has reiterated 
time and time again the importance of a care order being temporary and that measures must be 
taken to make sure children sustain link with their biological family (See among others K.A v. 
Finland, 2003, para.138 and Y.C. v. the United Kingdom, 2012, para.134). However, the 
decision of whether a care order shall be lifted must always be taken with the child’s best 
interest in mind. The Court states that the authorities has a “…duty to consider the best interests 
of the child.” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.76) when deciding in matters concerning the 
child. This includes, but is not limited to, the child’s health or development. In B. v. The UK, 
the ECtHR states that “…for most children there will be no doubt that their interests will best 
be served by efforts to sustain links with their natural families.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). 
Therefore, the Court questions what the care orders purpose is. The removal of parental rights 
shall only be taken with the child’s best interest in mind. There must be weighty reasons as to 
why one shall deprive a biological parent his/her rights. In these settings, the child’s best interest 
is considered a weighty argument. 
If a care order is prolonged and the child lives with a foster family, the child most likely creates 
bond with his/her new family. This is addressed by the ECtHR in both B. v. The UK, K. and T. 
v. Finland and Kutzner. 
“A child often becomes strongly attached to his foster parents and it is therefore harmful for the 
child to detach him or her from the foster family and the relationships built within that family. 
The younger the child is, the faster the psychological relationship between the child and the 
foster parents develops. It may be necessary for the stability of the child that the family 
situation not be changed back again. Ultimately, both the taking into public care and the 
termination of public care must be decided in the best interests of the child.” (K. and T. v. 
Finland, 2001, para.151, see also B. v. The United Kingdom, 1987, para.63 and Kutzner v. 
Germany, 2002, para.67). 
The ECtHR focuses on the child’s wellbeing. Even though the Court has on several occasions 
stated that it is in the child’s best interest to be reunited with its biological family, there are 
some exceptions. If a significant period of time has passed since the child was taken into care 
by the authorities and the child shows strong connection to its foster parents, the child’s interest 
of being with its new family may prevail over the biological parents’ rights to family life. It all 
relates to decision made in cases concerning children, the children’s interests are paramount.  
The fact that children’s interest may surpass the biological parents’ interest has been addressed 
by the ECtHR. In Johansen, P., C., and S. v. The UK and K.A. v. Finland, the Court states that 
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“…interest of the child … may override those of the parents.” (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, 
para.78, K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.138, P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.117). While in 
Gnahoré the Court emphasizes that “…in cases of this type[cases concerning care orders] the 
child’s interest must come before all other considerations.” (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59). 
The ECtHR has also addressed issues concerning severing family ties. In Gnahoré the court 
states that since the severing of family ties means to cut a child from its root, the child’s best 
interest is for the authorities to facilitate a reunion of the family as soon as possible. Unless the 
biological family has proved to be particularly unfit to care for the child (Gnahoré v. France, 
2001, para.59). The ECtHR acknowledge that to split up a family is a very serious step to take. 
The justification of such a measure should only come from a weighty consideration of the 
child’s best interest, which may override the interest of the biological parent (Olsson v. Sweden 
(No.1), 1988, para.72, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.148, R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, 
para.81). 
When looking at ethical arguments, the child’s interests is a key factor. The ECtHR have, with 
several occasions, commented on the importance of considering what is in the child’s best 
interest. The phrase “child’s best interest” appears time and again in the ECtHRs judgements. 
The Courts use the phrase as means to legitimatize its decision. The Court reiterates that 
decisions must be “…supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the 
interests of the child…” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49), and that the consideration of the 
child’s interests must start with the national authorities and should be a crucial factor when 
issuing a care order. 
In Y.C. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that  
“In identifying the child’s best interests in a particular case, two considerations must be borne 
in mind: first, it is in the child’s best interests that his ties with his family be maintained except 
in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child’s best 
interests to ensure his development in a safe and secure environment” (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, 
para.134). 
In the statement the ECtHR presents two facts. First, that it is the child’s best interest to maintain 
ties with his/her biological parents, unless the parents have proved to be unfit to take care of 
the child. Second, it is in the child’s best interest to be in a safe and secure environment where 
the child can thrive.   
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7.3.3 Pro-parent – In-depth presentation of ethical arguments 
In both B. v. The UK and W. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that when the authorities reach 
decisions involving children it is unavoidable to include “…the views and interests of the 
natural parents.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.64, W. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). The Court has 
reiterated repeatedly the importance of weighing all relevant considerations when taking a child 
in to care. In both B. v. The UK and W. v. The UK, the ECtHR emphasizes that the biological 
parent views and interests must be included as a relevant consideration by the authorities (B. v. 
The UK, 1987, para.64, W. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). 
Six of eleven ethical arguments in total relate to family ties.62 In B. v. The UK, the ECtHR states 
that “…for most children there will be no doubt that their interests will best be served by efforts 
to sustain links with their natural families.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). This Court cites “the 
Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care” which was a code issued by the UK 
government in 1983. The citation is used as a means to highlight the importance of a 
continuation of parental access when a child is taken in to care. In other words, it would be both 
in the parents and in the child’s interests to maintain parental access even when a care order has 
been issued (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.77). 
In Margareta and Roger Andersson, the ECtHR focused on the biological parents’ right to 
maintain a relationship with their child. The parents were not only restricted from meeting their 
child but also from contacting the child via mail or telephone. The Court emphasized that the 
measures taken by the authorities were “…particularly far reaching.” and that the reasons for 
implementing such measures must be strong (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, 
para.95). However, the ECtHR stated further that even though the authorities had strong reasons 
to act in a certain way, any measure must “…be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting 
the Andersson family.” (Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.95).  
The child’s interests are repeatedly used as an argument for maintaining family ties. In 
Gnahoré, the ECtHR underlines that there must be “exceptional circumstances” in order to 
justify severing family ties. The reason why it calls for exceptional circumstances, is that 
severing the family ties would violate the child’s best interests  The Court emphasizes that 
situations where parents have been deemed unfit to care for the child would constitute an 
exceptional circumstance (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59), as would “…the overriding 
                                                
62 See table 16, section 7.3.1. 
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requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests.” (R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81). In 
other word, the child’s best interests surpass all other considerations. If keeping the family ties 
would harm the child in any way, or hinder the child’s development, it is justified to sever them. 
In E.P. v. Italy (1999, para.69), the ECtHR states that it must be a balance between the child’s 
best interests and the biological parents’ rights. The authorities are obligated to take the 
necessary steps to ensure that biological parents and children can be reunited. If the authorities 
fail to do so, it would be a violation against the biological parents’ rights under art.8 of the 
ECHR.  
In both R. v. The UK and Eriksson, the ECtHR states that to able to exercise parental rights is a 
basic part of family life, as are the “…mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s 
company…” (R. v. The UK, 1987, para.64, Eriksson v. Sweden, 1989, para.58). If the 
authorities are hindering these basic parts of family life, that would be a violation against art.8. 
This is highlighted in Eriksson. The authorities’ decision to place the child in foster-care, and 
prohibit contact, for an indefinite period of time was found by the Court to be an interference 
in the mother’s life that violated her rights under art.8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR emphasized 
that the interference in the mother’s life was not affected by the child relationship with its foster 
parents (Eriksson v. Sweden, 1989, para.58). Meaning that the child’s relation to its foster 
parents must be taken in to account as a separate consideration. 
7.3.4 Biological family – In-depth presentation of ethical arguments 
In total 42%, or 10 out of 24, arguments in this category all state that “The mutual enjoyment 
by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life.” 
(See, among others, B. v. The UK, 1987, para.60). Art.8 of the convention grants everyone the 
rights to respect for private and family life (ECHR, 1950, art.8). The convention does not define 
what constitutes as family life. However, three of the five care order judgements from 198763 
all contain the abovementioned statement. Meaning that the ECtHR defined the company 
between biological parents and children as fundamental for family life in the first care order 
cases that appeared before the Court.  
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The second part of the above mentioned argument states that “… the natural family relationship 
is not terminated by the reason of fact that the child is taken into public care.” (See, among 
others, B. v. The UK, 1987, para.60). This underlines the fact that the care orders ultimate aim 
is to reunite biological parents and their children. It also underlines the importance of nurturing 
the relationship between biological parents and children, while the children are in public care. 
However, only 6 of the 10 judgements containing these arguments have included the second 
part. Of the 10 judgements that included the argument in this category, McMichael (1995) was 
the first case to omit the second part of the argument. All judgements that came prior to 
McMichael included the second part, while the judgement that came after did not.  
The importance of not severing the bonds between biological parents and their children has 
been addressed by the ECtHR on several occasions.  
“It follows that the interest of the child dictates that family ties may only be severed in very 
exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, 
if and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family.  
In the interest not only of the parent concerned, but also of the child, the ultimate aim of any 
“care order” must be to “reunit[e] the ... parent with his or her child.” (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, 
para.59). 
The Court states that due to the child’s best interests it must be “very exceptional 
circumstances” in order to justify severing the bond between biological parents and children. 
Further, the Court states that it is in, both, the parents’ and children’s interest to reunite the 
biological parents with their child. The Court also states that “everything must be done” to 
maintain the relationship between biological parents and their children. 
In P., C., and S. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that severing the bond between biological parents 
and children can “…only be justified in exceptional circumstances or by the overriding 
requirement of the child’s best interest.”(P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.118). The Court 
has in P., C., and S. v. The UK omitted the word “very” when stating that it must be exceptional 
circumstances in order to justify severing family ties, which separates the judgement from 
Gnahoré. The ECtHR also emphasize that the child’s best interest is an overriding requirement. 
In other words, if a care order is in the child’s best interest that would be justification enough 
to sever the bond between the child and its biological parents. It also implies that it is not 
necessarily always in the child’s best interest to “rebuild” the biological family. 
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In R. and H. v. The UK, the ECtHR focuses on measures taken to deprive parents of their 
parental rights: 
“…measures which deprive biological parents of the parental responsibilities and authorise 
adoption should only be applied in exceptional circumstances and can only be justified if they 
are motivated by an overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best interests.” (R. and H. 
v. The UK, 2011, para.81). 
Again, the Court emphasizes that the child’s best interest is an overriding requirement. While 
the ECtHR stated in P., C., and S. v. The UK that in order to justify a measure it must be either 
exceptional circumstances or in the child’s best interest, the Court states in R. and H. v. The UK 
that it is only the child’s best interest that can justify any measures that severs the bond between 
biological parents and child.  
In Scozzari and Giunta, the ECtHR states that “…it is an interference of a very serious order to 
split up a family. Such a step must be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty consideration 
in the interests of the child.” (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.148). The Court 
emphasize that it is the child’s best interests that must be taken into account when deciding 
whether or not to sever the ties between biological parents and child. The Court also 
acknowledges the severity of severing biological family ties.  
The impact a care order has on both, the parents and the child, is also addressed by the ECtHR 
in Saviny. The Court underlines the importance of a “…careful assessment of the impact of the 
proposed care measure on the parents and the child…” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49). The 
ECtHR emphasize that it is the respondent State that must assess each measure before 
implementing it. Any decisions must “…be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty 
considerations in the interests of the child,…” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49). 
How to identify what is in the child’s best interest has been addressed by the ECtHR in Y.C. v. 
The UK (2012, para.134). The Court states that it is in the child’s best interest to maintain the 
ties with its biological parents. However, this does not apply if the parents are deemed unfit to 
care for the child. What is in the child’s best interest is to grow up in a safe and secure 
environment, ensuring the child is protection. 
In both Saviny (2009, para.52) and M.D. and Others (2012, para.76), the ECtHR state that a 
care orders ultimate aim is to reunite the biological family with their child. In M.D. and Others, 
the Court emphasizes that it is only the “…overriding requirement pertaining to the child’s best 
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interest.” (M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, para.76) that can justify any measures that deprive 
biological parents of their parental rights. In Saviny, the ECtHR states that a care order cannot 
be justified “…without prior consideration of the possible alternatives.” (Saviny v. Ukraine, 
2009, para.52). The Court also emphasize that the authorities in the respective State has a 
“positive obligation” to facilitate a reunion between biological parents and their children. In 
order to do so, the Court state that the authorities must “…enable regular contact between them 
[biological parents and children], including, where possible, by keeping the siblings together.” 
(Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.52). In other words, the ECtHR underlines the importance of 
keeping siblings together in order to best maintain family ties, even when the children are in 
public care. 
The importance for the biological parents and their child to maintain a relationship, while the 
child is in public care, in order to facilitate a reunion is addressed by the ECtHR in K.A. v. 
Finland. 
“The possibilities of reunification will be progressively diminished and eventually destroyed if 
the biological parents and the child are not allowed to meet each other at all, or only so rarely 
that no natural bonding between them is likely to occur.” (K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.139). 
The ECtHR emphasize the importance of regular contact in order to keep the natural bond 
between biological parents and their child. If one is not able to maintain contact while the child 
is in public care, over time, the natural family ties will be severed.  
Both the child and the parents’ interest are brought to attention by the ECtHR in Johansen and 
E.P. v. Italy. In E.P. v. Italy the Court state that “…a fair balance must be struck between the 
interests of the child and those of the parent.” (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62). However, the Court 
emphasizes that in doing so special attention must be paid to the child’s best interest, which 
may override those of the parents. It is not only the parents’ interest that is being discussed by 
the ECtHR, it is also their rights. When issuing a care order the authorities must do what they 
can in order to facilitate a reunion between the child and its biological parents. When doing so, 
the authorities must balance the parents’ rights, under the ECHR, against the child’s best 
interest. However, parents may never be granted rights that would harm the child’s health and 
development (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62 and para.69). The balance of the parents’ rights 
against the child’s interests has also been a topic in Johansen. In Johansen, the ECtHR state 
that “…a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in public 
care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child.” (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, 
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para.78). In other words, if it is in the child’s best interest to remain in public care, this trumps 
the parents’ right to family life under art.8 of the ECHR. 
In K.A. v. Finland, the ECtHR acknowledge that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, the Court 
emphasizes that “…a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as 
restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access.” (K.A v. Finland, 2003, 
para.139). The reason is that any limitations beyond the care order further endanger that the 
bond between biological parents and child are severed. As reiterated by the ECtHR on several 
occasions, a care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological parents with their child. Any 
limitation on contact between the biological parents and children, while the child is in public 
care, endanger that there may become an unrepairable breach in their natural bond. 
7.3.5 The Court – In-depth presentation of ethical arguments 
The ethical arguments in the Court category can be divided into three categories, the interests 
of the biological parents, the child’s interests and the relationship between biological parents 
and their child. 
In regard to the biological parents’ interests, the ECtHR focuses on what it has to determine in 
order to assess whether there has been a violation of art.8 of the ECHR. In both B. v. The UK 
and X. v. Croatia, the Court states: 
“…what therefore has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances 
of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been 
involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them 
with the requisite protection of their interests.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.65, X. v. Croatia, 2008, 
para.48, Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.138). 
Meaning that unless the biological parents have been given the opportunity, and an appropriate 
channel, to make their interests heard, it may be a violation of art.8 of the ECHR. However, the 
ECtHR emphasize that one must take into account the seriousness of the decisions that shall be 
taken and the particular circumstances of each case, when assessing the involvement of the 
biological parents. 
When it comes to the child’s interests, the ECtHR states in both Scozzari and Giunta (para.138) 
and M.D. and Others (para.27) that “…in the event of a conflict over a minor’s interests between 
a natural parent and the person appointed by the authorities to act as the child’s guardian, there 
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is a danger that some of those interests will never be brought to the Court’s attention and that 
the minor will be deprived of effective protection of his rights under the Convention.”. Meaning 
that biological parents and the child’s guardian may have opposing views as to what is in the 
child’s best interest. 
In W. v. The UK, the ECtHR focuses on the child’s bond with its foster family. The Court states 
that over time a child may create new bonds with its foster family, which may cause it to be 
against the child’s interests to reunite the child with its biological parents. However, the ECtHR 
emphasizes that, for these reasons, it is important for the authorities to facilitate parental access 
while the child is in public care so that the natural bond between biological parents and child is 
not broken (W. v. The UK, 1987, para.62). 
To what extent the national authorities may use their margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether to keep the child in public care and thus sever the bond between child and biological 
parents has been addressed by the ECtHR in P., C., and S. v. The UK. The Court states that it 
all depends on the “…nature of the parent-child relationship.” (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, 
para.118). If a biological parent has never had care and custody of a child, the severance of link 
between child and that parent falls under the national courts margin of appreciation to assess 
what is in the child’s best interests. 
In both Johansen (1996, para.64) and Kutzner (2002, para.67), the ECtHR underlines that the 
national authorities have a wide margin of appreciation in assessing whether to take a child into 
public care. However, the Court emphasizes that a stricter scrutiny is called for on any further 
limitations that may restrict the family relation between biological parents and child.  
In Kutzner the ECtHR states that “It [the ECtHR] will also have regard to the obligation which 
the State has in principle to enable the ties between parents and their children to be preserved.” 
(Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.65). Meaning that the national authorities have undoubtedly 
an obligation to preserve the natural bond between biological parents and their children, when 
the children are in public care. 
7.3.6 Other – In-depth presentation of ethical arguments 
In P. C. and S. v. The UK (2002, para.116), the ECtHR states that to take a newborn baby into 
public care at the moment of its birth “…is an extremely harsh measure.”. In order for such a 
measure to be justified, the Court states that there must be an “…extraordinarily compelling 
reason…” (P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.116). This is especially so if the biological parent 
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has not been part of the decision-making process leading up to the interference. The ECtHR 
emphasize that the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the 
necessity of taking a child into care but that the justification for such measure must be so 
profound that it can stand up to the Courts scrutiny. The ECtHR points out that the national 
authorities have an obligation to assess the impact the proposed measures have on the biological 
parents and the child, and to consider all other options prior to taking a child into care. (See i.a. 
P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.116, Haase v. Germany, 2004, para.90, and Moser v. Austria, 
2006, para.66). To illustrate what that entails, the ECtHR refers to K. and T. v. Finland para.166. 
In K. and T. v. Finland, it is pointed out that the authorities had restricted the parental access to 
their children in order for the children to get attached to their foster family. The authorities 
meant it was sufficient that the children were aware of their parents’ existence. After this 
justification had been approved by the domestic court once, it was used as reasoning for all 
restriction-decisions since (K. and T. v. Finland, 2001, para.166). In other words, the authorities 
did not assess each decision separately.  
7.3.7 Discussing the ethical arguments 
I will in the following section discuss how the ethical arguments can answer the four questions 
presented in section 1.1 In-depth presentation of research question. 
Viewing ethical arguments pertaining to the ECtHRs assessment of the cases, the main focus is 
ensuring that the interests of both the parents and child is made clear. In B. v. The UK (1987, 
para.64) and W. v. The UK (1987, para.63), the ECtHR emphasize that it is unavoidable to 
include the views and interests of the biological parents when contemplating whether to 
implement a measure, i.a. a care order. In other words, biological parents must be involved in 
the decision-making process. The biological parents’ involvement in decision-making process 
have been highlighted by the ECtHR on several occasion (see i.a. B. v. The UK, 1987, para.65, 
and Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.138). The ECtHR emphasize that the biological parents’ 
involvement must correlate with the seriousness of the decision to be taken, taking the particular 
circumstances of each case into account. If domestic authorities fail to involve the biological 
parents in the decision-making process to a degree that is sufficient to make their interests heard, 
it will constitute as a violation against the biological parents’ rights under art.8 of the ECHR. 
As previously mentioned, established case law dictates that a care orders ultimate aim is to 
reunite biological parents with their child. When contemplating whether to lift a care order, the 
ECtHR states that the authorities have a positive duty to consider the child’s best interests, 
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which include considerations on the child’s health and development (see i.a. Kutzner v. 
Germany, 2002, para.76). The ECtHR emphasize that it is, in most cases, in the child’s best 
interests to sustain the link between biological parents and their child. To deprive biological 
parents of their parental rights is a serious interference into their lives, which can only be 
justified by weighty argumentation that can withstand the ECtHR scrutiny, such as arguments 
pertaining to the child’s best interests. The Court underlines that all other options must be 
considered before taking a child into public care. If the domestic authorities fail to consider all 
other options, it may be a violation against the biological parents’ rights (see i.a. B. v. The UK, 
1987, para.77, Haase v. Germany, 2004, para.90, Moser v. Austria, 2006, para.66, and Saviny 
v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49 and para.52). 
The ECtHR focuses on the importance of balancing the child’s interests with the biological 
parents’ rights (E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.69). The biological parents have the right to respect for 
their private and family life. Any interference with this rights is an interference with art.8 of the 
ECHR, unless it is “necessary in a democratic society” or “in accordance with the law” (ECHR, 
1950, art.8). The ethical arguments point to the fact that it is a mutual relationship between 
biological parents and child. To hinder such a relationship to develop, will be a violation against 
art.8 of the ECHR (R. v. The UK, 1987, para.64).  
The relationship, or bond, between the biological parents and child has been addressed by the 
ECtHR on several occasions. The Court emphasizes that taking a child into public care does 
not terminate the bond between biological parents and their child (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.60). 
However, the ECtHRs focus shifted with McMichael v. The UK (1995, para.86). While all 
judgements mentioning “the mutual enjoyment of each other’s company” prior to 1995 included 
a sentence stating that the relationship between child and biological parents is not terminated 
when the child is taken into public care, the judgements after 1995 omitted this sentence. That 
the focus shifted does not entail that the Courts opinion shifted. The ECtHR has on several 
occasion, after 1995, highlighted the importance of allowing biological parents and children to 
maintain contact, while the child is in public care, in order for their bond to be maintained and 
enabling the family to later be reunited (see i.a. K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.139). The ECtHR 
emphasize that when assessing whether there has been a breach on art. 8 of the ECHR, the 
Court must examine if the domestic authorities have fulfilled their obligation to enable the ties 
between parents and their children to be preserved (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.65). The 
ECtHR do, however, acknowledge that the domestic authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
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appreciation when assessing whether to take a child into public care, but emphasize that if the 
domestic authorities do not enable regular contact between the child and its biological parents, 
it endangers that there can become an unrepairable breach in their natural bond. Meaning that 
any further limitations that may restrict or hinder the natural bond between biological parents 
and child to be developed calls for stricter scrutiny (see i.a. Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.64, 
Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67, and K.A v. Finland, 2003, para.139).  
Situation where the ECtHR finds a violation against the biological parents’ rights under art.8 
of the ECHR raise a new question. How does this affect the child? The ECtHR emphasize that 
acknowledging that the biological parents’ rights have been violated does not affect the child’s 
relationship with its guardians. Meaning that the child’s interests, such as its bond with its foster 
family, calls for a separate assessment (Eriksson v. Sweden, 1989, para.58). The ECtHR 
underlines repeatedly that the child’s best interests are an overriding requirement. If it is in the 
child’s best interests to remain with its guardians and not to be returned to its biological parents, 
the ECtHR states that the bonds with the child’s biological family can be severed. The ECtHR 
acknowledge that it is an interference of a very serious order to sever the bond between the 
biological family and is only justified in “exceptional circumstances” (see i.a. Scozzari and 
Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.148, and P. C. and S. v. The UK, 2002, para.118).  
To summarize, the ethical arguments pertaining to the ECtHRs assessments, revolve around 
how the Court assess and balance the interests of the biological parents and their child. The 
arguments also point to what the ECtHR expect from the domestic authorities. Viewing the 
biological parents’ interests, the ethical arguments states that the biological parents must be 
involved in the decision-making process to an extent that ensure that their interests are known. 
The arguments also focus on the importance of keeping the biological family together. 
Concerning the child’s interests, the ethical arguments state that the child’s interests are an 
overriding requirement. All decision pertaining to the child, including both the domestic 
authorities and the ECtHR assessments of a case should be taken with the child’s interests in 
mind. 
In the ethical arguments, it is clear that arguments pertaining to the child’s best interest is ever 
present. When it comes to who decides what is in the child’s best interests the ECtHR have 
focused on the biological parents’ saying in the matter. When a parent is deprived of his/her 
parental rights, a guardian protects the interests of the child. The ECtHR acknowledge that the 
child’s guardian and its biological parents may have conflicting opinions as to what they deem 
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to be in the child’s best interests. For these reasons the ECtHR states that, in order to protect 
the child’s interests, biological parents may represent their child’s interests before the Court in 
situations where they otherwise have been deprived of their parental rights (B. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.77, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.138, and M.D. and Others v. Malta, 2012, 
para.27).  
In Y.C. v. The UK (2012, para.134), the ECtHR has been clear as to what the Court believes to 
be in the child’s best interests. “…first, it is in the child’s best interests that his ties with his 
family be maintained except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, 
it is in the child’s best interests to ensure his development in a safe and secure environment”. 
By stating what the ECtHR believes to be in the child’s best interests, the Court has essentially 
created guidelines as to what one needs to consider when contemplating whether a measure was 
in the child’s best interests.  
The ethical arguments focus on the biological parents, the child’s guardian and the ECtHRs role 
in assessing whether a measure was in the child’s best interests. The Court emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring that the child’s interests are safeguarded thru the legal proceedings. The 
Court acknowledge that if there is a conflict of interest between the biological parents and the 
child’s guardian and/or the domestic authorities, there may be discrepancies between the parties 
as to what they believe to be in the child’s best interests. In order to ensure the protection of the 
child’s best interests, the ECtHR has created guidelines as to how one should consider whether 
a measure was in the child’s best interest. By using phrasing as “particularly unfit” and “ensure 
his development in a safe and secure environment” in the guidelines, the ECtHR have kept 
room for the Court to exercise its discretion (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). 
When it comes to what rights the child has, the ethical arguments point to what is in the child’s 
best interests. The ECtHR have stated that the consideration of what is in the child’s best 
interests must start with the national authorities and should be a crucial factor when issuing a 
care order (Saviny v. Ukraine, 2009, para.49). 
 As aforesaid, the ECtHR has stated that it is in the child’s best interests that its ties with its 
biological family is maintained. In total there is 21 unique ethical arguments pertaining to the 
ties with biological family.64 In B. v. The UK (1987, para.77), the ECtHR states that “…there 
                                                
64 See table 16, section 7.3.1. 
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is no doubt their interest will best be served by efforts to sustain links with their natural 
families.”. The Court emphasize that the natural link should be sustained also while the child is 
in public care. However, in situations where the biological parents have been deemed unfit to 
care for the child, it would be against the child’s interests to maintain a bond with its parents. 
Established case law dictates that the child’s interests is an overriding requirement and it is thus 
justified to sever the biological family ties (see i.a. Olsson v. Sweden (No.1), 1988, para.72, 
and Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, 2000, para.148). If maintaining the biological family ties in 
any way harms the child or hinder its development, “exceptional circumstances” exist and it is 
justified to sever the ties (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59, R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, 
para.81).  
The ECtHR has stated that it is important for the biological family ties that there is contact with 
the biological family while the child is in public care. The ECtHR has stated that to deny 
biological parents to not only meet their child but also to contact their child via telephone or 
mail, is “particularly far reaching”, and thus a violation against art.8 (Margareta and Roger 
Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.95). In other words, the child and its biological parents have 
a right to contact while the child is in public care, in order to maintain the natural family ties. 
When a care order has been issued, the authorities must do what they can in order to facilitate 
a speedy reunion between the child and its biological parents. A care orders ultimate aim is for 
the biological family to be reunited (see i.a. E.P. v. Italy, 1999, para.62 and para.69). However, 
the ECtHR points out that ““…a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child 
in remaining in public care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child.” (Johansen 
v. Norway, 1996, para.78). If it is in the child’s best interests to remain in public care, the child’s 
interests trump the biological parents’ right to family life. 
The importance of maintaining the biological family tie while the child is in public care is 
closely connected to the child interests of remaining in public care. Over time, a child creates 
bonds with its caretakers. If considerable time has passed since the child has been removed 
from its biological parents and placed with a foster family, the bond with its foster parents may 
be so strong that it would be against the child’s best interests to sever it (see i.a. W. v. The UK, 
1987, para.62, and K. and T. v. Finland, 2001, para.151). Again, the Court points out that the 
child’s interests trump the parents’ right to family life. 
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Art.8 of the ECHR (1950) grants everyone “respect for his private and family life”. The 
question surrounding what constitutes as family life has been discussed since the first care order 
cases appeared before the ECtHR. In three of the five cases from 1987 the Court stated that 
“The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental 
element of family life.” (see i.a. R. v. The UK, 1987, para.64). Meaning that the ECtHR defined 
the company between biological parents and children as fundamental for family life in the first 
care order cases that appeared before the Court.  
To summarize, the ethical arguments points to the fact that it is the children’s interests that is 
the decisive factor in cases concerning care orders. The ECtHR have created guidelines as to 
how one should assess what is in the child’s best interest. The ethical arguments also highlight 
the relationship between biological parents and their child while the child is in public care, and 
stress the importance of contact between biological parents and their child. 
Lastly, there are no ethical arguments pertaining to the CRC. 
7.4 Moral discourse – findings and discussion 
Moral arguments revolve around the unwritten rules, or norms, in society. Hereunder all 
references to cultural differences between the Contracting States. There are no moral 
arguments in the pro-parent- and biological family category. The pro-child category has the 
most moral arguments, with 13 arguments. In the Court- and “other”-category there is five 
and three moral arguments respectively. Table 17 shows an overview of moral arguments in 
each of the five initial-categories.65 
Table 17 Number of moral arguments in each of the initial-categories 
Pro-child 13 Pro-parent 0
Biological family 0 The Court 5
Other 3
Number of moral arguments in each inital-category
 
7.4.1 Categorizing the moral arguments 
The moral argument discourse differs from the other three discourses as there are only two of 
the four initial-categories that have arguments that can be considered moral.66 The pro-child 
                                                
65 Not every moral argument in, inter alia, the pro-child category is in favor of the child. An in-depth 
presentation of all moral arguments in each of the five initial-categories is found in sections 7.4.2 – 7.4.4. 
66 See table 17, section 7.4. 
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category has the largest amount of moral arguments, with 13 unique arguments and six different 
argument-categories. The Court category has five unique arguments and three argument-
categories. This makes in total 18 unique moral arguments and nine argument-categories. Table 
18 illustrates an overview of the moral argument categories: 
Table 18 Overview of moral argument categories 
Category Judgements Arguments Category Judgements Arguments
Family ties 4 4 Margin of appreciation 3 3
Limitations 3 3 Decision-making 1 1
Perceptions 2 2 Culture 1 1
Discretion 2 2
Child's best interest 1 1
Mutual enjoyment 1 1
Pro-Child moral arguments The Court moral arguments
 
7.4.2 Pro-child – In-depth presentation of moral arguments 
As presented in the section concerning pragmatic arguments, the procedures surrounding the 
national authorities’ decision to take measures to protect a child are not absolute. The national 
authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. The focus of this section is to present the 
normative side of the arguments used by the ECtHR. 
When referring to severing family ties the ECtHR states that “…such measures should only be 
applied in exceptional circumstances…” (Aune v. Norway, 2011, para.66). The Court also 
acknowledges the severity in splitting up a family. For these reasons the ECtHR underline that 
biological families should not be split up, unless there are compelling reasons to do so. The 
compelling reasons include, but are not limited to, what is in the child’s best interest.  
The normative arguments have a cultural side. What is appropriate in one state may not be 
appropriate in another. The ECtHR therefore rely on the national authorities’ discretionary 
choices. In both Johansen and Kutzner the ECtHR address these issues 
“…the Court will have regard to the fact that perceptions as to the appropriateness of 
intervention by public authorities in the care of children vary from one Contracting State to 
another, depending on such factors as traditions relating to the role of the family and to State 
intervention in family affairs and the availability of resources for public measures in this 
particular area.” (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.64, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.66). 
The Court acknowledges that there may be different perceptions as to how the public perceives 
a measure taken by the authorities. By highlighting the cultural differences between Contracting 
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States, the Court gives guidance as to how one can judge similar cases, originating from various 
Contracting States, differently. 
The ECtHR has some limitations to the national authorities’ margin of appreciation. In Y.C. v. 
The UK, the Court states that “…it is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more 
beneficial environment for his upbringing.” (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). This means that 
in order to justify an intervention into a family, one must have more compelling reasons than 
just a beneficial environment. The child’s wellbeing, health or development must be at risk in 
order for a care order to be justified. The Court further states that parent may never be entitled, 
under art.8 of the ECHR, to have measures taken that  would harm a child’s health and 
development (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.78, Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59). 
In Johansen, the ECtHR acknowledge the mutual relationship between parents and children in 
family life. The Court states that any measure taken by national authorities hindering the 
relationship between parents and child, shall be considered an interference under art.8 of the 
ECHR (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.52). However, this do not apply if a child’s health or 
development is at risk. 
Keeping in line with the cultural differences between the Contracting States, the ECtHR 
acknowledge the national authorities’ margin of appreciation. However, the Court states that 
“The margin of appreciation … will vary in the light of the issues and the seriousness of the 
interests at stake,…” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67). The Court further highlights the 
importance of protecting the child. Meaning that the national authorities should prioritize to 
ensure and secure the children’s health and development. In other words, the ECtHR have given 
the national authorities some guidelines as to how they should use their discretionary power.  
7.4.3 The Court – In-depth presentation of moral arguments 
Three of the five arguments in this category all state the same: 
“(d) in determining whether an interference is “necessary in a democratic society” or whether 
there has been breach of a positive obligation, the Court will take into account that a margin of 
appreciation is left to the Contracting States.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.61, R. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.65, W. v. The UK, 1987, para.60) 
The argument itself is part of a list were the ECtHR highlights established case-law. The section 
from which the argument originates is identical in all three cases. In the argument, the ECtHR 
acknowledge the national authorities’ right to make discretionary choices and that the Court 
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will take the national authorities’ margin of appreciation into account when assessing whether 
there has been a breach on the ECHR, which implies that the ECtHR acknowledge that there 
may be differences as to how national authorities assess cases across domestic borders. In other 
words, there may be culturally differences between States that influences the ECtHRs 
assessment of a particular case. 
The concept of a decision being culturally conditioned is further elaborated by the ECtHR in 
Kutzner. In Kutzner, the Court underlines the fact that what the public perceives as appropriate 
may vary from one Contracting State to another, depending on “…such factors as traditions 
relating to the role of the family and to State intervention in family affairs and the availability 
of resources for public measure in this particular area” (Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.66). 
However, in B. v. The UK, the ECtHR states that the national authorities decision-making 
process cannot be devoid from the significance of the decision.  The Court emphasizes that any 
decision must be based on relevant considerations and that the decision cannot be one-sided 
and hence “…neither is nor appears to arbitrary.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). Further, the 
ECtHR states that it “…is entitled to have regard to that [decision-making] process to determine 
whether it has been conducted in a manner that, in all the circumstances, is fair and affords due 
respect to the interests protected by Article 8 [of the ECHR]” (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). 
Meaning that the ECtHR emphasize that in order to ensure everyone’s protection under art.8 of 
the ECHR, it may look at the national authorities’ decision-making process. The Courts 
assessment will surpass the national authorities’ margin of appreciation. 
7.4.4 Other – In-depth presentation of moral arguments 
In both B. v. The UK and R. v. The UK, when summarizing established case-law, the ECtHR 
addresses the notion of necessity in an interference with an individual’s right to respect for 
family. 
“(b) the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need 
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” (B. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.61(b), R. v. The UK, 1987, para.65(b)). 
In other words, the ECtHR underlines that the necessity of an interference should correlate with 
the social need for the authorities to intervene and that the interference must be proportionate 
to what the authorities want to achieve. 
107 
 
All Contracting States have both positive– and negative obligations under the ECHR. Positive 
obligations entail the Contracting States to actively secure the fundamental rights of all people, 
while negative obligations entail the Contracting States to not violate the ECHR. In Gnahoré, 
the ECtHR state that there is no precise definition of the boundaries between positive- and 
negative obligations. The Court emphasizes that in assessing these obligations, “…a fair 
balance … has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the 
community as a whole…” (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.52). Furthermore, the ECtHR 
emphasize that when assessing these obligations, the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation. 
7.4.5 Discussing the moral arguments 
Unlike the other three discourses, moral arguments are not found in all initial-categories. 
Viewing how the moral arguments can answer the four questions presented in section 1.1 In-
depth presentation of research question, it is clear that not all the questions can be answered by 
the moral arguments. There a few to none moral arguments giving answers to the last three 
questions. I will therefore limit myself to discuss how the moral arguments can answer how the 
ECtHR assess cases and point to eventual statements that shed a light on the first three 
questions. 
The moral arguments focus on the norms and culture in society. In Aune v. Norway (2011, 
para.66), the ECtHR states that a natural bond between biological parents and their child should 
not be broken, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying severing such a bond. By 
stating “exceptional circumstances” the ECtHR opens the door for discretionary assessments. 
What constitutes an exceptional circumstance may vary from State to State. Meaning that 
culture may play a role in assessing whether an interference was justified. 
The cultural differences between each of the Contracting States have been addressed by the 
ECtHR. The Court emphasizes that tradition relating to family, what tradition the domestic 
authorities have in interfering with family affairs and what resources are available for public 
measures all affect how appropriate the public perceives a measure to be (Johansen v. Norway, 
1996, para.64, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.66). It is up to the domestic authorities’ margin 
of appreciation to assess the appropriateness of a measure. 
The ECtHR acknowledge that the domestic authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation but 
have given the authorities some restriction as to how they can use their discretionary power. 
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Looking as to how a care order is justified, it is not enough to simply state that it is a more 
beneficial environment for the child’s upbringing and thus acceptable to remove the child from 
its biological parents. In order for the care order to be justified, the child’s health, development 
or wellbeing must be at risk (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012). Turning the table and looking at what 
rights are given to the biological parents, the ECtHR states that the parents may never be entitled 
to have measures taken that potentially could harm a child’s health and development (Johansen 
v. Norway, 1996, para.78, Gnahoré v. France, 2001, para.59). To what extent the domestic 
authorities may exercise their margin of appreciation will vary in light of the issues and 
seriousness of the interests at stake. The ECtHR emphasize that any measure taken by the 
domestic authorities hindering the relationship between biological parent and their child, is 
considered a violation against art.8 of the ECHR (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.52). This 
does not apply if the child’s health or development is at risk. The  ECtHR underlines that what 
is important is to secure the children’s health and/or development (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, 
para.52, Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, para.67).  
The phrase “necessary in a democratic society” is found in the moral arguments. The ECtHR 
underlines that the necessity of an interference should correlate with the social need for the 
authorities to intervene and that the interference must be proportionate to what the domestic 
authorities want to achieve (see i.a. R. v. The UK, 1987, para.65(b)). The ECtHR also point out 
that when assessing whether there has been a breach on the domestic authorities positive 
obligations under the ECHR, the Court will take the domestic authorities margin of appreciation 
into account (see i.a. R. v. The UK, 1987, para.65(d)). Meaning that the ECtHR acknowledge 
that the assessment of necessity initiated by the domestic authorities may be culturally 
conditioned. However, the ECtHR emphasize that the decision made by the domestic authorities 
must be based on relevant considerations, ensuring that the decision neither is nor appears to be 
arbitrary (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). When assessing whether an interference from the 
domestic authorities was a violation against art.8 of the ECHR, the ECtHR point out that it will 
view the domestic authorities decision-making process. Any assessment made by the ECtHR 
surpass the domestic authorities margin of appreciation (B. v. The UK, 1987, para.63). 
Viewing how the domestic authorities should adhere to the ECHR, the ECtHR have pointed out 
that the domestic authorities have both positive- and negative obligations. Or, in other words, 
the domestic authorities have obligations to actively secure the fundamental right of all people 
and to not violate the ECHR. There is no clear definition of the boundaries between positive- 
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and negative obligations. The ECtHR emphasize that when one assesses the obligations, one 
must balance the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole. In doing 
so, the domestic authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation (Gnahoré v. France, 2001, 
para.52). Meaning, inter alia, that the domestic authorities must balance the negative obligation 
of not violating the parents’ right to respect for private and family life with the positive 
obligation to protect the health and development of the child. 
To summarize, there are few to none moral arguments revolving around the last three supportive 
questions.67 The moral arguments point to the fact that children do have a right to protection 
for their health, development and wellbeing. Otherwise, the moral arguments focus on how the 
ECtHR and domestic authorities assess cases. The moral arguments highlight the cultural 
differences between the Contracting States and acknowledge that how one assesses a case may 
be culturally conditioned. For these reasons, the ECtHR emphasize that the domestic authorities 
enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in their assessments. Looking at the domestic authorities’ 
margin of appreciation, the ECtHR have created some basic guidelines as to what the Court 
expects the domestic authorities to consider in their assessments. Lastly, the moral arguments 
highlight the positive- and negative obligations the domestic authorities have opposite the 
public and emphasize that there is no clear boundary between the obligations.  
Chapter 8 - Discussion and concluding remarks 
This thesis aims to answer how the ECtHR weigh children’s and parents’ rights in care order 
cases. In order to highlight all sides of the research question I conducted two analysis’, a 
statistical- and a discourse analysis. The statistical analysis revealed which judgements and 
paragraphs have created the biggest impact in the care order field, as well as the development 
in the ECtHR. The discourse analysis revealed the argumentation used by the ECtHR when 
justifying its decisions and indicated the development in the Courts argumentations. 
To get a better understanding of the ECtHR assess cases, the children’s rights and how the 
Court balances the interest of biological parents and child, I raised four supportive questions.68 
How each of the discourses may answer the supportive questions were presented in chapter 7 – 
                                                
67 See section 1.1 In-depth presentation of research question, for presentation of supportive questions. 
68 See section 1.1 In-depth presentation of research question. 
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Discourse analysis. I will in the following chapter pull the threads together and link the two 
analysis’ to my main research question. The chapter is divided in to three sections. 
I will first discuss the statistical findings presented in chapter 6 – Descriptive statistics – 
findings. I have divided the discussion surrounding the statistical finding in to three parts. 
Firstly, I will discuss the development in the number of care order cases that have appeared 
before the ECtHR. Next, I will discuss which cases have had the largest impact on the care 
order field and how they have impacted the field. Lastly, I will discuss the paragraphs being 
referred to in the judgements, with a special focus on the development of the initial-categories. 
More specifically, I will examine which paragraphs have mostly influenced the care order field 
and look at any development in the pro-parent, pro-child and biological family categories. 
In the second section, I will summarize the discourse analysis presented in chapter 7 and answer 
the four supportive questions by combining the arguments used in the four discourses. I will 
also address the ambiguity in some of the arguments.  
Lastly, I will combine the statistical findings with the findings from the discourse analysis and 
present my concluding remarks surrounding my main research question. 
8.1 Discussing the statistical findings 
The care order field is a fairly small field, with 44 cases stretching over three decades. In terms 
there has been an average of 1.47 care order cases presented before the ECtHR each year. 
However, in section 6.1 Statistical findings - the cases I found that the number of care order 
cases that appeared before the ECtHR is ever-increasing. In 1987 to 1996 there were 10 cases, 
1997 to 2006 there were 14, and from 2007 to 2016 there were 20 cases that appeared before 
the Court. From the first to the second decade there has been a 40% increase in care order cases 
and from the second- to third decade an increase of near 43%. Meaning that every ten years 
there has been a 40+% increase in care order cases that have appeared before the ECtHR. What 
may be potential reason as to why the field has had an exponential growth over the last three 
decades can be the implementation of Protocol No. 11 and Protocol No. 14.69 
Protocol No. 11 were implemented to keep up with the vast number of cases that were submitted 
to the ECtHR (CoE, n.d., Helland, 2012, s.37). Until 1998 when Protocol No. 11 came in to 
                                                
69 See section 2.2.2 Changes in the European Court of Human Rights – Protocol No. 11 and No. 14, for 
description of the two Protocols. 
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force, the ECtHR was a part time court. Changing the Court from a part-time Court to a full-
time, entailed that the ECtHR had the potential to process more cases. How many cases that 
have been processed by the ECtHR in the two first decades are not as well documented as in 
the third decade. In 2006, the ECtHR started publishing an overview of how many cases that 
were processed by the ECtHR each year.70  
Viewing at the number of care order cases appearing before the ECtHR, it seems quite stable 
the first decade (1987 – 1996), with an average of one case each year. In 1987, when the first 
care order cases appeared before the Court, there were five cases which were heard 
simultaneously (See i.a. O. v. The UK, 1987, para.4). In 1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994 there were 
no care order cases brought before the ECtHR.  
In the second decade (1997 – 2006), on average, 1,4 care order cases appeared before the 
ECtHR each year. In 1998 Protocol No. 11 came in to force. Meaning that after the 
implementation of Protocol No. 11 there was, on average, a 0.4 increase in the number of care 
order cases that appeared before the ECtHR. In 1997 and 2005 no care order cases were brought 
before the ECtHR. 
Protocol No. 14 came in to force in 2010. The protocol aimed to streamline how the ECtHR 
handled cases. By letting a single-judge declare a case inadmissible, instead of a three-judge 
committee, and letting a three-judge committee rule in cases within a well-established area of 
case law, instead of a seven-judge Chamber, the Protocol aimed to increase the ECtHRs 
efficiency (Myjer et al., 2010, s.55-56). As in the second decade, there was another increase in 
care order cases that appeared before the ECtHR in the third decade (2007 – 2016). More 
specifically, there was a 43% increase since the previous decade and a doubling from the first 
decade.  
Looking past the care order field towards the total number of applications that have been 
decided, either by judgement or declared inadmissible or struck out, by the ECtHR in the last 
decade, the number of decisions apparently have increased. See appendix I for overview. From 
2006 through 2009, the total number of cases that were deemed inadmissible or struck out were, 
plus-minus 10%, 30.000. The number of judgements ranged from 1719 in 2006 to 2393 in 2009. 
In 2010, when Protocol No. 14 came in to force there was an increase in, both, cases deemed 
inadmissible or struck out and in judgements. In 2010 38.576 cases were deemed inadmissible 
                                                
70 See appendix I for overview. 
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or struck out and 2607 judgements were delivered. In the following years, after Protocol no.14 
came into force there was a massive increase in cases deemed inadmissible or struck out, 
culminating in 2013 when 89.740 cases were either deemed inadmissible or struck out. After 
2013, the number of cases that have been deemed inadmissible or struck out have reduced.  
With the implementation of the two protocols, more cases are being processed by Court. 
However, a larger amount of cases processed does not mean an increase in judgements. On the 
contrary, the number of judgements delivered by the ECtHR has decreased in the years 
following the implementation of Protocol No. 14. After Protocol No. 14 came into force, cases 
that are in an area of well-established case law are speedily processed by the ECtHR. This in 
turn may free time for the Court to prioritize cases that are in areas that needs special attention, 
such as care order cases. In other words, the increased number of cases processed by the ECtHR 
each year may explain the increase of care order cases that have appeared before the Court the 
last three decades.  
Skivenes and Søvig (2016, p.14) found that recent judgements in care order cases bore a more 
child-centered view than older judgements. The increased focus on the child’s best interest and 
the child’s wellbeing may also explain the increased number of care order cases in the prior 
decades. If the ECtHRs focus is a reflection of our society as a whole, then one could expect 
that domestic authorities also have an added focus on the child’s best interests, which may cause 
authorities to be more prone to issue care orders and thus potentially create an increase in 
conflict between authorities and parents.  
Viewing the impact the different judgement have had in the care order field, there are some 
points one should look out for. First, judgements that are not referred to by others have little 
impact on the generic field of care orders. It may, however, have context-based impact. Context-
based impact is dependent on a case having similar merit in order to be visible. Meaning, until 
a case with similar merits appear before the ECtHR, context-based impact will not be picked 
up in search for judicial precedent. 
Second, if a judgement has a high number of references to other judgements this may indicate 
that the judgement finds itself in an area of well-established case law. However, as Lupu and 
Voeten (2018, p.29) point out, when writing the judgements the ECtHR follows domestic 
traditions. If the domestic courts have a tradition of anchoring their judgements in case-law, the 
ECtHR do the same when ruling in cases concerning those legal systems. Which, in turn, may 
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cause some judgements to have a higher number of references to other judgements, than what 
would be the considered normal if the case had originated in another country.  
Third, if a judgement is referred to by few others and has a low number of references to other 
judgements, it indicates that it is at the periphery of the generic field. If there are no similarities 
between the judgements, judicial precedent cannot be used. 
The three aforesaid points are important to keep in mind when discussing the impact each 
judgement has had in the field of care orders. Some judgements have arguably made a visible 
impact in the care order field. The visible impact is found when examining judicial precedent 
that can be classified as generic. If a judgement creates precedent that influences how the 
ECtHR assess cases in general, it will be possible to see the change in argumentation. I.a. When 
discussing whether to sever the biological family ties the ECtHR state in Johansen (para.78) 
that “…the Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child…”, and in 
R. and H.. v. The UK (para.73) “…the best interests of the child is paramount.”. By adding the 
word “paramount” the ECtHR created a visible change in argumentation from Johansen to R. 
and H. v. The UK.  
Viewing the judgments that have the highest- and lowest referral rate, and the judgements that 
refer most- and least to others, one can make a qualified guess as to which judgements have had 
a visible impact on the generic field of care orders. See appendix E and F for tables. However, 
without looking at each of the references, it is difficult to draw a conclusion as to which 
judgements have created the biggest impact. The analysis of arguments presented in each 
paragraph of the references was presented in chapter 7 – Discourse analysis and will be further 
discussed in sections 8.2 Supportive question – discussion and concluding remarks and 8.3 
Main research question – concluding remarks. 
Johansen has a referral rate of 68%, which is 7% more than the next judgement on the list, 
Olsson. Both judgements originates from the first decade of care orders cases, which entails 
that the judgements have a limited number of judgements they could refer to, in order to justify 
their decisions. The limited number of care order cases that had appeared before the ECtHR at 
the time would also point to the fact that the judgments are in an area of unproven ground and 
thus do not alter exiting precedent but rather creates new. This is especially so for Olsson, which 
only had the five judgements from 1987 to use as reference. Johansen had nine judgements that 
it potentially could refer to. 
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The five cases that arguably created new precedent, are the five cases from 1987. The five cases 
were heard at the same time by the ECtHR. The cohesion between the five cases is apparent 
when looking at references to the five cases, i.a. Gnahoré (para.52) refers to “…the W., B., and 
R. v. The United Kingdom judgements…”. However, even though the cohesion is apparent, 
there are differences between the five judgements. Viewing how many times each of the five 
judgements are referred to one finds that W. v. The UK is referred to 22 times, B. v. The UK 11, 
R. v. The UK 3, H. v. The UK 2 and O. v. The UK 1 time. W. v. The UK and B. v. The UK has a 
significantly higher referral-rate than the other three judgments. This indicates that the merits 
in the two judgements are more generic than in the other three judgements. Looking at the 
ECtHRs ruling, O. v. The UK is the only judgement, of the five, where the ECtHR stated with 
dissenting opinion that there had been no violation on art.8 of the ECHR (O. v. The UK, 1987, 
para.3 and para.4). In R. v. The UK, W. v. The UK and B. v. The UK, it was a unanimous decision 
stating that there had been a violation against art.8 of the ECHR, and in H. v. The UK there was 
a dissenting decision stating the same. Of the five judgments, O. v. The UK and H. v. The UK 
are the only judgements that refer to a care order judgement. Looking at the impact each of the 
five judgements have had in the care order field, W. v. The UK has had the largest impact, due 
to its high referral-rate. The judgment has a referral-rate of 51%, which is twice as much as the 
next judgment, B. v. The UK. See appendix E for complete table. 
From the second decade with care order cases, two judgements stand out, K. and T. v. Finland 
and Kutzner. K. and T. v. Finland has a referral-rate of 55% and, in turn, refers to two other 
judgements. Kutzner has a referral-rate of 54% but has a high number of references to others, 
referring to 11 of 17 possible judgements. See appendix E and F for complete tables. There are 
two care order cases from Germany that are brought before the ECtHR, Kutzner and Haase. As 
Kutzner, Haase has a high number of references to other judgements. It has references to 15 of 
20 possible judgements. Since both cases from Germany have a high number of references to 
other judgements, my initial thought was that it could be a part of practice and tradition from 
the German legal system. However, speaking to Ingvill Helland Göller, who has done extensive 
research on German legal methods, and are associate Professor and Head of the Department of 
Law at the University of Agder (phone conversation, 12.04.19), she could unconfirm that 
thought. She pointed out that the high number of referrals could mean that the ECtHR wanted 
to take special care of legitimizing its decisions. This would especially be so, if the ECtHR 
presented a new interpretation of existing case law. Haase has a low referral-rate. With a high 
number of references to other and a low referral-rate, that indicates that the case is in an area of 
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well-established case law. Kutzner however, has a high referral-rate and refers to a high number 
of cases, which may indicate that Kutzner has brought something new to the field of care orders 
and thus wants to justify its new interpretations.71 
From the last decade, one judgement stands out, R. and H. v. The UK. R. and H. v. The UK has 
a referral-rate of 33% and has the second highest number of references to others. As with 
Kutzner, a high referral-rate and high number of referrals to others may indicate that the 
judgement breaks new ground and thus the necessity to take special care when justifying its 
decision.72 
Johansen, Olsson, W. v. The UK, K. and T. v. Finland, Kutzner and R. and H. v. The UK are 
the six judgements with the highest referral rate. To better assess the impact each judgement has 
had, I will look at how many paragraphs from each of the six judgement are being referred to, 
the amount that refers to each of the paragraphs and if the paragraphs are consistently referred 
to. By the latter, I imply references that are referred to from the time-period when the judgement 
was finalized until the present date. See appendix G for a complete overview of all cases. 
Johansen has the highest referral rate. There are three paragraphs from the judgements that are 
referred to: para.52 (13x, biological family), para.64 (15x, the Court, pro-child) and para.78 
(15x, biological family and pro-child).73 All three references have a high number of referrers, 
which indicates that they are applicable to a larger field. All three references are consistently 
referred to in the years following Johansen. Meaning that all three references from Johansen 
are as relevant today as they were in 1996. It is worth noting that in Johansen, none of the 
paragraphs are strictly pro-parent. 
Olsson is the judgement with the second highest referral-rate. In total, six paragraphs are 
referred to: para.59 (6x, biological family), para.61 (3x, the Court), para.67 (2x, the Court), 
para.68 (11x, the Court), para.72 (1x, pro-child) and para.81 (12x, biological family). Unlike 
Johansen, there is a sprawling number of references to each paragraph. Two of the paragraphs 
are referred to consistently, para.68 and para.81. The first judgements referring to the two 
paragraphs are Johansen (para.68) and Margareta and Roger Andersson (para.81). Even though 
there is a four-year gap between Margareta and Roger Andersson and Johansen, I would still 
consider the judgements to come from the same era, due to the fact that in the years between 
                                                
71 The paragraphs from Kutzner was presented in chapter 7 – Discourse analysis. 
72 The paragraphs from R. and H. v. The UK was presented in chapter 7 – Discourse analysis. 
73 (nx, …) tell how many times each paragraph is cited and how the paragraph is coded in the initial-categories. 
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the two judgements there is only one other care order which has appeared before the ECtHR. 
As in Johansen, there are no paragraphs which are considered pro-parent. One paragraph, 
para.72, is coded as pro-child and is referred to only once by Scozzari and Giunta. This means 
that the first time one of the care order cases referred to the paragraph that is considered pro-
child is 12 years after judgement was finalized. The last three paragraphs, from Olsson, are not 
consistently referred to. Few referrals to a paragraph indicate that the impact the paragraph has 
is context-based and therefore must be assessed individually.  
In W. v. The UK, seven paragraphs are referred to: para.59 (8x, biological family), para.60 (5x, 
the Court), para.62 (9x, the Court, other), para.63 (3x, pro-parent), para.64 (13x, pro-parent, 
other), para.65 (2x, the Court) and para.78 (1x, pro-parent). Unlike Olsson and Johansen, W. v. 
The UK has paragraphs that are pro-parent. However, there are no paragraphs that are pro-child. 
Three paragraphs are consistently being referred to; para.59, para.62 and para.64. While both, 
para.59 and para.64, have a fairly even distribution of judgements referring to them thru the 
three decades, para.62 do not. In para.62 more than half the references derive from judgements 
in the last decade, meaning that the paragraph has had an upswing the last decade. Para.60, on 
the other hand, is consistently being referred to until 2004, but after 2004, there are no 
references to para.60.  The last three paragraphs are seemingly context-based, and is presented 
in chapter 7 – Discourse analysis. 
In K. and T. v. Finland, seven paragraphs are referred to: para.151 (4x, pro-child), para.154 (8x, 
pro-child), para.155 (6x, the Court), para.166 (7x, other), para.173 (6x, the Court), para.178 
(5x, the Court) and para.179 (4x, the Court). Since K. and T. v. Finland was finalized in 2001, 
the judgements have had no impact on the first decade of care order cases. Out of the seven 
paragraphs that are referred to in K. and T. v. Finland, six are consistently referred to. One, 
para.151, is not. In total, there are four references to para.151, three originate from cases prior 
to 2004 and the last from 2013. From the time K. and T. v. Finland was finalized in 2001 and 
to 2004, five care order cases were brought before the ECtHR, three of which all referred to 
para.151. Since the paragraph was consistently referred to in the beginning of the millennium, 
it can indicate that there has been a development in how the ECtHR assess the cases, which 
changed para.151 from having a generic impact on the care order field to a context-based. 
Viewing the other paragraphs referred to in K. and T. v. Finland, four paragraphs focus on how 
the ECtHR should assess care order cases. None are considered to be pro-parent or in favor of 
the biological family. In K. and T. v. Finland, the main focus is on the child and the Court. 
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In Kutzner, five paragraphs are referred to: para.56 (2x, the Court), para.65 (2x, the Court), 
para.66 (1x, pro-child, the Court), para.67 (11x, pro-child, the Court) and para.76 (3x, pro-child, 
pro-parent). One paragraph, para.67, is consistently referred to. The other four paragraphs are 
seemingly context-based and were discussed in chapter 7 – Discourse analysis. It is, however, 
worth noting that one paragraph, para.76, is coded as both pro-child and pro-parent and has 
been referred to in total, three times. The low number of judgements referring to the paragraph 
indicates that it does not have a generic impact on the care order field.  
Lastly, in R. and H. v. The UK, four paragraphs are referred to: para.73 (3x, pro-child, pro-
parent), para.75 (2x, the Court, pro-parent), para.76 (3x, other), para.81 (2x, pro-child, pro-
parent, the Court). Unlike the five previous presented judgements, R. and H. v. The UK does 
not have a paragraph that stands out as more cited than others. The impact the judgements has 
on the care order field is yet difficult to see. The reason being that the judgement is from 2011, 
which means that there is a limited number of cases that can refer to the judgement. All 
paragraphs in the judgement, however, is referred to more than once. Viewing the cases 
referring to R. and H. v. The UK, Y.C. v. The UK and N.P v. the Republic of Moldova refer to 
all four paragraphs, which means that there are only two of the four paragraphs are referred to 
by other cases. This indicates that R. and H. v. The UK has a context-based impact on the care 
order field. However, three of the four paragraphs being cited are coded in more than one initial-
category. Reviewing every reference from all 44 care order cases, only three paragraphs are 
coded in three initial-categories at one time, one of which is from R. and H. v. The UK 
(para.81).74 The diversity in the references indicates that R. and H. v. The UK has a broad impact 
on the care order field.  
There are significant differences as to how the six judgements are referred to. Johansen is the 
only judgement where all references in the judgment can be considered to have a generic impact 
on the field of care orders. K. and T. v. Finland follow suit, but with one reference having a 
more context-based impact. 
Looking at the impact each of the six judgements has on the care order field, there are 
differences. Of the six judgements, Johansen has the lowest number of paragraphs being 
referred to. However, while all three paragraphs being referred to in Johansen are consistently 
being referred to and thus have a generic impact, each of the five remaining judgements have 
                                                
74 The other two paragraphs are found in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy (para.138), and P., C., and S. v. The UK 
(para.118). See appendix C. 
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at least one paragraph that is context based. The judgement with the highest number of 
paragraphs that are consistently being referred to, are K. and T. v. Finland. Meaning that K. and 
T. v. Finland has a broader impact on the care order field than Johansen. Even though K. and 
T. v. Finland is consistently referred to, the number of referrals is not as high as the most cited 
paragraph in four of the five other judgements. The broad impact is also found in R. and H. v. 
The UK. As with K. and T. v. Finland, the number of referrals to each paragraph in R. and H. 
v. The UK is not as high as is the case with the other four judgements.  
In order to better assess the impact a single reference has had on the care order field, I examined 
how many percent of all judgements referred to the most cited paragraphs. In Johansen the two 
most cited paragraphs are referred to in 44% of all judgements. In Olsson the most cited 
paragraph is referred to in 31% of the all judgements, in W. v. The United Kingdom the same 
number is 30%, in K. and T. v. Finland 28%, in Kutzner 42% and in R. and H. v. The UK 25%. 
Meaning that it is para.67 from Kutzner, and para.64 and para.78 from Johansen that has had 
the largest, generic, impact on the care order field.  
Looking past the single paragraphs and to all the references to a judgement as a whole, Kutzner 
is the judgement with the least paragraphs (one) being consistently referred. This indicates that, 
of the six judgements, Kutzner has the narrowest impact on the care order field. As aforesaid, 
which impact R. and H. v. The UK has is difficult to say. What one can determine is that each 
of the paragraphs in the judgement is evenly referred to. Viewing W. v. The UK and Olsson, the 
two judgements are among the first care order cases to ever be brought before the ECtHR. 
Meaning that both judgements are ground-breakers and thus should have made huge impact in 
the care order field. There are paragraphs, from the two judgements, that arguably have had 
large influence on the care order field, such as W. v. The UK para.64 and Olsson para.81. 
However, considering that the two judgements were among the first judgements to be finalized 
by the ECtHR, the judicial precedent set by the judgements are not as voluminous as one may 
expect. This shows that the ECtHR develops constantly. If there had been no development in 
how the ECtHR assess cases, it most likely would have been a higher number of referrals to the 
first care order cases that appeared before the ECtHR. 
To summarize, Johansen has had the greatest, generic, impact on the ECtHRs care order field. 
Paragraph 67 from Kutzner has had the same impact as the paragraphs from Johansen. While 
the Johansen-judgement has had a broad impact on the care order field, Kutzner’s impact is 
narrow. The generic impact from the Kutzner-judgement is restricted to one paragraph coded 
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as pro-child and the Court. K. and T. v. Finland has the broadest impact on the care order field, 
with six paragraphs that can be considered to have had a generic impact. R. and H. v. The UK 
has had a broad, diverse, impact on the care order field. Whether the impact is generic or 
context-based is yet to be determined. Both W. v. The UK and Olsson are among the first care 
order judgements that appeared before the ECtHR. Both judgements have endured the ravages 
of time and are still being cited in newer judgements. Which mean that the two judgements 
have influenced the care order field in the longest timespan.  
Turning away from the assessing the impact the judgements has had on the care order field and 
turning towards the paragraphs being cited, I will now discuss any development surrounding 
the paragraphs being referred to. I have created three tables showing paragraphs coded as pro-
child, pro-parent and biological family, which can be found in appendix H, H1-3. Any 
development in the ECtHR’s role in assessing cases is difficult to spot in a statistical analysis 
and is therefore omitted from this discussion. However, by looking at the statistics of the 
development of the pro-child, pro-parent and biological family category one senses in which 
direction the ECtHR is heading for. 
The first two paragraphs that are in favor of the child originate from B. v. The UK. However, 
one of the two paragraphs was first referred to by McMichael in 1995, and the second was 
referred to by Scozzari and Giunta in 2000. Hence there were no judicial precedent references 
in favor of the child prior to 1995. The pro-child category has increased substantially the last 
two decades. The upswing started with Johansen. After the Johansen-judgement there is a 
visible change in the number of references in favor of the child, which is an ever-increasing 
number. In total 92 of 94 pro-child references have come after year 2000. See appendix H1. 
The increasing number of references in favor of the child indicates that the ECtHR have a more 
child-centered focus in later years. This does not mean that there were no arguments in the 
judgements prior to 2000 in favor of the child, but they had not yet been referred to and thus 
not created visible precedent on the care order field. In fact, several of the references in favor 
of the child is referred to many years after the judgements were finalized. I.a. as aforesaid, B. 
v. The UK (para.63) was first referred to eight years after the judgement was finalized and, 
both, Scozzari and Giunta (para.149) and P., C., and S. v. The UK (para.118) were first referred 
to nine years after the judgements were finalized. Reviewing the number of times each of the 
aforesaid paragraphs are referred to, one thing sets B. v. The UK apart from the other two 
judgements. B. v. The UK is consistently referred to after the first referral. The paragraphs from 
the other two judgements are not. This indicates that while para.63 from B. v. The UK has had 
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a generic impact the two other paragraphs have had a context-based impact. In total there are 
24 paragraphs, referred to 94 times in the timespan between 1995 and 2016, that are in favor of 
the child. 
Looking at paragraphs in favor of the parent, it is clear that there are more pro-parent paragraphs 
than pro-child. In total there are 27 pro-parent paragraphs being referred to. The pro-parent 
paragraphs are, however, significantly less referred to than pro-child, with 72 referrals. Unlike 
pro-child, the first references to pro-parent paragraph is seen in 1987, the last reference being 
from 2016. Meaning that there are judicial precedent references in favor of the parents in the 
entire timespan there has been care orders. Of the 27 paragraphs being referred to, only two75 
are referred to more than seven times and thus on the list of most cited paragraphs.76 Looking 
at the most cited paragraphs, the pro-parent category is the only one of the initial-categories 
that does not have reference that are solely coded in the category. Meaning that the two pro-
parent paragraphs in the list of most cited paragraphs are also coded as “other” (W. v. The UK, 
para.64) and “pro-child” (Gnahoré, para.59). The low number of pro-parent paragraphs being 
cited more than a few times indicates that the paragraphs being referred to have a context-based 
impact. In other words, the pro-parent category has more paragraphs with context-based impact 
than the pro-child and biological family categories, and less generic. On average each of the 
paragraphs in the pro-parent category is referred to 2.67 times, the paragraphs in the pro-child 
category is referred to 3.92 times and the paragraphs in the biological family category, on 
average 4.53 times. Seemingly, it is the paragraphs coded as biological family that has the most 
generic impact and pro-parent who has the most context-based. 
Viewing the paragraphs coded as biological family there is, in total, 17 paragraphs being 
referred to 77 times. There are fewer paragraphs coded as biological family than pro-child and 
pro-parent. The high number of references being consistently referred to77 indicates that, seen 
as a whole, paragraphs coded as biological family have a more generic impact than what was 
the case with paragraphs coded as pro-parent. The pro-child category also has a high number 
of paragraphs being consistently referred to, but a lower overall average. This indicates that the 
impact from the pro-child category is somewhere between the context-based impact from pro-
parent category and the generic impact from biological family category. As with the pro-parent 
category, paragraphs in favor of the biological family is first referred to in 1987 and last referred 
                                                
75 W. v. The UK, para.64 (1987) and Gnahoré v. France, para.59 (2001). 
76 See table 10, section 6.2. 
77 See appendix H3. 
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to in 2016. Meaning that paragraphs that are in favor of biological family have been referred to 
in the entire timespan care order cases have been brought before the ECtHR. 
Looking at the judicial precedent it is clear that after a judgement is finalized, if there is a 
development in the ECtHRs assessments, it is instantly referred to.78 If a judgement creates new 
precedent, that will be immediately noted. There is only one judgement in my material that, for 
the time being, cannot be referred to by others, Jovanovic v. Sweden, as it is the newest 
judgement in my data material. As pointed out when discussing R. and H. v. The UK, it is 
impossible to see any generic impact judgements have had on the care order field in the statistics 
before some time has passed. In order to see the impact, and thus the influence, each judgement 
and paragraph has had on the care order field one must examine the content of each paragraph. 
8.2 Supportive questions – discussion and concluding remarks 
The first supportive question revolves around how the ECtHR assess cases and secure the rule 
of law of everyone, when dealing with different judicial systems. 
The legal arguments point to the ECtHRs role in assessing the measures implemented by 
domestic authorities. The measure taken must be “in accordance with the law” or “necessary in 
a democratic society”. In order to assess whether a measure was “in accordance with the law”, 
the ECtHR review, in light of the ECHR, how the domestic authorities justify implementing a 
measure. This allows for the ECtHR to unveil any potential infractions on the Convention. The 
ECtHR does however emphasize that it is not a substitution for domestic authorities.  
When it comes to assessing whether a measure was “necessary in a democratic society”, there 
are two considerations. “First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a 
whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were “relevant and sufficient”; second it 
must be examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to 
the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention.” (Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.133). 
The legal arguments point to the fact that in order for a measure to be justified, the measure 
must proportionate for the legitimate aim pursued. If the relation between the measure and its 
goal is disproportionate, the measure cannot be justified and thus not be considered “necessary 
in a democratic society”. The second consideration revolves around the decision-making 
                                                
78 I.a. the five judgements from 1987 were heard and finalized on the same date, but still there are references 




process. The legal arguments emphasize that the ECtHR will assess whether the decision-
making process was fair, and that the interests of all parties involved were respected. The legal 
arguments also highlight the notion of necessity, in the phrase “necessary in a democratic 
society”. The ECtHR emphasize that the necessity points to a pressing social need to interfere. 
The pragmatic arguments focus mainly on the domestic authorities’ decision-making process. 
By stating how the domestic authorities should proceed in a decision-making process, the 
ECtHR has essentially created a guideline for how the domestic authorities should conduct their 
decision-making process in order for a measure to be justified. As were the case with the legal 
arguments, the pragmatic arguments emphasize that the ECtHR role is not act as a substitution 
for domestic authorities, but to ascertain whether the decision reached by the domestic 
authorities were a result of carefully consideration of the interests and rights of all involved. 
Viewing the ethical arguments pertaining to the ECtHRs assessments, their focus is mainly on 
how the ECtHR should assess, and balance, the interests of the biological parents and their 
child. The ethical arguments emphasize that the biological parents must be involved in the 
decision-making process, leading up to a care order, to an extent that ensure that their interests 
are known. When it comes to the child’s interests, the ethical arguments highlight that they are 
an overriding requirement. All decision pertaining to the child should be taken with the child’s 
best interests in mind. That includes decisions made by the domestic authorities, and the 
ECtHRs assessment of a case.  
The moral arguments shed a light on cultural differences between the Contracting States. The 
ECtHR underlines that the domestic authorities’ decision-making process may be culturally 
conditioned. Traditions, norms and judicial system may all play a role in how the domestic 
authorities assess a case. Keeping in line with the cultural differences, the ECtHR acknowledge 
that the domestic authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in their assessments. 
However, the ECtHR have created, what is basically guidelines as to what the Court expect the 
domestic authorities to consider in the assessments. The Court states that the decision made by 
the domestic authorities must be based on relevant considerations, ensuring that the decision 
neither is nor appears to be arbitrary. The moral arguments also underline the obligations, both 
the positive and negative, the domestic authorities have opposite the public.  
Viewing arguments pertaining to how the ECtHR assess a case, it is clear that the Court does 
not consider itself to be a substitute for the domestic authorities. The ECtHR emphasizes that 
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the Courts role is to assess whether the decision reached by the domestic authorities were “in 
accordance with the law” or “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The phrase “in accordance with the law” points to both the content and quality of domestic law. 
Meaning that there should be laws in each of the Contracting States that justifies the domestic 
authorities’ decisions. The ECtHR emphasizes that there should be a measure of protection in 
domestic law against arbitrary interference, but that is not the Courts role to assess domestic 
law in abstract. The Court does however underline that the domestic law should be phrased in 
a way that is reasonably understandable for anyone who may be affected by it. This does not 
entail that any law that confers discretion is a violation against the ECtHRs requirements, 
“…provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with 
sufficient clarity … to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.” 
(Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden, 1992, para.75). 
Looking at the phrase “necessary in a democratic society” the keyword is necessary. If there is 
a pressing social need to interfere, the domestic authorities have an obligation to do so. Any 
concern regarding a child’s health, development or wellbeing constitute a pressing social need. 
In other words, the child’s best interests will fulfill the requirements of necessity. The ECtHR 
reiterates that in the Courts assessments, the child’s best interests are an overriding requirement. 
However, that the child’s best interests are an overriding requirement does not entail that the 
biological parents’ interests should not be heard. The ECtHR emphasizes that the biological 
parents must be involved in the domestic authorities’ decision-making process and that their 
interests should be balanced against the child’s. 
To conclude, the ECtHR assessment of cases revolves around the question of whether an 
interference was “in accordance with the law” or “necessary in a democratic society”. The 
ECtHR emphasize that it is not a substitution for domestic authorities. The Courts reviews 
whether decision-making process leading up to the interference were justified. When looking 
at a case, the ECtHR examine whether the interests of the biological parents and child has been 
taken into account by the domestic authorities, in their decision-making process. The child’s 
interests surpass those of the biological parents, but the biological parents must have had an 
opportunity to make their interests heard. In the ECtHRs assessments, culture plays a role. Each 
of the Contracting States has its own national culture that can influence the authorities’ 
decision-making process. The ECtHR underlines that the domestic authorities enjoy a certain 
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margin of appreciation in the assessment but emphasize that any decision reached by the 
authorities must neither be, nor appear to be, arbitrary. 
The second supportive question revolves around the child’s best interests. Who decides what is 
in the child’s best interests in the decision-making process leading up to a care order being 
issued? 
The legal arguments highlight the fact that the biological parents have a right to be involved in 
the decision-making process leading up to a care order. If the authorities deem it necessary to 
remove the child from its biological parents and place the child in public care, the decision must 
be taken on a sufficient evidentiary base. The ECtHR points out that, statements from 
professionals, laymen and witnesses supporting the domestic authorities may strengthen the 
authorities’ decision. No one is infallible. Meaning that even though there are professionals 
stating that the child’s best interests is to be placed in public care, that can in retrospect be 
proven to be an incorrect decision. For these reasons the ECtHR emphasize that the biological 
parents’ standing as biological parents suffice to let them speak on their child’s behalf before 
the Court, even in situations where they otherwise have been deprived of their parental rights. 
The pragmatic arguments focus on the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation in deciding 
what is in the child’s best interests. As in the legal arguments, there are pragmatic arguments 
stating that biological parents may speak on their child’s behalf in situations where the child 
cannot speak for itself. 
As were the case with legal- and pragmatic arguments, the ethical arguments underline the 
importance of involving the biological parents’ in the decision-making process. Involvement is 
especially essential in situations where the biological parents are in a conflict with the domestic 
authorities. If there is a conflict of interest between the authorities and biological parents, there 
may be discrepancies as to what they believe to be in the child’s best interests. The ECtHR has 
created what is essentially a guideline on how one should consider what is in the child’s best 
interests. “…first, it is in the child’s best interests that his ties with his family be maintained 
except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child’s 
best interests to ensure his development in a safe and secure environment” (Y.C. v. The UK, 
2012, para.134). The ECtHR does, however, leave room for the authorities to use their 
discretion in assessing if the biological parents are “particularly unfit” or if the child’s is in a 
“safe and secure environment”.  
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The moral arguments focus on cultural differences between the Contracting States. Meaning 
that it is within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation to decide what is in the child’s 
best interests. The ECtHR underlines that it is not enough to simply state that it is a more 
beneficial environment for the child’s upbringing, to justify a care order. The child’s health 
and/or development must be at risk. 
Arguments pertaining to the biological parents’ involvement in deciding what is in the child’s 
best interests are coded in more than one discourse category. Looking at the argumentation 
used, there is no doubt that a care order is issued with the child’s best interests in mind. When 
assessing the child’s best interest in the decision-making process leading up to a care order, the 
ECtHR must balance both weak and strong assessments. As explained in section 4.1.3 
Discourse ethics, each of the discourses can be categorized as a weak or as a strong 
assessment.79 The biological parents’ involvement in the decision-making process cannot be 
categorized as a weak assessment. The biological parents have self-interest in the outcome of 
the domestic authorities, which entails that the assessment done by the biological parents in 
deciding what is in the child’s best interests, is a strong assessment. Professionals, laymen, and 
witnesses do not per se have the same vested interests as the biological parents. In their 
statements, they shall be objective and truthful about what they believe to be in the child’s best 
interests. Or, in other words, they shall have a more pragmatic approach to the decision-making 
process.  
As pointed out by the ECtHR, there may be conflicting interests between biological parents and 
the authorities, with regards to what is in the child’s best interests. Professionals, laymen and 
witnesses help the authorities to make an educated decision. However, all argumentation 
pertaining to interests, that be of the authorities, the child or biological parents, have an ethical 
side. Meaning that all assessments pertaining to interests are to a certain degree strong 
assessments.  
To conclude, the decision of what is in the child’s best interests is to a certain degree for the 
domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation to decide. The decision must be taken on sufficient 
evidentiary base, i.a. on statements from professionals, laymen and witnesses, and must include 
                                                
79 See table 4, section 4.1.3. 
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the views of the parents. Arguments pertaining to the child’s interests all have an ethical/moral 
side, which entails that the assessments done by the authorities are mostly strong assessments. 
The third supportive question focuses on the extent of children’s human rights under the ECHR 
and how their rights are adhered to by the ECtHR. 
When speaking of children’s human rights, the legal arguments point to what is in the child’s 
best interests. Meaning, that it is the child’s interests that is emphasized, not the child’s rights. 
The ECtHR states that if the child’s wellbeing is at jeopardy, the child’s interests trump the 
parents’ rights, and an interference with the parents’ rights is justified. There are no legal 
arguments that state to what extent the child is granted rights under the ECHR. 
When speaking of children’s rights, the pragmatic arguments focus on what is believed to be in 
the child’s best interests. The majority of the pragmatic arguments revolve around reuniting the 
biological parents with their child, after a care order has been issued. Even though established 
case law dictates that a care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological parents and child, a 
child’s health and development should never be put at risk. The ECtHR states that the child’s 
best interests are an overriding requirement. Meaning, that if it is in the child’s best interest to 
remain in public care, the child’s interest trumps the biological parents’ right to be reunited with 
their child. In other words, the parents may never be entitled rights that put a child’s health and 
development at risk.  
The ethical arguments highlight the child’s best interests as the decisive factor in cases 
concerning care orders. In order to determine how one should assess what is in the child’s best 
interests, the ECtHR have created guidelines. The ethical arguments also underline the 
importance of maintaining a relationship between biological parents and children, while the 
children are in public care. The natural bond between biological parents and children must be 
allowed to develop while the child is in public care. In order to do so, the ECtHR stress the 
importance of allowing contact between the child and its biological parents while the child is 
in public care. 
The moral arguments highlight the fact that children have a right for protection of their health, 
development and wellbeing.  
Arguments pertaining to the child’s interests can be found in all four discourses. However, one 
cannot deny that all arguments pertaining to the child’s interests have an ethical/moral side. 
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When one speaks of the child’s interests, one speaks about the child’s thoughts and feelings, 
which are subjective. Meaning that the authorities’ positive duty to protect the child can feel 
like paternalistic abuse from the child’s side. This will be further discussed in section 8.3 Main 
research question – concluding remarks. Established case law dictates that a care orders ultimate 
aim is to reunite biological parents and child, as soon as circumstances permit. This entails that 
the child has a right to be reunited with its biological parents. The domestic authorities’ duty to 
facilitate a reunion between biological parents and child is an established fact. The arguments 
pertaining to the reunion between biological parents and child have been coded as pragmatic 
arguments, due to the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation in assessing how and when 
the reunion shall take place. The assessments done by the domestic authorities are, however, a 
combination of strong and weak assessments. How the reunion shall be conducted is a weak 
assessment, its ramifications, a strong assessment.  
To conclude, children’s rights are mostly tied to their interests. A child in public care has a right 
to be reunited with its biological parents, unless it is in its interests to remain with its foster 
family. The child’s interests are an overriding requirement, which seemingly overrides both the 
parents’ and the child’s rights. The child’s interests can be divided in to three categories; health, 
development and wellbeing. If one of the categories is at risk, the domestic authorities have a 
positive duty to protect the child. 
The last supportive question aims to answer how the CRC influence the ECtHR. There were no 
references to the CRC in any of the paragraphs I examined. Looking at previous research on 
the field, Skivenes and Søvig (2016, p.14) found that the CRC are referred to by the ECtHR, 
but are not a prominent source. Meaning, that in general, the CRC does not influence how the 
ECtHR assess care order cases.  
8.3 Main research question – concluding remarks 
This thesis aims to answer how the ECtHR balance biological parents and children’s rights in 
care order cases. To do so, one must have an understanding of what rights biological parents 
and children have. Children’s rights have been a recurring subject thru out the thesis. However, 
the biological parents’ rights have not directly been addressed to the same extent. Since the 
biological parents are over the age of 18, they are considered adults. Meaning, there is no 
question as to whether they are entitled to the rights under the ECHR or that they have rights 
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under domestic law. The question is, what if the children’s rights interfere with the parents’ 
rights? 
As previously mentioned, children’s rights are mainly a question of what is in their interests. 
However, some rights given to the biological parents is “two-way”-rights. With “two-way”-
rights I mean rights given to parents that include children and thus are given indirectly to 
children. A care orders ultimate aim is to reunite biological parents with their child. Meaning 
that both, the biological parents and the child, have the right to be reunited. How one weighs 
the “two-way”-rights are not necessarily in equilibrium between the biological parents and the 
child. The ECtHR has on several occasions underlined that even though a care orders ultimate 
aim is to reunite biological parents and children, what is in the child’s interests must be 
considered. The ECtHR has further stated that the child’s interests is an overriding requirement 
and thus surpasses the biological parents’ rights. In other words, what the ECtHR believe to be 
in the child’s best interest, weigh more than the biological parents’ rights in the Courts 
assessments. The child’s interests as an overriding requirement entails that in situations where 
one has “two-way”-rights, one runs the risk of depriving the child of its rights, due to its 
interests. This will be addressed a bit further down in this section. 
Over the three decades in which there have been care orders, there has been a change in how 
the ECtHR assess the cases. Looking at the initial-categories, there were no paragraphs in favor 
of the children prior to 1995. The bulk of paragraphs in favor of the child, is seen the last 15 
years.80 This points to the fact that the ECtHR have turned towards a more child-centered 
approach in their assessments. The wording used by the ECtHR in the judgements with regard 
to how the Court sees children and biological parents’ rights, have also changed. In Johansen 
(para.78) the ECtHR stated that “…the Court will attach particular importance to the best 
interests of the child…”. Para.78 from Johansen is tied for first, when looking at which 
paragraphs are most referred to.81 In newer judgements, despite still referring to the paragraph 
from Johansen, the ECtHR has changed the wording to “…the best interests of the child is 
paramount.” (see i.a. R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.73, and Y.C. v. The UK, 2012, para.134). 
By changing how the ECtHR consider children’s interests from “particular importance” to 
“paramount”, the Court leaves no room for doubt to what role the child’s best interests should 
play, as it is the strongest formulation, regarding the child’s best interests, used in western law 
                                                
80 See appendix H. 
81 See appendix G. 
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(Parker, 1994, p.27). The child’s best interests come before all other considerations. The 
question is, who decides and how do they decide, what is in the child’s best interest? 
In care order cases, not all children are in a position to make their views heard by themselves. 
Some children are taken into public care from birth. The child’s development, health and age 
may all play a part in how one should decide what is in the child’s best interest. The key phrase 
here is “how one should decide”. It is not the child who decides (Archard, 2013, p.64). When 
discussing the child’s best interests, one discusses what is best for the child’s health, 
development and wellbeing. The domestic authorities have a positive duty to protect the child’s 
interest. By deciding what they believe to be in the child’s best interests, the domestic 
authorities run the risk of making a decision which the child perceives as paternalistic abuse. In 
Johansen the child ran away from his children’s home twice, across the country, to live with 
his mother. Despite the child’s interests of remaining with his mother, the domestic authorities 
kept the child in public care – to protect its interests (Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.19). As 
aforesaid, reunite is a “two-way”-right. Meaning, mother and child have a right to be reunited, 
as soon as circumstances permits. In Johansen, mother and child both wanted to live together. 
Due to the domestic authorities’ positive duty to protect the child’s interests, both mother and 
child were not heard and thus deprived of their right to be reunited (Skivenes and Strandbu, 
2006, p.15). In other words, what the domestic authorities believed to be in the child’s interests 
surpassed both the mother and child’s rights.  
Viewing the decision-making process leading up to a care order being issued, the ECtHR have 
given the domestic authorities what is basically guidelines as to how they should conduct their 
decision-making process.82 Removing a child from its biological parents and depriving the 
parents of their parental rights is a hard-paternalistic decision and severe interference into the 
life of, both, the biological parents and child.83 The ECtHR emphasizes that due to its severe 
nature, a care order must be issued with weighty consideration as to what is in the child’s best 
interests. Statements from professional, laymen and witnesses may all strengthen the decision 
made by the domestic authorities. However, the domestic authorities must ensure that the 
biological parents’ interests are known, and heard, before reaching a decision.84 No one is 
infallible, which entails that decisions made in good faith may in retrospect prove to be 
                                                
82 See section 8.2 Supportive questions – discussion and concluding remarks. 
83 See section 3.2 Paternalism. 




misguided. The ECtHR have stated that the domestic authorities cannot be held accountable for 
actions taken due to genuine and reasonable concern about a child’s wellbeing (see i.a. R.K. 
and A.K. v. The UK, 2008, para.36). By stating that concerns about a child’s wellbeing justifies 
even wrongly interferences with the biological parents’ rights, the ECtHR has set a benchmark 
as to what role the child’s interests play. The child’s interests trump the biological parents’ 
rights. 
It is the domestic authorities that issue a care order, and it is the domestic authorities that decide 
what is in the child’s best interests. They do not, however, reach a decision by themselves. 
When contemplating what is in the child’s best interests, the domestic authorities rely on 
statements from professionals, laymen and witnesses.85 The ECtHR have emphasized that in 
order for a decision pertaining to care orders to be justified, the domestic authorities must have 
included the biological parents in the decision-making process to an extent that their interest 
are known (See i.a. McMichael v. The UK, 1995, para.87, and Kutzner v. Germany, 2002, 
para.56). What is considered to be in the child’s best interests varies across Contracting States. 
Culture, religion and traditions all play a role in deciding what is in the child’s best interests 
(Burman, 2003, Skivenes, 2010, p.2). 
The ECtHR reiterates time and again that it is not a substitute for domestic authorities. The 
Courts role is to review decisions made by domestic authorities in light of the ECHR, to 
potentially unveil any infractions on the convention (see i.a. Johansen v. Norway, 1996, para.64, 
and R. and H. v. The UK, 2011, para.81). In other words, whether to issue a care order is up to 
the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation.86 
Viewing the argumentation used by the ECtHR in their assessments, the argumentation used to 
support the biological parents differs from the one used to support the children. When arguing 
favorably towards the biological parents, the ECtHR use an overweight of legal arguments. 87 
As aforesaid, as adults the biological parents’ rights are unquestionable. The biological parents 
are granted the rights given to them under the ECHR and domestic law. A high number of legal 
arguments indicate that when the ECtHR argue favorable towards the biological parents, they 
anchor their argumentation in the law. 
                                                
85 See section 8.2 Supportive question – discussion and concluding remarks. 
86 See section 3.3.2 Margin of appreciation. 
87 See section 7.1 Legal discourse – findings and discussion. 
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The argumentation used to support children, are more diverse. When discussing children’s 
rights, hereunder the “two-way”-rights, the ECtHR rely on arguments pertaining to the legal 
discourse. When discussing the child’s interests, the Court relies mostly on arguments 
pertaining to the ethical discourse.88  
The argumentations used to support the child’s interests are ethical. The argumentations used 
to support the parents’ rights are legal. This indicates that arguments pertaining to strong 
assessments are weightier than weak assessments.89 
In the end, when viewing how the ECtHR weigh children’s and biological parents’ rights in 
care order cases, it is clear the child’s interests surpass the biological parents’ rights. Seemingly 
it is not a question of who’s rights are weightiest, but rather what is considered to be in the 
child’s best interests. 
8.4 What may be further explored? 
The ECtHR refers to CRC. That is a fact. When looking at the judicial precedent, there were no 
references to the CRC. When referring to the CRC, do the ECtHR use the reference as an 
ornamentation to underline its views, or do the ECtHR change their view to show 
responsiveness towards the CRC? To what extent the CRC influences the ECtHR and, seen in 
light of the ECtHRs development to a more child-centric approach, has it been a development 
in the ECtHRs relation to the CRC in latter years? 
In my research I have delimitated my research to paragraphs that have created judicial 
precedent. The judicial precedent gives a good indication of the generic development of the 
care order field. It would be of interests in further studies to examine whether the judgements 
as a whole give the same indications. If one looks at all judgements as a whole, one will get a 
clearer view as to which cases have created the largest ripple-effect on the care order field, 
independent of the impact was generic or context-based. 
 
  
                                                
88 See sections 7.1 – 7.3 Legal, pragmatic and ethical discourse – findings and discussions. 
89 See table 4, section 4.1.3 
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Introduction - Readers guide to tables 
As some judgements have long names, which do not fit in the table. I therefore created a 
unique ID for each judgement. I took the first letter from the applicant, the country code and 
year, which left me with a unique, easy identifiable, case ID for each case. I.a., “Johansen v. 
Norway” 1996. Johansen – J, Norway – NO and 1996 – 96. In other words, “Johansen v. 
Norway” 1996 is shortened to JNO96. 
If a case had more than one applicant, I used the first letter from each applicant in the code 
e.g. “K. and T. v. Finland” 2001 is KTFI01. 




Appendix A: Interview guide Dean Karl Harald Søvig90 
Prior research: 
- What has Søvigs previously researched. 
- What is Søvigs experience about researching the ECtHR. 
ECtHR: 
- Who writes the judgements? 
- Openness.  
- Children’s rights in the ECtHR. 
- Parents’ rights in the ECtHR. 
- Age discrimination? 
- Who does the ECtHR factor in cultural differences? 
Children’s rights: 
- International v. national – big contrasts? 
- Previous research. 
- CRC – how is this enforced? 
- ECtHR and CRC – does the Court use CRC as reference. 
- Development in children’s rights – before and now. 
Anything else: 
- Does Søvig have any preliminary thoughts about my research? Hypotheses? 
- Anything Søvig thinks is important that I take into account in my research? 
  
                                                
90 The interview was conducted in Norwegian. The interview guide is translated from Norwegian to English for 
the readers convenience. 
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Appendix B: Presentation of the cases: 
The following is a presentation of the 44 cases that constitute the base for my research. The 
summary of each case is taken from the preparatory work done by Marit Skivenes, Karl 
Harald Søvig and their assistants in their data gathering. 
1 1987 – B. v. The United Kingdom (BUK87) 
 Care order and termination of parental access. Child adopted by foster family.  
2 1987 – H. v. The United Kingdom (HUK87) 
 Interim care order and adoption. Violation of art.8. 
3 1987 – O. v. The United Kingdom (OUK87) 
 Care orders of four siblings and termination of parental access. No violation of article 
8 (fifteen to two votes). 
4 1987 - R. v. The United Kingdom (RUK87) 
 Voluntary care order. Foster parents applied to adopt the two children but was 
dismissed. The procedures which were applied in reaching the decisions to terminate 
the applicant’s access to A and J did not respect her family life. 
5 1987 - W. v. The United Kingdom (WUK87) 
 Voluntary care order, adoption and termination of parents’ access. Violation of art. 8. 
6 1988 - Olsson v. Sweden (OSE88) 
 Violations alleged to have arisen from decision to take children into care, manner of 
its implementation and refusals to terminate care. Care orders of three children. 
7 1989 - Eriksson v. Sweden (ESE89) 
 The applicant alleged that the decision to prohibit her for an indefinite period from 
removing her daughter from the foster home, the maintenance in force of this 
prohibition for more than six years, the restrictions imposed on her access to the child 
and the Social Council’s failure to reunite the applicants violated Article 8. 
8 1992 - Margareta and Roger Andersson v. Sweden (MRSE92) 
 Care order case. Restrictions on access between mother and son taken into public 
care. 
9 1995 - McMichael v. the United Kingdom (MUK95) 
 Child was placed in care; parental access was terminated, and the child was freed for 
adoption. The applicants complained about the unfairness of the decision-making 
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processes in the children’s hearing and the lack of transparency in reports and 
documents submitted before the children’s hearing. 
10 1996 - Johansen v. Norway (JNO96) 
 The applicant alleged that the taking into care of her daughter S., the refusal to 
terminate the care and the deprivation of her parental rights and access gave rise to 
violations of Article 8. 
11 1998 - Bronda v. Italy (BIT98) 
 The applicants complained that their granddaughter had not been returned to her 
original family, contrary to what the Genoa Court of Appeal had decided. 
12 1999 – E.P. v. Italy (EIT99) 
 The applicant complained that she had been deprived of her daughter and alleged a 
violation of Article 8. 
13 2000 - Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy (SGIT00) 
 Sexual abuse while in public care. 
14 2000 - L. v. Finland (LFI00) 
 Two children were placed in public care due to the parent incapability to provide the 
stimulation necessary for growth and development, as well as basic security. No 
adoption. 
15 2001 - Gnahoré v. France (GFR01) 
 Son remained in care despite the fact that prosecution against his father had been 
dropped. No violation of art. 8. 
16 2001 - K. and T. v. Finland (KTFI01) 
 Emergency care order. 
17 2002 - Buchberger v. Austria (BAT02) 
 Two children were placed in the care of the Youth Welfare offices.  No mention of a 
care order, but custody was transferred to the Youth Welfare Offices. The applicant 
alleged that the decision given in proceedings for the transfer of custody of her sons 
T. and A. to the Youth Welfare Office violated her right to respect for her family life 
and that the proceedings leading thereto had been unfair. 
18 2002 - Kutzner v. Germany (KDE02) 
 Violation: two children was placed in unidentified foster homes due to their parents’ 
lack of intellectual capacity. Both the withdrawal of parental rights and deprivation of 
visiting rights was considered inappropriate. 
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19 2002 - P. C. and S. v. The United Kingdom (PCSUK02) 
 Mother suffering from Munchhausen Syndrome by Proxy. Child victim of induced-
illness abuse. Care order issued. Child put up for adoption. 
20 2003 - K.A. v. Finland (KFI03) 
 The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that his right to respect 
for his private and family life and home was violated on account of his children’s 
placement in public care, the decision-making procedure and the implementation of 
that care. 
21 2004 - Haase v. Germany (HDE04) 
 Violation: Withdrawal of parental rights and prohibition on access to children. 
22 2006 - H.K. v. Finland (HFI06) 
 Violations of Art. 8 (care order and access restrictions). The applicant complained 
that removing his daughter from his care was not in her best interest, and that he had 
not been heard nor been given access to his child. 
23 2006 - Moser v. Austria (MAT06) 
 The applicants complained that the transfer of custody of the second applicant to the 
Youth Welfare Office violated their right to respect for family life as guaranteed by 
Article 8. 
24 2006 - R. v. Finland (RFI06) 
 The applicant contested that there had been any legal basis for maintaining the public 
care or restricting access. The access restrictions had not been justified nor had the 
authorities actively sought to reunite the applicant with his child. 
25 2007 - Berecová v. Slovakia (BSK07) 
 The applicant’s children were placed in institutional care due to the applicant’s ill 
treatment. The applicant complained that her right to respect for her family life had 
been violated by the placement of her children in an institution. 
26 2008 - R.K. and A.K. v. The United Kingdom (RAUK08) 
 Temporary placement of a child under public care due to fears of ill-treatment by the 
parents. 
27 2008 - X. v. Croatia (XHR08) 
 Exclusion of the applicant, who had been divested of her capacity to act, from 
proceedings resulting in the adoption of her daughter. 
28 2009 - Saviny v. Ukraine (SUA09) 
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 The applicants alleged, in particular, that the placement in public care of their three 
minor children infringed their rights guaranteed by Articles 6 § 1, 8 and 14. 
29 2010 - A.D. and O.D. v. The United Kingdom (AOUK10) 
 A child was placed temporarily in care due to a parental assessment and not a risk 
assessment. A risk assessment showed that the child suffered from brittle bone 
disease and the care order was discharged. The case concerns how local authority 
failed to conduct a risk assessment. Not permanent care order was made. 
30 2010 - Dolhamre v. Sweden (DSE10) 
 Three siblings were taken into public care. The applicants complained under Article 8 
of the Convention that their right to family life had been violated by the Swedish 
authorities and courts by taking the children into public care, and keeping them there, 
as well as by refusing to allow the parents to have any contact with their children for 
prolonged periods of time, contrary to the best interest of the children, and to the 
detriment of the family unity. 
31 2011 - Aune v. Norway (ANO11) 
 Decision to deprive applicant of parental responsibilities and to authorize the 
adoption of her son by his foster parents. Son was placed in compulsory foster care 
and adopted. 
32 2011 - R. and H. v. The United Kingdom (RHUK11) 
 Adoption based on a care order. Care orders of three siblings. The applicants 
complained that the freeing order [for adoption] was a disproportionate interference 
with their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 
33 2012 - M.D. and Others v. Malta (MOMT12) 
 Automatic and perpetual deprivation of parental rights following criminal conviction 
for ill-treatment of children. Care order placing two children in an institution. 
34 2012 - V. v. Slovenia (VSI12) 
 The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the domestic 
authorities had removed X and Y and placed them in foster care without having a 
legal basis to do so and without any justified reason. The replacement of the children 
was provoked by the death of another child, where the authorities found the 
circumstances “suspicious” 
35 2012 - X. v. Slovenia (XSI12) 
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 The applicant complained that his children had been unjustifiably taken into foster 
care, that he was unable to have contact with them and that there had been undue 
delays in the related proceedings. 
36 2012 - Y.C. v. The United Kingdom (YUK12) 
 Adoption based on a care order. First an interim care order, then a placement order 
before finally an adoption. 
37 2013 - A.K. and L. v. Croatia (AKLHR13) 
 The applicant’s parental rights were divested due to her mild mental disease. Her 
child was put up for adoption. 
38 2013 - Ageyevy v. Russia (ARU13) 
 Two adopted children were placed in public care. The adoption was revoked, and 
they were refused access to their children. The case concerns the revocation of 
adoption while criminal proceedings for suspected child abuse were still pending. 
39 2013 - B. v. Romania (BRO13) 
 The applicant alleged, in particular, that the procedures by which she had been 
admitted to psychiatric institutions and her children had been taken into care had been 
unlawful. 
40 2013 - Mircea Dumitrescu v. Romania (MRO13) 
 The applicant complained about the placement of his minor child in a foster care 
center and about the refusal of the domestic authorities to release him temporarily 
from prison for family reasons. The applicant alleged that there had been interference 
with his family life on the grounds that his son had been placed in the care of social 
services and that his parental rights and responsibilities had been transferred to public 
authorities. 
41 2013 - P. and S. v. Poland (PSPL13) 
 Alleged violation of article 8 of the convention as regards the determination of access 
to lawful abortion. Court, sitting in camera, ordered the first applicant’s placement in 
a juvenile shelter as an interim measure.  
42 2013 - R.M.S. v. Spain (RES13) 
 The applicant alleged that she had been deprived of all contact with her daughter and 
separated from her without valid reason. She maintained that the administrative 
authorities had decided to place her daughter in pre‑adoption care before the domestic 
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courts had even ruled on whether she had been abandoned. Adoption based on a care 
order. 
43 2016 - Jovanovic v. Sweden (JSE16) 
 The applicant alleged, in particular, that the refusal to terminate the compulsory 
public care of her son violated her right to family life. 
44 2016 - N.P. v. The Republic of Moldova (NMD16) 
 The applicant alleged under Article 8 of the Convention that the decision to withdraw 
her parental authority and the restrictions on her visiting rights had been 
disproportionate and that the authorities had failed to make efforts to safeguard her 
right to live with her child. 
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Appendix C – Judicial references coded in more than one category91 
BUK87 KDE02
para.61 Other, court para.66 Child, court
para.63 Child, court para.67 Child, court
WUK87 para.76 Child, parent
para.62 Court, other PCSUK02
para.64 Parent, other para.116 Court, other
RUK87 para.117 Child, parent
para.64 Both, parent para.118 Child, parent, court
para.65 Court, other KFI03
ESE89 para.139 Other, both
para.58 Parent, both RAUK08
MRSE92 para.36 Court, other
para.72 Both, other XHR08
MUK95 para.47 Court, other
para.92 Court, other para.48 Parent, court
JNO96 SUA09
para.64 Court, Child para.49 Child, both
para.78 Both, Child AOUK10
BIT98 para.82 Parent, court
para.51 Both, other RHUK11
EIT99 para.73 Child, parent
para.62 Child, both para.75 Court, parent
SGIT00 para.81 Child, parent, court
para.138 Child, parent, court MOMT12
GFR01 para.27 Parent, court
para.51 Parent, other para.76 Child, both
para.59 Child, parent PSPL13
para.128 Parent, other
Judgement Judgement Paragraphs In favour of?In favour of?Paragraphs
 
                                                
91 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
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Appendix D – Cross table, finding judicial precedence92 
 
                                                
92 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
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Appendix E – List of how many judgements refers to each judgement93 
Name Being referred to Potential refferers Sum
JNO96 23 34 68 %
OSE88 23 38 61 %
KTFI01 16 29 55 %
KDE02 14 26 54 %
WUK87 22 43 51 %
RHUK11 4 12 33 %
GFR01 9 28 32 %
MUK95 11 35 31 %
SGIT00 9 30 30 %
PCSUK02 7 25 28 %
RAUK08 5 18 28 %
BUK87 11 43 26 %
MOMT12 2 8 25 %
XHR08 4 17 24 %
KFI03 5 24 21 %
YUK12 2 10 20 %
ESE89 7 37 19 %
EIT99 6 32 19 %
MAT06 3 21 14 %
PSPL13 1 7 14 %
MRSE92 5 36 14 %
SUA09 2 16 13 %
BAT02 3 27 11 %
RFI06 2 22 9 %
VSI12 1 11 9 %
HDE04 2 23 9 %
ANO11 1 13 8 %
AOUK10 1 14 7 %
RUK87 3 43 7 %
LFI00 2 31 6 %
BIT98 2 33 6 %
HFI06 1 20 5 %
HUK87 2 43 5 %
OUK87 1 43 2 %
ALHR13 0 6 0 %
ARU13 0 4 0 %
BRO13 0 5 0 %
BSK07 0 19 0 %
DSE10 0 15 0 %
JSE16 0 0 0 %
MRO13 0 2 0 %
NMD16 0 1 0 %
RES13 0 3 0 %
XSI12 0 9 0 %  
                                                
93 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
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Appendix F – List of how many judgements each judgement refers to94 
Name Refers to Potential judgements Sum
HDE04 15 20 75 %
GFR01 10 15 67 %
KDE02 11 17 65 %
PCSUK02 9 18 50 %
JNO96 4 9 44 %
HFI06 10 23 43 %
RHUK11 12 31 39 %
MUK95 3 8 38 %
MAT06 8 22 36 %
ESE89 2 6 33 %
LFI00 4 12 33 %
YUK12 11 33 33 %
DSE10 9 28 32 %
MOMT12 11 35 31 %
SGIT00 4 13 31 %
SUA09 8 27 30 %
MRSE92 2 7 29 %
NMD16 11 42 26 %
HUK87 1 4 25 %
OUK87 1 4 25 %
ALHR13 9 37 24 %
KFI03 4 19 21 %
ARU13 8 39 21 %
BIT98 2 10 20 %
OSE88 1 5 20 %
RES13 8 40 20 %
BAT02 3 16 19 %
EIT99 2 11 18 %
VSI12 5 32 16 %
KTFI01 2 14 14 %
RFI01 3 21 14 %
JSE16 6 43 14 %
XHR08 3 26 12 %
ANO11 2 30 7 %
XSI12 2 34 6 %
PSPL13 2 36 6 %
BSK07 1 24 4 %
AOUK10 1 29 3 %
BRO13 1 38 3 %
MRO13 1 41 2 %
BUK87 0 4 0 %
RAUK08 0 25 0 %
RUK87 0 4 0 %
WUK87 0 4 0 %  
                                                
94 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
150 
 
Appendix G – list of paragraphs and which judgements refers to them95 
 
                                                
95 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 











H1 - List of pro-child references96 
Judgement Paragraphs Referrals Timespan
BUK87 para.63 6 1995 - 2016
BUK87 para.77 1 2000
OSE88 para.72 1 2000
JNO96 para.64 15 2000 - 2016
JNO96 para.78 15 1999 - 2016
EIT99 para.62 1 2001
SGIT00 para.138 4 2004 - 2013
SGIT00 para.149 3 2009 - 2013
GFR01 para.59 8 2002 - 2016
KTFI01 para.151 4 2002 - 2013
KTFI01 para.154 8 2002 - 2016
KDE02 para.66 1 2004
KDE02 para.67 11 2002 - 2016
KDE02 para.76 3 2009 - 2016
PCSUK02 para.117 1 2006
PCSUK02 para.118 1 2011
KFI03 para.138 1 2006
HDE04 para.82 1 2013
SUA09 para.49 1 2012
ANO11 para.66 1 2011
RHUK11 para.73 3 2013 - 2016
RHUK11 para.81 2 2012 - 2016
MOMT12 para.76 1 2016
YUK12 para.134 1 2016
SUMMARY 24 94 1995 - 2016
Pro-child
 
                                                
96 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
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H2 - List of pro-parent references97 
Judgement Paragraphs Referrals Timespan
BUK87 para.64 3 1995 - 2013
BUK87 para.77 1 2000
HUK87 para.90 1 2004
RUK87 para.64 2 2001 - 2002
WUK87 para.63 3 1987 - 2013
WUK87 para.64 13 1987 - 2013
WUK87 para.78 1 1995
ESE89 para.58 4 1992 - 2002
ESE89 para.71 5 1992 - 2013
MRSE92 para.95 1 1996
EIT99 para.64 1 2001
EIT99 para.69 5 2002 - 2016
SGIT00 para.138 4 2004 - 2013
GFR01 para.51 2 2002 - 2004
GFR01 para.59 8 2002 - 2016
KDE02 para.76 3 2009 - 2016
PCSUK02 para.117 1 2006
PCSUK02 para.118 1 2011
HDE04 para.99 1 2009
XHR08 para.45 1 2013
XHR08 para.48 1 2013
AOUK10 para.82 1 2012
RHUK11 para.73 3 2012 - 2016
RHUK11 para.75 2 2012 - 2016
RHUK11 para.81 2 2012 - 2016
MOMT12 para.27 1 2013
PSPL13 para.128 1 2013
SUMMARY 27 72 1987 - 2016
Pro-parent
 
                                                
97 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
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H3 – list of biological family references98 
Judgement Paragraphs Referrals Timespan
BUK87 para.60 2 2001 - 2002
RUK87 para.64 2 2001 - 2002
WUK87 para.59 8 1987 - 2013
OSE88 para.59 6 1989 - 2013
OSE88 para.81 12 1992 - 2016
ESE89 para.58 4 1992 - 2002
MRSE92 para.72 2 2001 - 2002
MRSE92 para.91 3 2001 - 2013
JNO96 para.52 13 1992 - 2016
JNO96 para.78 15 1999 - 2016
BIT98 para.51 2 2001 - 2002
EIT99 para.62 1 2001
KFI03 para.92 3 2004 - 2016
KFI03 para.139 1 2016
SUA09 para.49 1 2012
SUA09 para.52 1 2016
MOMT12 para.76 1 2016
SUMMARY 17 77 1987 - 2016
Biological family
 
Appendix I – list of applications decided (2006 – 2016) 
2018 2738 1014 40023
2017 15595 1068 70356
2016 1926 993 36579
2015 2441 823 43133
2014 2388 891 83675
2013 3661 916 89740
2012 1678 1093 86201
2011 1511 1157 50677
2010 2607 1499 38576
2009 2393 1625 33067
2008 1880 1543 30163
2007 1735 1498 27059





By judgement delivered 
(excluding joined appl.)
By decision (inadmissible 
or struck out)
 
                                                
98 See Appendices, Introduction – readers guide to tables, for explanation of case ID’s. See also Appendix B for 
a complete overview of case ID’s. 
